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Chapter 1 
 
THE TRUDEAU LIBERALS IN POWER 
 
G. Bruce Doern and Christopher Stoney 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In this 2016-17 edition of How Ottawa Spends, we examine key aspects of the Liberal 
agenda as both the defeated main opposition parties, the Conservatives and the NDP, now look 
for new leaders and take their time in choosing successors who would be capable of taking on 
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. As last year’s How Ottawa Spends illustrated, the Liberal election 
campaign platform and its later first Speech from the Throne revealed a Liberal Party with a 
massively ambitious socio-economic agenda on offer, characterized by its effort to be in as many 
ways possible, the quintessentially opposite of the controlling one-man Harper Conservative 
government it had defeated (Stoney and Doern 2015, Chapter 1). 
In the immediate aftermath of the vote and of the dynamics of taking power, Canadians 
witnessed the dominance of Justin Trudeau’s own outgoing persona and style and how he was 
being seen positively both nationally and internationally. Trudeau had initially spent most of his 
time abroad on a series of meetings with massive positive media coverage in Washington, and in 
Europe but also in social media coverage. This included coverage of his government’s support for 
the admission of 25,000 Syrian refugees including Trudeau personally greeting the new arrivals at 
Toronto airport.  
 At home, Canadians, both those who voted for him but also many who did not, were 
presented with an expressive and outgoing leader in sharp contrast to the often severe and sombre 
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shadow cast by Stephen Harper’s persona and modus operandi during the previous decade. 
Trudeau and his Cabinet were now meeting publically with provincial leaders and with 
organizations representing city mayors and municipalities in ways that Harper had not and did not 
want to. Ten months after his election and well past the honeymoon stage of most freshly elected 
governments, the Trudeau Liberals were still riding high in the opinion polls.   
 In reflecting on and covering the so-called shift to Trudeau’s self-declared “sunny ways” it 
is often difficult to keep track of what more significant policy and agenda changes are and have 
been, something that How Ottawa Spends has done for almost 4 decades.  In the editors’ lead 
chapter therefore we cover four aspects of the Liberal agenda. We look first at the inaugural 
Liberal Budget including its large deficit infrastructure focus and early comments about it. We 
then examine the Liberal strategy on democratic institutions centred on electoral reform to replace 
the current first-past-the-post system. Third, we probe the complex agenda links and content 
regarding pipelines, interest group democratic pluralism and indigenous peoples. Fourth, we draw 
attention to three agenda events and pressures, national and global, that were not in the frame at 
the time of the election, the Speech From the Throne (SFT) and the Budget, but which are now 
emerging as important factors in politics and policy. These include the Fort McMurray Alberta 
fire and ecological disaster; the UK’s Brexit referendum decision to leave the European Union  
and its initial impacts, and “Trumpism”, the unprecedented chaotic, divisive and verbally abusive 
US election battle being waged by Donald Trump in the name of the Republican Party. In both the 
Brexit and Trumpism developments, there is new uncertainty for Canada and the world, to which 
Trudeau will have to react both with words and actions. These appear to be coalescing around 
changing views of the excesses of globalization and stronger concerns about free trade and free 
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trade agreements. Much depends of course on whether Trump wins the November 2016 US 
Presidential election against Hilary Clinton, a prospect that at time of writing seems unlikely but 
not impossible. 
 The final section of this chapter also highlights some of the important insights, arguments 
and findings of our contributing authors in their chapters on other key policy and agenda features 
of the early Trudeau era. Some of these are also referred to briefly in the main earlier sections of 
this chapter. 
 
THE LIBERAL AGENDA: BUDGET SPEECH 2016. 
 
Finance Minister Bill Morneau presented the first Trudeau Liberal budget on March 
22
nd
, 2016 (Department of Finance, 2016). It built on the earlier first Liberal Speech from the 
Throne (2015) tabled early in December 2015 and perhaps even more on the Liberal 2015 
election platform where planned deficits anchored around infrastructure investment demarcated 
the Liberals from the Harper Conservatives and the NDP opposition which opted for balanced 
budgets, and by implication, more austerity. This was pivotal in gaining the Liberals a resounding 
and in many ways unexpected majority government (Stoney and Doern 2015). 
 The Budget Speech developed 15 themes and realms for political-economic action and 
discourse, beginning with “help for the middle class” and ending with “a strong voice” on the 
international stage. Help for the middle class highlighted the already announced Liberal tax cuts 
for the middle class, paid for partly by “raised taxes for the top 1 per cent” (Department of 
Finance 2016, 3). Announced in the budget is the “introduction of the new Canada Child Benefit” 
cast as a “plan to help families more than any other social program since universal health care” 
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(Ibid, 3). Not mentioned in the budget speech, though it was in the earlier SFT, was the promise 
of Canada Pension Plan (CPP) reform and renewal (see Ian Lee’s detailed analysis in Chapter 10). 
The middle class was also central in the “long term growth for the middle class” theme 
that followed but which otherwise was de facto the government’s commitment to “new 
investments in infrastructure from coast to coast to coast” (Ibid 4). This was the core of the 
deficit spending and investment macro budget strategy and would amount to “$11.9 billion over 
five years” and more than $120 billion over the next decade (Ibid, 4). The investments would 
“focus on long- term value” and would focus initially on “public transit, water and wastewater 
systems, provide affordable housing, and to protect infrastructure systems from the effects of 
climate change” (Ibid 5). Fanny Demers and Michel Demers in Chapter 2 provide a detailed early 
look at the Liberal infrastructure plans and agenda, including their underlying economics but also 
governance challenges.  It is worth keeping in mind that the Harper government had also  
promised in its budgets long multi-year infrastructure investment plans both when it was running 
deficits and when it was aspiring to be a responsible balanced budget government when and if it 
was re-elected (Doern and Stoney 2014-2015; Doern, Maslove and Prince 2013).    
 These lead-off commitments in the Budget Speech were followed by measures more 
broadly aimed towards an “innovative and clean economy” and then in more detail for measures 
on “post-secondary education” (including increased Canada Student Grant amounts) and 
“investments in world-class institutions and research” including $95 million per year through 
Canada’s granting councils, but also $2 billion over 3 years for a new Post-Secondary Institutions 
Strategic Investment Fund “to modernize on-campus research, commercialization and training 
facilities” (Department of Finance 2016, 6). Commitments then follow in the Speech on “clean 
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growth and a low carbon economy” (Ibid 8) where Canada’s new stronger focus on a working 
climate change plan had already been evident, led by Trudeau as prime minister, and coordinated 
nationally and via renewed federal-provincial negotiations anchored in Environment Canada, 
already renamed Environment and Climate Change Canada. While it was infrastructure investment 
that anchored the macro fiscal deficit position of the government, there was, as seen above, 
considerable new spending of other kinds as well, including new commitments to foster “new 
relationships with Indigenous Peoples” amounting to “8.4 billion over the next five years” (Ibid 
12).     
 Interestingly and crucially, but without being covered by its own heading, the Finance 
Minister very early on in the Budget Speech stated that 
[F]ortunately, circumstances for investment are ideal… Wise management of the nation’s 
finances back in the 1990s restored Canada’s fiscal health, giving us a debt-to-GDP level 
today that is by far the lowest of any G7 country. At the same time, our interest rates have 
never been lower, so we can borrow on excellent terms—as governments are being urged 
to do by everyone from the IMF to the OECD to the G20. Our plan is reasonable and 
affordable. By the end of our first mandate, Canada’s debt-to-GDP ratio will be lower 
than it is today” (Ibid 2-3). 
  
 On the federal budget per se, the immediate issues raised by critics and observers are 
highly selective and even curiously expressed. The Economist (2016) characterized the overall 
budget with an overall label of “globalization with a human face” (Ibid 58) a phrase far removed 
from any such stated theme in the Budget per se. It also said that Trudeau and his finance minister 
“had no hesitation in keeping the lavish promises of extra spending made by their Liberal Party 
during the election campaign” (Ibid) but also that their infrastructure spending increases “wisely 
does this by boosting maintenance spending on existing facilities, while they ponder backing 
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bigger projects” (Ibid).  According to the Economist there is wisdom in the Liberal budget 
approach noting that  “most economists support deficit spending when borrowing rates are low 
and the economy is weak” but then ends its analysis with a note of caution adding that the 
“question is: will Mr. Trudeau know when to stop?” (Ibid). 
 Globe and Mail columnist Jeffrey Simpson (2016) who is sympathetic to the Liberal 
Trudeau agenda, has also raised the issue about when Trudeau will have to stop saying yes but 
relates it more to overall limits on policies that are not just spending in nature but rather to the 
normal limits of trying to please everyone, all of the time. The C.D. Howe Institute’s Craig 
Alexander emphasizes a different argument about the budget plans (Alexander 2016). He argues 
that the “2016 budget delivers on the Liberal election platform but it comes with fiscal risks” (Ibid 
1). There is, in Alexander’s view, “a real risk that the economy does not grow as fast as predicted, 
that tax revenues disappoint, that interest rates rise more than anticipated or that more spending is 
called for in future budgets. Sustained deficits can add up quickly and dramatically, which is why 
they are not sound fiscal policy” (Ibid 3). This kind of analysis, however, leaves out the crucial 
absence in public budgeting of viable ways to budget for capital assets which have long lifetimes 
and are not and should not be treated in debates and fiscal practice as just operational spending 
(Doern, Maslove and Prince 2013). 
 Still other initial commentaries in Canada on the budget were centred initially in a dispute 
between the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO), an independent entity which had battled with the 
Harper government over its budgetary accountability. The PBO took on the Trudeau government 
by arguing that its fiscal plan was less transparent, making it more difficult for parliamentarians to 
scrutinize public spending (Parliamentary Budget Office 2016a; Curry 2016). Interestingly, this 
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PBO report received major media coverage, whereas a further PBO report two weeks later 
concluded that “despite this weaker external outlook, the PBO anticipates that the combination of 
fiscal measures in Budget 2016 and accommodative monetary policy will help bolster the 
Canadian economy. PBO projects that growth in real ….GDP will rebound to 1.8 per cent in 
2016 and then rise to 2.5 per cent in 2017” (Parliamentary Budget Office 2016b). This more 
favourable PBO report received little or no media coverage.  
 The Trudeau Liberals are it seems prepared to take significant risks. But there is another 
related dynamic, certainly in the early years, that may play out in different ways. This dynamic 
centres on the fact that Trudeau, as a cure for Harper centralism and “one-man” government, has 
promised that his ministers, half men and half women for the first time in Canadian history, will 
have their own space to make decisions, and also to act and advise on the basis of good policy 
evidence. This means that some laudable decisions will be taken as ministers decide (to spend and 
regulate, or to cut spending and deregulate) but also that mistakes will be made and spenders and 
guardians will intervene and collide in the name of conflicting values and events. And eventually, 
the Prime Minister may be required to intervene and say no more often.  
 
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND ELECTORAL REFORM. 
The Liberal Speech from the Throne committed the Trudeau government to adopt its campaign 
promise that it would take action to “ensure that 2015 will be the last federal election conducted 
under the first-past-the-post voting system” (Speech From the Throne 2015, 2). Trudeau had 
already established Canada’s first ever Minister of Democratic Institutions and appointed as its 
minister Maryam Monsef, a newly elected MP from Peterborough, the youngest member of the 
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Cabinet, and a new Canadian from Afghanistan, who arrived in Canada in 1996 (ipolitics 2015). 
Her full mandate encompassed electoral and voting reform; Senate reform centred on creating a 
new non-partisan, merit-based process to advise the Prime Minister on Senate appointments; and 
the reform and strengthening of House of Commons committees (Speech from the Throne 2016, 
3). In this section, we focus only on the early work and debate on electoral reform. 
 The motion in Parliament to establish a Special Committee on electoral reform was 
appointed with a mandate to “to identify and conduct a study of viable alternative voting systems 
to replace the first-past-the-post system, as well as examine mandatory voting and online voting, 
and to assess the extent to which the options identified could advance the following principles for 
electoral reform: 
1) Effectiveness and legitimacy: that the proposed measure would increase public 
confidence among Canadians that their democratic will, as expressed by their votes, will 
be fairly translated and that the proposed measure reduces distortion and strengthens the 
link between voter intention and the election of representatives;  
2) Engagement: that the proposed measure would encourage voting and participation in 
the democratic process, foster greater civility and collaboration in politics, enhance social 
cohesion and offer opportunities for inclusion of underrepresented groups in the political 
process; 
3) Accessibility and inclusiveness: that the proposed measure would avoid undue 
complexity in the voting process, while respecting the other principles, and that it would 
support access by all eligible voters regardless of physical or social condition;  
4) Integrity: that the proposed measure can be implemented while safeguarding public 
trust in the election process, by ensuring reliable and verifiable results obtained through an 
effective and objective process that is secure and preserves vote secrecy for individual 
Canadians; 
5) Local representation: that the proposed measure would ensure accountability and 
recognize the value that Canadians attach to community, to Members of Parliament 
understanding local conditions and advancing local needs at the national level, and to 
having access to Members of Parliament to facilitate resolution of their concerns and 
participation in the democratic process; and 
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that the Committee be directed to issue an invitation to each Member of Parliament to 
conduct a town hall in their respective constituencies and provide the Committee with a 
written report of the input from their constituents to be filed with the Clerk of the 
Committee no later than October 14, 2016 (House of Commons, Journals, June 7, 2016) 
 
The alternatives that will be explored include: preferential voting, proportional voting 
but also in the context of possible mandatory voting and online voting and the Trudeau 
government says that it is “confident that multiple reform options (are) possible without 
constitutional negotiations” (Democratic Institutions 2016, 3). The government had also not 
expressed a specific preferred option of its own in advance. The future politics of the electoral 
reform issue was given an early preview in the new minister’s second question period encounter in 
the House of Commons, when a Conservative opposition MP, Blake Richards, asked her whether 
once the proposed new electoral system has been designed “will the government hold a 
referendum on that proposed system? Yes or no.” (Quoted in Wherry 2016, 1). The minister 
declined to answer. The Conservatives aimed to embarrass the government because in all 
probability they themselves were most supportive of the status quo electoral system.  In addition 
they were not on solid ground on the referendum option because when they were a new Party, 
and then a new Harper government advocating an elected Senate, they did not argue for a 
referendum in spite of sending up a trial-balloon to explore this option. Moreover, they did not 
have a convincing answer when the Minister later noted that giving women the vote early in the 
20
th
 century was surely a major decision in electoral reform and that it did not involve a 
referendum. 
 The structure of the House committee on electoral reform soon became an  
issue partly because there was no rule that stated the government had to accept its 
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recommendations. Andrew Coyne (2016) observed accurately that the Liberals initially wanted 
their own way on how to proceed but then they agreed to establishing a committee that the 
Liberals knew they would not control. There are four Liberals on the committee (including its 
chair), but also three Conservatives, two NDP members, and one each from the Bloc Quebecois 
and the Green Party. Coyne thus observes that the “committee on electoral reform (is) now a 
working model of proportional representation” (Ibid 1) and thus as a “practical matter, that means 
the Liberals cannot force the committee to adopt a given plan on the strength of their own votes 
alone. That was always unlikely: for a government to unilaterally alter something as fundamental 
as the voting system, without the support of any other party, would be so contrary to the laws of 
political warfare as to poison the rest of this Parliament” (Ibid 2). 
 Other expert commentators such as Paul Thomas (2016) have stressed also that changing 
the electoral system is never simple, given its intricate partisan calculus. Similar views also 
emerged in earlier 21
st
 century assessments of why so many Canadian provinces launched electoral 
reform with very mixed results in the last twenty years (Cross 2005). These kinds of assessment 
also include analysis of why electoral reform failed, including Ontario’s 2007 referendum on 
electoral reform which failed after a Citizen’s Assembly had worked for months, with the result 
being the retention of the first-past-the-post-system (LeDuc, Bastedo and Baquero 2008).       
 Thus it very much remains to be seen whether the electoral reform and political 
commitment that the 2015 election would be the last to be based on the first-past-the post system 
will be kept. It is highly likely, given all the things that might and might not happen regarding the 
Liberal mandate, that the final decision on electoral reform will be made in some key sense by 
Justin Trudeau on his own. The odds still favour reform and that such reform is needed in 
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Canada’s democracy but it is not guaranteed. 
PIPELINES, DEMOCRATIC INTEREST GROUP PLURALISM, AND 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
 
Electoral democracy is not the only form and type of democratic renewal that is on the 
Trudeau agenda. We look briefly at this part of the Liberal plan and the different kind 
of combined ways pipelines, democratic interest group pluralism and Indigenous Peoples 
democratic governance has emerged. We also address some of the ways that the Liberals may 
make some progress but also suffer setbacks including those that arise because of the fact that 
final energy pipeline decisions to proceed rest with the federal government and in these pipeline 
contexts, de facto with Prime Minister Trudeau.  
 Four policy/agenda trajectories have now been triggered. First, in its election platform 
(Liberal Party of Canada 2015) the Liberals promised “a renewed relationship with Indigenous 
Peoples” via a “new nation to nation process” that covered several overall socio-economic and 
democratic policy fields (Ibid 46-48). Pipelines were not mentioned in this election platform 
section. Second, pipelines and related issues overall of democratic interest group pluralism and its 
serious weakening in the Harper era featured in the Liberal agenda. This is shown in the analysis 
in Chapter 6 by Glen Toner, David Cherniak and Kevin Force who trace how energy, 
environment and climate change as intersecting realms needed both policy and democratic renewal 
as the Liberals took power. Third, the pipeline agenda was more explicitly joined in June 2016 
when six Liberal ministers jointly announced a series of public consultations that would provide 
public reviews of environmental assessments, and the National Energy Board (NEB) (Canadian 
Press 2016a). Fourth, on June 30
th
 the Federal Court of Appeal overturned the Northern Gateway 
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pipeline approval on the grounds that “the Canadian government had neglected to consult with 
First Nations by ignoring many of the project’ s impacts which were left undisclosed” (Canadian 
Press 2016b, 1). 
 The six minister initiative, as per their mandate letters from the prime minister, involves 
two House of Commons committees to study protection for fisheries and for navigable waters. 
Separate expert panels will also examine the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act and the 
National Energy Board. The overall Liberal argument is that these were all in their own way 
weakened greatly in the Harper era via its responsible resource development ethos which strongly 
favoured pipeline development via speedier business and industry crafted regulation and which, 
from 2012 on in particular, was also accompanied by Harper government attacks on 
environmental groups. Other review and reform analysis had also called for reform from longer 
term assessment of the performance of environmental assessment regulators and the NEB (Doern, 
Auld and Stoney 2015, chapters 4 and 5; Doern, Prince and Schultz 2014, 125-137). These were 
in democratic terms centred on the rights and responsibilities regarding social and also economic 
interest groups functioning in public interest-oriented pluralist democratic fora. These processes 
needed to be re-anchored in evidence and science-based processes and accountability (Doern, 
Castle and Phillips 2016; Doern and Kinder 2007).  
 The court decision on the Enbridge $7.9 billion Northern Gateway pipeline project was 
the latest in its developmental saga (Proctor 2016; Canadian Press 2016b). The Calgary company 
had 31 aboriginal equity partners and so there was some built in aboriginal support including from 
nations that were supportive because of its efforts in earlier NEB and Canadian Environmental 
Assessment agency joint processes leading up to its federal approval in 2014. Given the complex 
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209 conditions of approval, Enbridge asked the NEB for a three-year extension to the initial 2016 
construction deadline. But seven B.C. First Nations which were parties to the court appeal 
opposed the pipeline and had from the outset because of its adverse environmental impacts on the 
waterways in their traditional territory that would be used by tankers to further transport the oil to 
international markets. Another key factor in the story at present is that Prime Minister Trudeau’s 
2015 election campaign commitment included a formal banning of tanker traffic on the north 
coast of British Columbia.  
 The pipelines story in energy and environmental policy terms evokes interest group 
pluralism as democratic theory and practice. But of course Canada’s First Nations have 
constitutional rights as nations and are thus not just another interest group, though they 
undoubtedly feel like one on many occasions and situations. And of course, as noted above, First 
Nations can be on both sides of any given question rather than being a one party interest. Recent 
studies by academics and think tanks have brought out convincingly the need for deeper 
involvement by First Nations in the context of the overall dilemmas and multi-level and spatial 
regional location of environmental, climate change, energy and natural resource development 
projects, and evidence (science-based and precautionary). The analysis by Noble (2016) of eight 
policy case studies across Canada argues in part for the need for regional assessments by 
governments that are more comprehensive, rather than being triggered by a given project.  
Related analyses by Maclean (2016) and Hughes (2016) also argue for more 
comprehensive scope and governance change, the former based on root and branch change in 
Canada’s weakened environmental governance system, and the latter arguing increasingly that in 
the choice between pipelines and reduced carbon emissions, you can increasingly choose one but 
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not both. A further recent study by Cleland, Nourallah and Fast (2016) focusses on how to 
understand local communities’ trust and confidence in energy authorities. Among its findings are 
that “there is a lack of adequate forums for community involvement and a lack of adequate and 
accessible information, all well upstream of individual project applications and regulatory 
decisions, often involving regional level, multi-project and long-term considerations” (Ibid 2). 
  
DEALING WITH CHALLENGES AND CHOICES, NATIONAL AND GLOBAL: 
THE FORT MCMURRAY FIRE, BREXIT AND TRUMPISM 
 
As is always the case, governments new and mid-term have to deal with other challenges and 
choices not of their own making both with regard to what to say and what to do about socio-
economic problems and events.  In this regard, we look briefly at: the massive Fort McMurray 
fire in Alberta that dominated the national agenda in May 2016; Britain’s Brexit referendum 
decision on June 23
rd
 2016 to leave the European Union and its raucous political aftermath; and 
Trumpism, the media blizzard of belligerent talk, anger and anti-immigrant racism uttered by 
Donald Trump and his successful celebrity campaign to become the Republican Party’s leader and 
to battle with Democrat Hilary Clinton in the November 2016 US Presidential election.   
 The Fort McMurray fire was a massive fire feeding off tinder dry Alberta forests that 
suddenly engulfed the city of 70,000, a population that had doubled in the previous 15 years and 
that symbolized the booming Alberta oil sands, as oil industry workers and their families came 
from all over Canada and also from a large migrant and immigrant population from around the 
world. As its population rushed to escape the fire, their rescue and survival was the political and 
human focus of Albertans and the Alberta government but also garnered responses of concern and 
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support from across Canada and indeed globally under massive media coverage (Markusoff, 
Macdonald and Gillis 2016; Levin and Austen 2016). The rescue was perilously successful but at 
present policy and funding is focussed on rebuilding the city, large parts of which were destroyed. 
 The political socio-economic intricacies of the disaster and its aftermath are complex but 
also likely to be pivotal in the near term future. In Alberta, it brought largely positive political 
attention to NDP Premier Rachel Notley, who had lead her party to a historic election victory a 
year earlier and ended 50 years of Conservative Party rule. In her first year, she was dealing with 
a serious decline in the Alberta oilsands and oil industry due to falling international oil prices. Her 
personal relationship with Justin Trudeau was a positive and mutually supportive one before the 
fire and after it. She was earning strong approvals for her leadership and competence a year after 
her election victory (Mason 2016) although economic challenges and striking a balance with 
environmental concerns in an oil rich province will continue to make this a difficult balancing act. 
Just before the fire in late April 2016, she had met with the entire Trudeau Liberal Cabinet 
in Kananaskis Alberta when she sought approval for her case for the Energy East pipeline (Dyer 
2016). She was a supporter of stronger climate change policy in Alberta and Canada but in the 
context of reasonable oil sands development because the latter was crucial for garnering the 
needed provincial revenues and continuing better employment in the Alberta economy. Trudeau 
and Notley sought out a much less partisan relationship than had been true in recent decades. But 
both were also conscious of the fact that federal conservatives and Alberta’s Wildrose party (the 
official opposition in Alberta) and the Alberta Conservatives, now the “third” party in Notley 
governed Alberta were plotting to unite the latter two parties into a new Conservative Party to 
hopefully win the next Alberta election in 2019. But this means reading the political tea leaves in 
16 
 
modern urban Alberta where political futures may be less easy to design, imagine and predict.  
Views about links between oil companies, climate change and the cause of the Fort McMurray 
fires were also now becoming more explicit (Lukacs 2016) though they were by no means the 
majority view. 
 Brexit refers to the British referendum debate and decision as to whether Britain should 
leave the European Union or remain in it. The June 23
rd
 vote resulted in a narrow 52 to 48 
percent decision to leave the EU. It resulted in the immediate resignation of Conservative Prime 
Minister David Cameron. He had called for a referendum mainly to appease a small set of his Tory 
Eurosceptic MPs but of course he planned for a positive “remain” verdict. It was a self-inflicted 
political debacle. In the weeks following the vote it was political anarchy of biblical proportions as 
Tory ministers on both sides of the question pilloried each other and/or rushed to resign. The 
already strong splits in the opposition Labour Party were exacerbated, and new coalitions across 
parties were advocated to advance/restore national unity, especially in the name of the 48 percent 
remainers. The liberal Economist publication which supported the remain side pronounced the 
referendum result  as “divided we fall” (Economist 2016b) and the political debacle afterwards as 
“anarchy in the UK” Economist 2016c). Less than three weeks later Britain had a new 
Conservative Prime Minister, Theresa May, who had been a remainer but had not campaigned 
much for the remain side. As PM she promises to implement the Brexit verdict and produce a 
“better Britain” but in a Tory majority House of Commons where a large majority of Conservative 
MPs were and are remainers and a minority are leavers. And it remains the case that no one has 
yet developed a coherent or considered view about what a post-Brexit deal and world will look 
like and consist of. 
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 The Brexit referendum campaign had brought out deep-seated features of division that 
crossed party lines and reflected conflicts: between elites and the rest of the population; 
the poor and disadvantaged and the rich in an era of UK austerity policy: the UK as a whole 
versus Scotland, the latter voting strongly for remain; priorities regarding national values; 
restoring national identity, control and independence, with issues frequently tied to opposition to 
immigration (O’Connor and Vina 2016; Colley 2016) and thinly veiled racist views as exhibited by 
the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and its leader Nigel Farage who was an elected 
member of the European Parliament.  In a sense both the leave and remain sides wanted to retain 
or renegotiate access to the large European market but without the migration and immigration 
freedom to move requirements that were at the heart of the EU. 
During the debate and after it attention was drawn to other possible models for a new UK-
Europe access model, including the Norway model (Chu 2016), the Swiss model; and the Canada-
EU model as per the continuing Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) trade 
deal 5 years in the making and nearing completion.  In many ways, Brexit involved the need to 
negotiate over several years at least six difficult deals each of which would impact the others, 
economically and politically, with regard to whether they impacted services, the core of the 
British economy vis- a-vis Europe and vis- a-vis London’s global banking and financial services 
industry (Grant 2016; Rankin 2016). 
 Meanwhile the EU (and the Euro Zone) was dealing with its own problems of unity and 
the state of its democracy in an era of uncontrolled global migration and refugee movements from 
Middle East conflicts mainly, including Syria.  As it voted to leave the EU Britain continued to 
make new pro-Europe arrangements and had to deal with 27 other EU members including 
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Germany and France whose leaders were the defacto power centres that drove key EU decisions 
more often than not. Deep down in the inner reaches of the debate was the view that the EU for 
all its faults had above all been the institutional leader that had prevented European wars, a much 
better result than the decades of war that had raged in Europe in the first half of the 20
th
 century 
and was in that respect still very much needed now. 
 Canadians and the Trudeau government were left to watch in bewilderment at the Brexit 
events and debates. For the most part, they support the remain option for the UK and do not want 
the EU harmed or weakened, in spite of being unaware of exactly how it works or what kind of 
democracy it produces. The most likely post-Brexit explicit impact on Canada and on the Trudeau 
agenda and strategizing will centre on trade policy overall and on CETA. Trade policy overall 
refers to the fact that the UK will be seeking above noted new trade agreements with more than 
just the EU. It may want a direct UK-US free trade agreement because the UK already is its 6
th
 
largest trading partner (Canada is the first leading trade partner for the US). But any US-UK 
agreement would affect Canada-US markets in competitive terms, for good or ill. 
Signed between the EU and Canada last year after a very secret negotiation process, 
CETA may now face serious final obstacles both as it is reviewed for approval in 27 EU countries 
but also by the UK as the 28
th
 member which is not yet out of the EU but which will be relating 
CETA terms, strengths and weaknesses to its new post-Brexit trade agenda. There are numerous 
provisions in CETA that will not meet EU approval and also the possibility of fast passage by the 
EU may no longer be acceptable in the post-Brexit context (Brunsden and Barker 2016; Dearden 
2016). The new Trudeau government International Trade Minister, Chrystia Freeland, has 
supported the CETA deal but other informed analysts such as Thomas Walkom (2016) think that 
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she is seriously underestimating the problems ahead concerning the EU.  
 The potential ultimate impact of Trumpism in US politics will not be known until the 
November 2016 presidential election battle between Donald Trump and Hilary Clinton is decided 
by American voters. A large majority of Canadians and the Trudeau government will be devoutly 
hoping for a Clinton victory but in the meantime have to prepare in some way for what a Trump 
Republican presidency or a Hilary Clinton presidency and the new post-election composition of 
both houses in the US Congress might involve in both policy and political terms. 
 Trumpism as a socio-political phenomenon has been the quintessential “in your face” TV, 
print media and social media reality for Canadians who are continually bombarded with US media. 
 Analyses of Trumpism are numerous with David Tabachnick’s portrayal pinning it down to four 
interacting characteristics: “celebrity; nativism; the outsider, and populism” (Tabachnick 2016). 
Celebrity refers to Trump’s business and media CEO fame and arrogance. Nativism refers to his 
“Making America Great Again” banner and his “conspiratorial fear of foreigners” (Ibid 1) hence 
his pledge to build a wall along the Mexican border, to deport all illegal immigrants, and to ban all 
Muslim immigration. The outsider notion crafts strong views about Trump as an anti-
establishment figure but also because he is a rich businessman he is also an “insider-outsider” 
(Ibid). Populism is also central as Trump “relies on the rhetoric of resentment but is thin on 
specifics” (Ibid).  
Disgruntled white males have been attracted to him particularly because of the above 
features and the overt and latent racism. But the male protest base is a complicated one. 
Many have genuinely lost out in the last decade or more, perhaps due to free trade impacts or 
perhaps also due to technological change. Others are entertained by Trump both at his campaign 
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rallies and his media performances where he both uses and attacks the media.  Others have looked 
at whether Trump has an ideology and concluded that it is hard to find, though on matters of 
international trade he seems to favour attacks on recent liberalized trade agreements such as 
NAFTA because the rules are unfair to America and its workers and businesses are losing out. 
But he seems not to have a good grasp of markets per se in spite of his purported business 
acumen. As Tucker (2016) points out, as a self-styled CEO businessman who “competes and 
wins”, he wants to beat the competition, which is other countries. Thus, “he speaks of the United 
States as if it were one thing, one single firm. A business” (Ibid 2) when in fact it clearly is not. 
 Trumpism is already very real internationally in some political senses. The label was 
applied to some of the anti-immigration and racist features of the UK Brexit debate and impacts 
(Judah 2016; Colley 2016). Within the US there are genuine concerns about what it already means 
for American democracy and governance whether Trump wins or not (Bacevitch 2016; Draper 
2016; Cassidy 2016) but of course even more compellingly if he does. In policy terms, Canadian 
debate has speculated mainly on possible impacts on NAFTA where Trump has stated that he 
wants to renegotiate the agreement with Canada and Mexico to get a better deal for American 
workers (Gollom 2016). The initial media commentary has focussed on whether a President 
Trump would have “the power to just tear up the agreement” (Ibid 1) since aspects of the US 
process in getting NAFTA approved were partly under the President’s powers and partly via 
Congressional approval. The response in Canada to Trumpism and to possible trade implications, 
or also to appeals to Canada by Mexico for help and support, is unlikely to become a partisan 
issue fuelled by the federal Conservatives (Martin 2016) or by the NDP. If Hilary Clinton wins 
there also may be NAFTA trade issues to deal with because in the Democratic Party’s election 
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campaign criticism of NAFTA has emerged as a fairly central part of the Bernie Saunders 
candidacy against Clinton but which is now in the Clinton-led campaign agenda.   
 The above three kinds of future agenda known unknowns are in one sense normal for new 
governments and for established ones but there will be others for the Trudeau Liberals, including 
some embedded in their own mandate agenda items, as revealed also by our contributing authors. 
 
RELATED CONTRIBUTING AUTHOR ANALYSES 
 
 
Our expert authors offer informed and considered views about  policy and budgetary realms in the 
emerging Trudeau and national agenda (as will other authors in the coming 2017-18 and 2018-19 
editions that lead into the 2019 federal election). We preview several other analyses in the 
chapters that follow. 
 Fanny Demers and Michel Demers in Chapter 2 take an early informed view on Liberal 
infrastructure policy and spending. It offers views about the economic impact of infrastructure 
investment on productivity and growth. They agree that the financing of infrastructure spending 
through deficit financing at a time of economic slack is optimal given low interest rates. They 
examine the value of a two-phase plan being advocated but also stress the need to avoid the 
pitfalls of distributive politics through closer attention to key features of governance and 
accountability.The pros and cons of using the public-private partnership (PPP) model are 
examined for the delivery of infrastructure projects and the delivery of public services. Also 
explored are other financing options such as asset recycling and the planned creation of a 
Canadian Infrastructure Bank. 
 In Chapter 3, John Lester makes the case for why Canada needs an entrepreneurship 
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policy rather that a small business policy.  He argues that small business has a well-deserved 
reputation as the engine of job growth and a key contributor to innovation in Canada but that 
unfortunately, a large fraction of Canada’s spending on small business is wasted. He argues that 
overall, “a better approach would be to focus policies on ensuring that innovative startups do not 
face any unwarranted barriers to entry and growth. The intermediate result would be fiscal 
savings, higher-quality entrepreneurship and a more innovative economy. The ultimate impact 
would be a more prosperous Canada”. 
 The Michael Prince and Pamela Moss analysis in Chapter 4 looks at Liberal plans for a 
Canadians With Disabilities Act. They show how Minister Qualtrough as Minister of Sport and 
Persons with Disabilities will need to reconcile three sets of structural tensions within three 
powerful discourses and that managing the fractious relationships across groups will need a 
deep understanding of, and sensitivity to, how to make sense of disability itself.  They argue 
that the “enthusiastic optimism of Prime Minister Trudeau and his Liberal government is a 
refreshing respite from the years of austerity talks. …unfortunately, we cannot be as enthusiastic 
or optimistic that sunny days are the forecast for persons with disabilities in Canada. They are 
“Encouraged? Yes. Confident? No. Hopeful? Cautiously so”.  
In Chapter 5, David Castle and Peter Phillips probe the potential for a “new innovation 
agenda”, proposed by the Liberals, given the current conditions for STI left by the Harper and 
earlier Chrétien -Martin governments. The Trudeau Liberals have inherited this situation, but 
Castle and Philips show that thus far it “speaks primarily to their intended style of government”. 
The Liberals propose to change how government works by focusing on government-by-cabinet, 
re-establishing the position of Chief Science Advisor, a commitment to science-based evidence, 
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horizontal collaboration between ministries and departments, and public mandates for ministers 
that make clear the intention of government to put resources into policy areas that are either 
focused directly on or underpin the core STI effort. They argue that it is “too soon to tell whether 
their style of government will mean the continuation of the current conditions for STI, or a 
transition to a new policy”. The authors also stress that “given the importance of growing the 
knowledge economy, remaining internationally competitive, and acknowledging higher rates of 
inflation in R&D than other parts of the economy, chronic underfunding of research has become a 
localized structural deficit”. 
The analysis by Glen Toner, David Cherniak and Kevin Force in Chapter 6 examines the 
the Liberal Energy and Climate Agenda. They ask whether the Trudeau government in its first 
year in power, “has begun to walk the talk of sustainable development (SD) by instituting a more 
equitable balance in the energy/environment domain”. They argue that it is too early to answer the 
question definitively, but that the tone and substance of the ministerial mandate letters, the 
financial commitments made in the budget to support climate change initiatives and low carbon 
energy systems “suggest the Liberals are following through on their campaign commitments”. 
The tone and substance of engagement with the provinces/territories and cities and the broader 
policy community including Indigenous Peoples is “a stark rebalancing of the energy/environment 
domain” compared to the Harper era. Regarding multiple pipeline decisions, the analysis 
suggests that the Liberals will support some but also that “the Liberal cabinet will face tough 
decisions which may generate the support of governments in the producer provinces but also 
stir opposition in major cities and local communities along the projects and in at least part of 
the broader scientific and environmental community. The Liberals will not be able to please 
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everyone with the outcomes of these decisions regardless of the degree of inclusiveness of 
the process”. 
R. Paul Wilson in Chapter 7 looks at a largely unexamined but very important aspect of  
 
of the management of politics regarding the inter-executive activity of ministerial advisors in the 
Government of Canada. While specifically examining a single point in time under the government 
of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Wilson’s analysis reveals significant parallels in ministerial 
policy staffers' horizontal activities with documented practice elsewhere.  At the same time, 
however, it suggests caution with respect to generalization.  Practice in Canada, moreover, 
differed under Harper from that under previous prime ministers; but there was even variation 
within the Conservatives' decade in power.  Wilson argues that “many factors, including the prime 
minister's personal style, the parliamentary context, the overall government culture and its 
relationship with the public service, impact the role of ministers and therefore the role of 
ministerial staff.  While it can be predicted that ministerial staff will use networks and relationships 
to pursue political goals, how they do so is very much context specific”.   
 Chapter 8 looks at the prospect of the Liberals achieving a targeted federal transfer for 
mental health. Mary Bartram’s detailed analysis traces these prospects in the light of the roots of 
fiscal federalism and the federal spending power and later health-related fiscal federalism. Her 
analysis shows early criticism in Parliament and elsewhere of the historic failure to directly fund 
mental health. The chapter then explores more recent history extending to the very recent past 
and shows further federal neglect and related disproportionate gaps in mental health funding due 
to shifts in the overall structure and nature of fiscal transfers in public health. The final 
conclusions of the chapter then offer a political analysis for the early Trudeau era arguing that the 
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near-term prospects for a targeted mental health transfer are good and maybe even strong but also 
conditional. It also offers brief discussion of the forms that such a transfer could take in the 
current context. 
 Karine Levasseur offers an in-depth analysis in Chapter 9 of Liberal policies for renewal 
and support to registered charities which had been, in the view of many, excessively politicized 
by the previous Harper government. She sees some hopeful signs of progress including the 
announced consultations on this Canada Revenue Agency-centred activity. But she also concludes 
that Canada is a laggard on the international scene and needs “changes to the rules far beyond 
mere clarification of the existing rules” and thus the government should look in depth “at other 
common law countries and how they modernized charity policy”. 
In Chapter 10, Ian Lee examines key issues in Canada Pension Plan enhancement in the 
context of historic evidence about the adequacy of the Canadian Retirement Income System 
(RIS). The three versus four pension pillars of the RIS are mapped and the issue of whether 
personal investments outside of registered plans ought to be included or excluded when analyzing 
adequacy of the RIS are examined as are the alleged inadequacies of the CPP. Lee then looks at 
the introduction in 2014-15 of the proposed Ontario Registered Pension Plan (ORPP) on the 
assumption of serious pension savings inadequacies which had a direct political impetus in the 
quick and the unexpected CPP agreement of June 2016 between the Trudeau Liberal government 
via Finance Minister Bill Morneau (a pensions expert) and 8 of 10 provinces. Lee concludes that 
the CPP reform agreement of 2016 was not designed to help existing retirees nor those near 
retirement. Rather the new CPP reforms were designed primarily to benefit millennials and Gen X 
people who will be retiring many years in the future.  Unfortunately, public debate mostly ignored 
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the unprecedented intergenerational wealth transfer that will take place over the next 10 to 30 
years as the parents of the boomers pass on followed by the boomers. For these and other 
reasons, Lee concludes that the Canada Pension Plan remains a work in progress. 
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Chapter 2 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY AND SPENDING: AN INITIAL LOOK AT THE 
TRUDEAU LIBERAL PLAN
1
  
 
Fanny Demers and Michel Demers 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Infrastructure investment, viewed as an engine of growth and a means of improving both 
productivity and welfare is a cornerstone of the newly-elected Liberal government’s 
economic policy platform as well as its first budget, Budget 2016: Growing the Middle 
Class. 
In Canada as in other advanced economies, public investment as a share of GDP has 
fallen substantially during the last decades
2
. Aging infrastructure and inadequate 
maintenance have led to a significant deterioration of the public capital stock with an 
ensuing loss of productivity. At the same time with population aging and environmental 
concerns such as climate change, new needs for public infrastructure have arisen, while 
public investment has not kept pace. In the past decades, various federal governments have 
addressed the issue with varying degrees of success and effort (Doern, Auld and Stoney, 
2015)
3
.  
In this chapter, we first examine the economic impact of infrastructure investment 
on productivity and growth as well as the empirical evidence with respect to its quantitative 
impact. We note that the overall impact of public investment tends to be larger (1) when 
there is economic slack, (2) monetary policy is accommodative, (3) public investment is 
efficient, and (4) debt finance is used. The financing of infrastructure spending mainly 
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through deficit financing at a time of substantial economic slack is optimal given low 
interest rates. 
Secondly, we present and analyse the features of the Liberal government’s two-
phased (Phase 1 and Phase 2) and three-pronged infrastructure plan according to which new 
infrastructure spending will be allocated over the next ten years to public transit, social and 
green infrastructure investment. Thirdly, in view of the large infrastructure projects that are 
envisaged, especially during Phase 2 of the Liberal government’s infrastructure plan, we 
argue that project efficiency, good governance and oversight will be paramount in securing 
the anticipated economic, social and environmental benefits of this plan for all Canadians, 
and avoid the pitfalls of  distributive politics.
4
 In this vein, we outline the best practices that 
need to be followed to ensure the success of the projects undertaken. We then present a 
brief synopsis of the pros and cons of the public-private partnership (PPP) model for the 
building of infrastructure projects and the delivery of public services. 
Finally, we also discuss alternative financing options such as asset recycling and the 
planned creation of a Canadian Infrastructure Bank. In order to benefit from these financing 
arrangements, public investment efficiency and sound governance will be essential.  
 
 
THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Economic benefits 
 
Infrastructure has usually been provided by the government or public-private partnerships 
for several reasons. First, since the social benefits of public capital exceed the private 
benefits a sub-optimal level of infrastructure investment will result if left to private interests 
alone. Secondly, infrastructure investments typically consist of large scale, capital-intensive 
projects such as highways, bridges, harbors and airports, water and sewage treatment, and 
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transit systems that require substantial initial disbursements by the provider while at the 
same time, the uncertain returns are reaped over a long horizon lasting many decades. 
These features constitute important challenges for the private sector, leaving public 
procurement as the likely option. 
Since the stock of public capital is a complementary input in the firm’s production 
function, infrastructure spending raises the productivity of other inputs such as private 
capital and labour thus lowering unit production costs thereby leading ceteris paribus to 
higher output.
5
 In addition to this direct effect, there is also an indirect impact: 
infrastructure spending leads to adjustments in inputs such as labour and private capital. 
Infrastructure stimulates private capital formation by increasing the marginal productivity 
of private capital and thus the rate of return. It also lowers investment adjustment costs and 
hence the costs of investing.
6
 For example, reduced highway congestion lowers the costs of 
carrying heavy equipment and materials for building a new factory, thus inducing greater 
investment.  In view of the complementarity of inputs, employment also rises.  
Economic geography arguments emphasize that greater public investment in 
transport infrastructure enables producers to cluster, thus leading to greater specialization, 
economies of scale and innovation. (de Haan, Romp and Sturm (2007) and Venables 
(2016)). By reducing commuting time, they also decrease worker fatigue, enhance labour 
productivity and welfare. 
Infrastructure investment also has indirect effects on productivity and growth 
through another important channel, namely through its beneficial impact on health. Thus, 
for example, Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) find that access to clean water and 
sanitation infrastructure have important health benefits, substantially reducing child 
mortality, increasing life-expectancy, improving school attendance, leading to greater 
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productivity. Their study based on an endogenous growth model that also takes into 
account the rival use of public funds, demonstrates that this indirect channel of 
infrastructure investment may have a sizeable impact on growth. 
In the long-run, provided public investment is efficient, a larger infrastructure 
capital stock contributes to raising the productive capacity of the economy and potential 
output. Clearly, a well-maintained, durable, stock of infrastructure is essential in order to 
reap these benefits. In fact, a greater flow of infrastructure services may be obtained not 
only by building new infrastructure but also by spending adequately on operations and 
maintenance so as to preserve the quality of the existing infrastructure.
7
  Maintenance 
expenditures not only extend the durability of public capital but also increase the efficiency 
and durability of private capital making more funds available for private investment thus 
enhancing growth. (Rioja (2003) and Calderón and Servén (2004)).
8
 
Furthermore, the import-leakage of infrastructure projects are low, since mostly 
domestic inputs are utilized, an important consideration given the depreciation of the 
Canadian dollar. 
 
Quantitative effects 
 
While the economic benefits of infrastructure are clear, measuring its quantitative 
economic impact, that is, the multiplier effect on output of a one-dollar increase in 
infrastructure investment, has been the subject of some controversy and of a large literature.   
 
Budget 2016 (p. 255) distinguishes between housing investment measures and 
infrastructure investment. The multiplier for infrastructure investment alone is estimated to 
be 0.9 in 2016-17 and 1.4 in 2017-18. Its impact on real GDP is estimated to be 0.2% and 
0.4% respectively for these fiscal years (p. 256). The type of expenditures that fall under 
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housing investment are also part of Phase 1. (p. 257) Table 1 shows the estimates for both 
types of spending. 
 
TABLE 1 
 
 
 
  Source: Budget 2016, p.255-57    
 
 
In order to gauge the plausibility of these estimates, it is useful to briefly review the 
different methods that have been used to assess the magnitude of the economic impact of 
public spending, and the results that have been obtained.  
The quantitative economic impact of infrastructure spending has been estimated 
using various methods. Relying on static single equation estimation of a production 
function, Aschauer’s (1989) pioneering study found an implausibly large value for the 
output elasticity of public capital implying that public investment would pay for itself three 
times in the form of additional tax revenues. Although some studies obtained similar 
values, issues of reverse causality (that is, higher output leading to greater infrastructure 
spending)
9
 and non-stationarity put these estimates in doubt. Estimations based on 
multivariate cost functions yielded lower values but they were plagued with similar 
problems, and they ignored dynamic feedback effects, that is, the important indirect effect 
through adjustments of private inputs. 
In order to address the causality between public investment and output, cross-
country panel estimation (Canning and Pedroni, 2008),
10
 simultaneous equation models 
Type of expenditure
2016-17 2017-18 2016-17 2017-18 2016-17 2017-18
Housing 1 1.5 1,359 966 0.1 0.1
Infrastructure 0.9 1.4 3,967 7,316 0.2 0.4
Multiplier Millions of dollars Impact on real GDP (% )
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(Cadot, Roller and Stephan, 2006) and instrumental variables methods (Calderón and 
Servén, 2004)) have been used. All these studies conclude that although there is evidence 
of reverse causality, infrastructure spending raises output and crowds in private investment.  
Another approach has used vector autoregressions (VAR) to address the 
simultaneity issue and to estimate the multiplier within a dynamic model of the economy. 
(Romp and de Haan, 2007 and Perreira and Andraz, 2013). In these models, the elasticity of 
the marginal product of capital refers to the total accumulated long-term change in each 
private input generated by an initial increase in public capital. This permits the model to 
capture both the direct (short-run) effect and the indirect (long-run) effect of a change in 
public capital on output through the adjustment of private inputs.  
Using the VAR methodology, in a study for the U.S. economy, Pereira (2000) found 
that an increase in public investment crowds in private investment in the long-run. He 
found that $1 spent on infrastructure in the aggregate raises private output by $4.46 over a 
20-year period, yielding a 7.8% rate of return. Thus, if output were taxed at 25%, public 
investment would pay for itself in the long-run. His results also showed that different types 
of infrastructure spending have different multipliers. Core infrastructure such as electric 
plants, transit, sewage and water supply systems have the largest impact with $1 of public 
investment generating private output by $19.79 over a 20-year horizon with a rate of return 
of 16.1%.
11
  
 
The State of the Economy and the Multiplier Impact of Infrastructure Programs  
 
The quantitative impact of infrastructure programs also greatly depends on the state of the 
economy when these are undertaken. As Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) have 
shown, the fiscal multiplier for government spending can be greater than one when the 
36 
 
 
nominal interest rate is low and there is enough slack in the economy so that the interest 
rate does not respond to a rise in economic activity. In their model, a rise in government 
expenditures helps stop a deflationary spiral thus lowering the real interest rate
12
 and 
stimulating economic activity.
13,14
  
Abiad, Furceri and Topalova (2015) estimate the asymmetric effects of the business 
cycle on the multiplier.
15
 If short-term multipliers and the elasticity of output to public 
capital are sufficiently large, public investment will succeed in increasing the productive 
capacity of the economy. In the baseline case, the short-term (one-year) and medium-term 
(four-year) multipliers were found to be 0.4 and 1.5. Their simulations also show that the 
state of the economy, efficiency of public investment and financing matter.  
During economic slack, the short-term multiplier rises by 50% to 0.6. During such 
low-growth periods, the increase in private investment exceeds the increase in GDP 
resulting in a rise in private investment as a share of GDP, a consequent increase in tax 
revenues, and thus a fall in the debt-to-GDP ratio since debt increases by less than GDP 
does.    
When public investment is highly efficient (Pritchett (2000)), thanks to sound 
project selection, implementation and monitoring, the level of output increases by 0.8% in 
one year and by 2.6% after four years. Private investment rises by more, and the debt-to-
GDP falls by more in the medium term when efficiency is high.  
Similarly, when debt-finance is used, a public investment increase amounting to 1% 
of GDP increases the level of output by 0.9% in the same year and by 2.9% four years after 
the shock. The medium term effect on investment is larger with debt financing and the debt 
to GDP ratio falls more quickly.  
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In short, the mode of financing of infrastructure spending, the economic climate 
within which it takes place, and importantly, the efficiency with which it is carried out, 
affect its economic benefits.  
Thus, the multiplier effects cited in the Budget are short-run effects and fall within 
the range predicted by most of these studies, and are plausible in view of the current 
economic climate, low interest rates and debt-financing. As noted above, the long-run 
multiplier taking into account the indirect effects of infrastructure expenditures may be 
much larger. In addition, the Budget predictions do not distinguish the different types of 
infrastructure investment. Yet, as pointed out by Pereira, the short and long run multipliers 
may vary depending on the type of infrastructure and can be quite large for some types 
such as core infrastructure. 
However, ensuring the maximum benefits of the Liberal government’s 
infrastructure plan in terms of economic growth and welfare will depend crucially on its 
efficient implementation.  
Before analysing the exact significance of “efficiency” in the context of public 
infrastructure projects, we first turn to an overview of the projected infrastructure spending 
as described in Budget 2016. 
 
THE LIBERAL BUDGET PLAN ON INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING: AN OVERVIEW 
The share of infrastructure investment in Canada has declined from 4.8% of real GDP in 
2010 to about 3.7% in 2015. In addition, according to the survey-based Canadian 
Infrastructure Report Card (2016, p. 10) about 35% of municipal infrastructures are either 
in fair, poor or very poor condition and in need of urgent repair.
16
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The first budget by the newly-elected Liberal government has attempted to redress 
the situation. Quoting two prominent economists (Lawrence Summers and Joseph Stiglitz) 
who have been strong proponents of infrastructure investment to promote growth in a time 
of sluggish economic performance, the budget has launched a comprehensive program to 
overhaul existing infrastructure and to undertake new large projects over the next ten years.   
The Liberal government’s projected infrastructure expenditures over the next ten 
years will be in the amount of $120 billion, $60 billion of which constitute new spending. 
With this announcement, the Liberal government means to fulfill its campaign promise 
regarding new infrastructure funding over the next decade.
17
This will be the largest 
infrastructure investment plan in Canadian history, surpassing the Conservative 
government’s New Building Canada Plan announced in the 2014 budget, which planned for 
$53 billion over ten years, $47 billion of which was new funding. The main motivation for 
these infrastructure plans was the creation of jobs and increasing economic growth. These 
economic benefits of infrastructure projects are certainly an important motivation for the 
expenditures announced in Budget 2016. However, the current budget distinguishes itself 
by the special emphasis on Green Infrastructure and on spending devoted to First Nations 
communities.  
The infrastructure expenditures in Budget 2016 are organized into two phases. Both 
phases will allocate infrastructure spending with a focus on three main areas, namely Public 
Transit, Social Infrastructure and Green Infrastructure.  
Phase I is itself comprised of more urgent expenditures which are to start 
immediately in 2016 and extend mainly over a two-year period, while some expenditures 
within this phase will be spread over a five-year period, for a total of $11.9 billion. The 
Phase 1 investments will mainly focus on maintenance and upgrading of existing structures, 
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that is, “…to modernize, and rehabilitate public transit, water and wastewater systems, 
provide affordable housing, and protect existing infrastructure from the effects of climate 
change.” (Budget 2016, p. 87) 18 This strategy is also in line with what has been 
recommended by The World Bank and IMF.  
In addition, provinces, municipalities and territories will have access to accelerated 
spending from the $9 billion of funding available from the Provincial-Territorial 
Infrastructure component of the New Building Canada Fund. The Canadian government 
will also provide up to 50% of the admissible costs of eligible projects in the public 
infrastructure and clean water infrastructure programs instead of the heretofore more 
commonly applied equal sharing of costs (i.e., 33% each) among the federal government, 
the provinces and the municipalities. 
Phase 2 expenditures, the details of which will be announced during the course of 
next year, relate to major infrastructure projects “…of local and regional importance, and 
[also] larger economically strategic projects that can provide transformative change at the 
national level. … Ambitious projects will be supported to reduce urban transportation 
congestion, improve and expand trade corridors, and reduce the carbon footprint of the 
national energy system.” (Budget 2016, pp. 87-88) Phase 2 of the infrastructure plan will be 
determined by consultation with other levels of government, and its details are not yet 
known at this time.  
The Phase 1 spending plan and its three-pronged approach is summarized in Table 
2.
19
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In addition to these expenditures of $11.9 billion, the government will also spend 
$3.4 billion over five years on a cash basis for the maintenance and upgrading of airports, 
harbours, and border installations, as well as for decontaminating hazardous waste sites on 
federal property.  
Municipalities will also continue to receive $ 3 billion per year from the (combined) 
Gas Tax Fund and the GST rebate for municipalities.
 20
 The government will also provide 
provinces, territories and municipalities with accelerated spending of $9 billion available in 
the Infrastructure Component of the New Building Canada Fund (established in 2014) and 
will provide them with the idle funds available in older federal infrastructure programs. 
Planning, design and engineering costs have now also been included among the eligible 
cost categories. The mandatory P3 screening that was imposed on projects under the New 
Building Canada Fund has been removed, thus permitting faster approval. This measure 
would also permit local governments to choose the financing option for the projects. 
In addition, oversight of PPP Canada, a Crown Corporation created in 2008 by the 
Conservative government
21
, has been transferred from the Department of Finance to the 
Department of Infrastructure and Communities (Infrastructure Canada). According to the 
Minister of Infrastructure and Communities, (Sohi, 2016) this move will permit the 
harmonization of practices and policies across different infrastructure projects, so that 
eligible projects could now receive greater government contribution (up to 33% or 50% 
depending on the project) as opposed to a maximum of 25% under the old regime. 
 
ADDRESSING SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND DURABILITY CONCERNS 
 
As mentioned above, the deterioration of the public capital stock threatens the flow of 
services from past infrastructure investments. This concern is fully reflected in the 
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government’s budget commitments. In addition to recognizing the urgency of maintenance 
and repair of Canada’s transportation infrastructure, a notable aspect of the investments 
envisaged under Phase 1, is the emphasis on Green Infrastructure and on First-Nations 
communities. Another, is the flexibility granted to municipalities with respect to funding 
issues.  
The budget plan thus highlights areas of past neglect and the urgency of palliating 
for it. First, with respect to First Nations, the $1.25 billion funding of on-reserve education 
over three years starting in 2016-17 that was announced in the 2014 budget, was reduced to 
$241 million in the 2015 budget. Budget 2016 allocates overall (in the combined Green and 
Social infrastructure categories) $3.5 billion over five years to infrastructure in First-
Nations communities (p. 103). The water and wastewater infrastructure components of this 
spending are crucial for the good health of these communities. The findings indicated 
above about the linkages between the quality of infrastructure, health, education, and 
productivity point to the importance of this initiative for First-Nations communities and for 
overall economic growth. (Agénor and Moreno-Dodson, 2006).  
Secondly, having reintegrated the international environmental community by 
signing the Paris Accord in April 2016
22
 Canada has agreed to cut its gas emissions by 30 
per cent from 2005 levels by 2030. (Hannay, 2015) According to the Vancouver 
Declaration on Clean Growth and Climate Change (2016) announced during the First 
Ministers’ Meeting on March 3, the government and the provinces committed to “build on 
the momentum of the Paris Agreement by developing a concrete plan to achieve Canada's 
international commitments through a pan-Canadian framework for clean growth and 
climate change. Together, we will leverage technology and innovation to seize the 
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opportunity for Canada to contribute global solutions and become a leader in the global 
clean growth economy.” (Vancouver Declaration, 2016). 
 The Green Infrastructure plan is a step in the right direction.
23
 The federal 
government intends to consult with the provinces in order to develop a climate strategy, and 
at the same time pursue negotiations with the US and Mexico on comprehensive 
environmental rules regarding greenhouse gas emissions. (McCarthy and Curry, 2015) The 
emphasis on federal-provincial collaboration is a marked change from 10 years of 
Conservative unilateral rule and will be essential to achieving the ambitious targets set in 
Paris. 
In Green-Lite, Doern, Auld and Stoney (2015) have decried “the sub-optimal nature 
of federal stewardship from an environmental perspective and the tendency for other levels 
of government and the private and not-for-profit sectors to assume greater responsibility for 
environmental policy in the absence of strong and sustained federal leadership…” (p.4) as 
well as “the gap between federal environmental discourse and rhetoric on the environment 
and the influence and impact of federal policies.”(p.4) This new expansive infrastructure 
program responds to the call for greater emphasis on environmentally and climate-change 
friendly greener infrastructure, and for greater leadership by the federal government made 
by Doern, Auld and Stoney.  
The “Clean water and waste water” component of the Green Infrastructure Plan and 
the Public Transit component of Phase I projects emphasize the much needed upgrading to 
Canada’s water system24 and transportation infrastructure25 as has been highlighted by two 
recent tragedies.  
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The following graph from the Canadian Infrastructure Report Card (2016, p.13) 
which describes the deterioration of roads, provides a stark illustration of the importance of 
undertaking maintenance projects such as those of Phase I. Roads experience a 40% drop in 
quality after 15 years of usage. The graph indicates how a $1 spent on maintenance “in 
time,” that is when the road is still in good condition could save $6-$10 of reconstruction 
when the road is in poor condition. This fact reinforces Rioja’s (2003) findings referred to 
above. Thus, for example, the cleaning of the reinforcing steel of a bridge constitutes a 
minor repair and could avert the need for its eventual replacement, a major repair requiring 
the mobilization of more qualified workforce and equipment, with large ensuing costs, and 
disruptions to traffic and to the community. (See Sundholm, Lepech and Wikström, (2015, 
p.11)). 
 
Another notable aspect of Phase I is the flexible administration of funding, a feature 
that is deemed important for municipalities and local governments as it facilitates their 
planning. (FCM 2016b)
26
. This management style is modelled after the federal Gas Tax 
which does not require any application to obtain funds for specific projects. This is the 
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municipalities’ preferred management style of funding, according to the FCM’s Budget 
Recommendations. (FCM, 2016a). The Prime Minister’s announcement that municipalities 
would be responsible for project selection, goes in this direction, and was well received.
 
27
(Curry, 2016)  
Explaining to the Canadian Council of Public Private Partnership the decision to 
remove the P3 screening requirement before approval of projects, the new Minister of 
Infrastructure stated: “We also believe in local autonomy. We believe that provinces, 
territories, and municipalities who own the projects we support should make their own 
procurement decisions. Removing the mandatory P3 screen respects their ability to make 
their own decisions on how to best meet their infrastructure needs.” (Sohi, 2016) 
The FCM has repeatedly stressed the importance of having “predictable” funding to 
permit better planning, and greater flexibility in choosing the projects that municipalities 
prioritize. The measures in Budget 2016 respond to many of the pre-budget 
recommendations of the FCM and were very well received by the FCM. Its post-budget 
declaration praised the increase in federal contribution to 50% of eligible costs on major 
projects, stating that: “Ottawa’s 2-phased approach to infrastructure investment is a smart 
plan. Phase 1 will give municipalities the flexibility and resources needed to fix and 
maintain core infrastructure and to plan for the future.” (FCM, 2016b). 
 
ENSURING PROJECT SUCCESS IN THE FACE OF COMPLEXITY, IRREVERSIBILITY AND 
UNCERTAINTY: EFFICIENCY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
Efficiency 
 
Clearly in order to reap the full benefit of these infrastructure projects, be it the anticipated 
multiplier effects or the social and environmental benefits, these projects must be 
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efficiently chosen, designed, built, managed and operated. It is also important to establish a 
good governance framework. It must be emphasized that the need for efficiency and good 
governance is essential whether the projects are carried out through the traditional 
government procurement model or the more recently popular public-private partnership 
(PPP) model. (We provide a discussion of the PPP models later in the chapter).    
The projects that fall under Phase 1 tend to be complex in many ways. Larger 
projects that fall under Phase 2 are bound to be even more complex. These are multi-
faceted projects that often cost several hundred million dollars, whose construction stage 
extends over many years, which have very complex design and planning stages, and which 
are fraught with uncertainties that often lead to enormous cost-over-runs and very 
important delays. 
Ensuring the success of such projects requires first a judicious choice of projects in 
view of well-established needs, secondly, a thorough understanding of the different ways in 
which they are complex, and thirdly, responding to the challenges raised by this 
complexity. The complexity of an infrastructure project is due to several important 
characteristics which encompass (Lessard, Sakhrani and Miller, 2014, p. 172): 
 the irreversible nature of the project, 
 the many uncertainties and risks28 which unfold and become known only through 
time,
29
  
 the size, the number of tasks and types of technical expertise required, 
 the “connectivity” or interrelationships among different parts of the project, 
 time constraints,30  
 the hierarchy among different levels of governments (sometimes with conflicting 
interests) that are involved in the project.  
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Some of these characteristics are also related. For example, the larger the size and 
the greater the number of tasks and types of technical expertise, the greater the technical 
risks and the larger the potential problems due to the interrelationships among different 
parts of the project. In addition, as Flyvbjerg (2005) and Salet, Bertolini and Giezen (2013) 
point out, even the size and scope of the project may change through time.  
One important characteristic that contributes greatly to the complexity is that these 
large engineering projects represent substantial irreversible commitments.
31
  The end-
product (a road, a bridge or a sewage system) cannot be put to an alternative use even if 
future needs turn out to differ from prior estimates. The initial planning stage is the phase 
during which the project design is elaborated. This is the most important phase because it 
has a determining impact on its outcome. It is also the phase that affords the greatest 
flexibility to project managers. When the project has been defined and all decisions are 
taken, the latter become in great part irreversible.
 32
  
During the operational phase, once projects are completed, few modifications are 
possible. Since the risks associated with the project become known only through time as it 
evolves, its irreversible nature becomes an important challenge to its efficient completion. 
There are numerous risks that contribute to the complexity of a project. Some relate to its 
technical aspects and affect completion while others are market-related or stem from 
institutional factors. Technical risks consist of engineering and design-specific problems, 
difficulties encountered during the construction phase and especially problems due to the 
use of innovative techniques.
33
 This type of risk also includes implementation errors caused 
by lack of experience or expertise such as human errors in the execution stage and in the 
setting of the critical path, or decisions taken with incomplete data and imperfect 
forecasting.   
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Market-related risks arise due to errors in forecasting demand (such as the number 
of customers in urban transport projects), supply (inputs into the project) or financial 
factors. Institutional risks include changes in regulations, practices and social 
acceptability.
34
 Finally, projects are also subject to what Miller and Lessard (2008) refer to 
as “turbulence risks”. This type of risk refers to cases when some unanticipated, though 
technically manageable, difficulty arises, but the latter provides ammunition to the 
opponents of the project, causes a chain reaction leading to substantial delays and even total 
abandonment.  
Different types of projects present various configurations of complexity and risks.
 
(Miller and Lessard, 2008). For example, some projects tend to present low market 
riskiness and moderate technical riskiness but can be quite risky on the social/institutional 
front due to environmental concerns. Other projects involving roads, bridges and tunnels 
are very risky both from a technical point of view (due to possible unforeseen geological 
difficulties or soil contamination), and also in terms of market-related elements such as 
difficulties in forecasting demand (flow of traffic) and hence their benefits with sufficient 
accuracy.
35
  
As mentioned above, the irreversible nature of infrastructure projects makes it 
difficult, and sometimes impossible, to respond to the realization of specific risks. The only 
way of mitigating this inescapable fact, is to maintain enough flexibility, especially during 
the initial planning stages of the project when the latter is in the process of being defined 
and formulated.
36
  
One important consequence of all these elements that characterize the complexity of 
projects is that they contribute to endemic cost overruns, major delays, overestimation of 
benefits and underestimation of costs.
 37
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As Flyvbjerg (2005 and 2014) notes, three types of explanations may be provided 
for very large deviations from projected costs, benefits and timing of these projects, 
namely: “technical, psychological, and political-economic.” Technical explanations refer to 
imperfect forecasting, incomplete data, and the lack of experience of forecasters and 
administrators as well as the technical risks mentioned above.  
Psychological explanations hinge upon the “over-optimism”38 of project planners 
who are so keen on seeing the project go ahead that they underestimate costs, overestimate 
benefits and the probability of success. The third, political-economic, explanation, has to do 
with “strategic misrepresentation.”39 That is, “planners and promoters purposely spin 
scenarios of success and gloss over the potential for failure” (Flyvbjerg 2005, 9) due to 
political or economic pressures to obtain funding for the project. Such misleading forecasts 
are a major source of risk in large projects, and ignoring this risk undermines economic and 
social goals.   
In order to circumscribe these detrimental effects, a thorough definition of the 
project based on reliable data and a good governance structure is essential. Defining the 
project well at the outset is of paramount importance.
40
 Many factors including the exact 
purpose and scope of the project, the gap in the existing infrastructure that it is supposed to 
fill, the potential beneficiaries, the stakeholders and the risks are all part of the definition of 
the project. This comprehensive approach is essential for accurate forecasts, and a sound 
cost-benefit analysis on the basis of economic, social and environmental costs and 
benefits.
41
 As mentioned earlier, the definition stage is the one that provides the greatest 
flexibility to the planners. The latter must ensure that a consensus is reached at this stage 
with respect to the exact purpose and design in order to mitigate regret once project 
construction begins and irreversibility sets in. 
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The importance of project definition is highlighted by Hilton and Stoney (2007) in 
their detailed analysis of Ottawa’s failed north-south Light Rail Train (LRT) project that 
was abandoned in 2007. They point to poor project definition and the ensuing contradictory 
announcements with respect to projected benefits and costs as being at the heart of this 
failure.
42
 
Governance 
 
It is also necessary to establish a good governance framework. According to Miller and 
Lessard (2008), a governance framework “provides the scaffolding around which the 
various issues of projects can be shaped … to make sure all the right questions are being 
asked …to develop answers and to outline the hurdles that the project must clear.” (169-
170). Good governance requires transparency and oversight, accountability and public 
participation.
 
(Flyvbjerg, 2008, Flyvbjerg,  Bruzelius and Rothengatter, 2003, Haider and 
Badami, 2007).  
Transparency is the first requirements of good governance. It necessitates due 
diligence, that is, a thorough analysis by independent experts of forecasted costs and 
benefits and making use of appropriate benchmarks based on comparable projects 
undertaken in the past to determine the uncertainty surrounding estimates.
 
In this respect, 
Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) have emphasized, the importance of using a “reference 
class” of projects as a check on optimism-bias. Given the tendency for biased forecasting, 
whether due to honest over-estimation or to strategic misrepresentation, it is necessary to 
have peer review of forecasts. (Flyvbjerg, 2013) Forecasts, peer reviews, benchmarks and 
other relevant information should be made available to the public. 
Accountability of officials is also essential. One needs to induce project planners to 
rely on truthful information and accurate forecasts. As stated for example in Article 1.2 of 
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the Code of Ethics of the Canadian Institute of Planners, members should “provide full, 
clear and accurate information on planning matters to decision-makers and members of the 
public.” (Canadian Institute of Planners, 2016) Professional penalties should be imposed on 
planners and forecasters by their relevant professional associations for failing to abide by 
this rule. For example, violation of a code of ethics should entail sanctions and even 
exclusion from one’s professional order. Project planners and promoters should also be 
made accountable for misuses of public funds in the event of systematic and willful 
misrepresentation of forecasts with the intent to obtain project approval and funding.
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In a democratic society, alongside transparency and accountability, it is also vital to 
have public participation and consultation (Bennett 2012; Dutil and Park 2012). Public 
hearings should be held to permit all stakeholders as well as citizens to express their views. 
This feedback should be taken into account by planners and decision-makers. Such a 
process would ensure “inclusiveness,” build stronger support and reduce resistance from 
opponents to the project. There is also a need for oversight, especially as these projects 
involve very large sums of taxpayers’ money.  
In order to ensure that the Liberal infrastructure plan meets the requirements of 
efficiency and good governance, it will also be essential to heed the recommendations of 
the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development.
 44
 While many of 
these criticisms are levied at how infrastructure programs were managed under the 
Conservative government, they remain relevant to improving efficiency and governance, 
and they have drawn a positive response from the Trudeau government. According to the 
Commissioner, improvements on funding and choice of projects, performance 
measurement, data collection and reporting are needed. 
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Funding of projects 
 
With respect to funding of projects, inadequate identification of environmental risks and 
lack of support for innovations to mitigate environmental risks were noted. Furthermore, 
the New Building Canada Fund does not prioritize disaster mitigation since the latter is 
only 1 of 14 criteria to obtain funding. In view of the critical importance of “increasing the 
resiliency of infrastructure” to deal with extreme weather conditions, these are serious 
deficiencies.  
In response to these claims, the Trudeau government indicated that beginning with 
the 2016-17 fiscal year, it will ensure that appropriate measures to address these risks have 
been adopted in new and revised projects. It also intends to seek innovative mechanisms for 
project funding and support the use of modern innovative technologies for the long-term 
infrastructure investment plan announced in Budget 2016. 
 
Performance measures and accountability 
 
The lack of performance measures such as final indicators, targets or timelines in projects 
financed by Infrastructure Canada was also observed, for example, for the Gas Tax Fund. 
The federal government is committed to work with other levels of government to develop a 
more informative reporting approach in the next outcomes report in 2018. The FCM has 
also agreed to develop specific objectives, performance targets and indicators to better 
assess the Green Municipal Fund. 
 
Data 
 
Access to quality data is essential for efficient project selection. There needs to be 
standardized, reliable and updated information on the state and condition of core public 
infrastructure for all levels of government. However, such information is not available. For 
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example, approximately one half of the 123 municipalities that have participated in the 
Canadian Infrastructure Report Card are not aware of the state of their underground 
infrastructure such as the water distribution system. In 2009, in spite of a memorandum of 
understanding between Infrastructure Canada and Statistics Canada to collect these data, no 
action was taken by the Harper government.  
As the Commissioner remarked, the Canadian government also needs to update the 
data and the tools used by engineers “to predict the probability of extreme rainfall amounts 
and the duration of storms” because many of these tools were found to be obsolete and the 
data has not been updated since 2006. (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2016) 
Such information is crucial for the design of municipal water infrastructure. Furthermore, 
national guidelines and floodplain maps are essential to help municipalities plan 
development in areas of low flood risk and to improve the resiliency of infrastructure where 
high flood risk prevails. However, they have not been updated since 1996, thus leaving the 
task to provinces and territories with ensuing inconsistencies between jurisdictions. 
The National Building Code serves as a guide to provincial and territorial codes. It 
is based on historical data and needs to be updated to account for climate change so as to 
ensure that homes and buildings are solid enough to endure extreme weather conditions. 
In response to these remarks by the Commissioner pertaining to data, Infrastructure 
Canada is committed, in line with Budget 2016, “to working with Statistics Canada as well 
as other stakeholders to improve infrastructure-related data.” 45 
 
Management practices and training 
 
Efficiency and good governance also require an appropriate expertise for public officials at 
the three levels of government. To this end, Budget 2016 announced $50 million for a new 
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asset management fund whose purpose will be to support the implementation of sound asset 
management practices and data collection on assets. Furthermore, funding is available 
under the Gas Tax Fund to improve project management. 
However, in order to ensure the efficient selection, the federal government could 
revive programs such as the National Guide to Sustainable Infrastructure (Infra Guide), 
which in collaboration with the FCM produced a body of technical and best-practice 
management information for public and private decision-makers involved in infrastructure 
programs. It could fund the Knowledge-Building Outreach and Awareness programs which 
in the early 2000’s provided funding for research in infrastructure. Funding for both of 
these programs was abandoned in 2007. 
 
Federal-provincial-municipal cooperation 
Under the Canadian constitution, municipalities and local governments fall under 
provincial jurisdiction. Infrastructure spending decisions thus require coordination not only 
among federal departments but also between the federal government, the provinces and 
territories and the municipalities. The Commissioner recommends greater federal-
provincial-municipal cooperation with respect to clarifying the role of each level of 
government and setting long-term infrastructure priorities.  In contrast to the unilateralism 
of the Harper government, the Trudeau government is adopting a collaborative approach.
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While the federal government will play a leadership role and be a funding partner, the 
responsibility with the planning, prioritization, design and operation of infrastructure 
projects will lie with provincial-territorial and municipal governments. However, the 
federal government should work with the provinces, territories and municipalities to 
develop clear guidelines to screen projects and to ensure that selected and funded projects 
meet rigorous criteria of efficiency and sound governance.  
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DELIVERING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS THROUGH  
PUBLIC-PRIVATE-PARTNERSHIPS (PPPs) 
In 2009, the Conservative government created PPP Canada, a Crown Corporation, and 
imposed mandatory screening of projects under the New Building Canada Fund by PPP 
Canada. As mentioned above, according to Budget 2016, this mandatory screening has been 
abolished. The Minister defended this decision by saying:  
“There has been some discussion in infrastructure circles and the media that this 
campaign commitment to remove the P3 screen indicated a lack of support for P3s 
in general…. [However,] this is not the case….  
 
[A]s a councillor in Edmonton I worked with PPP Canada to help us design and 
build our new LRT line. We saw the benefits of transferring the design and 
construction innovation – as well as the risk – that came from our partnership with 
the private sector. But our City Council struggled to transfer [the] operation of our 
transit system which we had effectively managed for a century…  
 
Removing the mandatory P3 screen respects [provinces, territories, and 
municipalities’] ability to make their own decisions on how to best meet their 
infrastructure needs. 
 
Our government believes that for certain projects, P3s are the right method to build 
the infrastructure we need. Not all projects are well suited, but many are…” (Sohi, 
2016) 
 
The change in Budget 2016 together with the Minister’s statements indicate a more 
reserved endorsement of the PPP model by the Liberal government than its predecessor. 
This may be in response to the criticisms faced by the PPPs which we discuss below.  
The PPP model has elicited some controversy and a large literature on both sides of 
the debate in recent years.
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 While a thorough analysis of the PPP model is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, we briefly describe the important points of this debate.  
The traditional model for carrying out infrastructure investment projects and 
providing public services is through public procurement, whereby the government plans 
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and designs the projects and then contracts out the actual building of the infrastructure 
project to various private enterprises. Usually the private firms that will be in charge of 
construction are chosen through a competitive bidding process. Government borrowing is 
used to pay for construction. After the construction phase is completed, the administration 
and maintenance of the project are traditionally conducted by the government, but 
sometimes these may be contracted out to private enterprises as well. In either case, 
government borrowing is used to defray the costs while revenues from the projects accrue 
to the government. 
In recent years, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been quite popular as a 
means of providing public infrastructure projects in Canada especially in Ontario, Québec, 
Alberta and BC. (See Vining, Boardman and Poschmann (2005), Boardman and Vining 
(2010) and Boardman, Siemiatycki and Vining (2016)). Thus, Ontario alone has more than 
70 either almost completed or on-going AFP (“Alternative Financing and Procurement,” 
i.e., PPP) projects. Infrastructure Ontario’s (2016) web site contains a list of these projects. 
Similarly, the Société québécoise des infrastructures (2016), Partnerships British Columbia 
(2016) and Alberta Infrastructure (2016) also list on-going and completed PPP projects.  
The exact contractual arrangements differ widely among PPPs: build-finance (BF), design-
build-finance (DBF), design-build-finance-maintain (DBFM) or design-build-finance-
operate-maintain (DBFOM). They may thus involve varying degrees of private sector 
participation in the projects.  
The most important characteristic that distinguishes PPPs from traditional public 
procurement is that most (or all) of the initial financing is privately provided, but the 
government must eventually pay the (consortium of) private companies once the project is 
completed (unless the contract specifies that the private parties will benefit from the 
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revenues generated by the operation of the facility that was built). In the case of public 
procurement, the government must pay up front for the construction of the project. The 
private provision of initial funds in the case of PPPs does not constitute an “alternative 
source of financing” of the project in the sense that it does not alleviate the burden on the 
government’s intertemporal budget, since the present value of the future payments by the 
government equals the payment it must make up-front. In principle it can be shown that 
whether the project is financed by traditional procurement or by PPPs the impact on the 
government’s finances are identical once one takes into account the transfer of risks. (See 
for example, Grout, (1997), de Bettignies and Ross, (2004), and Engel, Fischer and 
Galetovic, (2010).  
PPPs are a relatively new form of public service delivery and administration. Actual 
experiences with PPPs in Canada and around the world are a mix of both successes and 
failures. (See, for example, Bordeleau (2012), Hilton and Stoney (2007), Koppenjan 
(2008), Siemiatycki (2013)). 
Arguments often given in favour of PPPs are mainly greater efficiency and a more 
efficient allocation of risks among partners. The private sector has greater expertise, is 
more innovative, can build and manage infrastructure projects in a more cost-efficient and 
timely manner thus increasing “Value for Money” (VfM) relative to traditional public 
project development.
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 Most importantly, an essential benefit of PPPs stems from the 
efficient management of risks related to asymmetric information and incentive issues.  
There are often complementarities between the different stages of a project. (See de 
Bettignies and Ross,
 
2004, p. 149). Private involvement in several stages (rather than only 
in building and financing) may yield efficiency gains, and also alleviate moral hazard 
problems that may arise. Hence, for example, if a private firm is only involved during the 
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construction and not the maintenance stage, moral hazard issues arise since the company 
may reduce costs in order to obtain the procurement contract during the bidding process, 
and then provide a lower quality product along with the lower costs. (This may also be the 
case in the traditional procurement model where the private firms are only contracted to 
build.) If instead the firm is responsible for both construction and maintenance, then overall 
efficiency objectives over the life-cycle of the project will dictate a good quality product in 
order to minimize maintenance costs.  
Good quality service may also be ensured by carefully drafted contracts that include 
clauses with precisely defined quality standards for the service flow. These are some of the 
ways in which PPPs can lead to more effective risk management, whereas a traditional 
procurement model cannot address risks related to asymmetric information issues. In the 
latter case, there is a lack of incentive to control costs and there is no market discipline or 
detailed contract to control for quality of service delivery. (Murphy, 2008 and Engel, 
Fischer and Galetovic, 2010). It is also worth stressing that private partners in a PPP must 
have enough funds committed in the project so as to retain the financial incentive to 
efficiently and successfully complete the project, thus curbing agency problems.  
It is often argued that the PPP mode of financing is costlier than the traditional 
model, and that there is a substantial PPP premium relative to the traditional government 
procurement model, especially as the government can borrow at a cheaper rate than private 
firms.  
However, this premium is related to the risks that are transferred to the private 
partner, and can be reduced with an efficient allocation of risks to the party that can best 
deal with it. In general, it is optimal for the private partner to bear all technical risks related 
to construction and for the government to bear demand (or revenue) risk. (Engel, Fischer 
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and Galetovic, 2010) Consider for example, the case of a highway construction where the 
revenue stream will depend on user fees (tolls). The demand for the highway services 
depends in great part on general economic conditions which are exogenous to the firm. The 
latter can have no influence on this risk no matter how efficient it is. Bearing this risk will 
increase the firm’s exposure to systematic (market) risk thus increasing its overall 
borrowing costs. (That is, the firm’s beta increases.)  Thus the firm will charge a higher 
premium as compensation for bearing demand risk. As Engel et al. point out, this premium 
could be quite high. In this case, facing the demand risk is a cheaper option for the 
government, and will lower the PPP premium. 
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On the other hand, all technical risks 
related to the construction of the project should be optimally borne by the private partner. 
Bearing this risk has a cost reflected in the PPP premium, but it also induces the firm to be 
efficient and find expedient solutions to emerging hurdles. It is thus, as Engel et al. put it, 
“the flip side of the efficiency advantage of PPPs.” (Engel et al., (2010), 42)  
Murphy (2008) stresses that “An appropriate risk allocation requires that 
governments have the expertise to identify all of the relevant risks before entering into the 
partnership contract. Governments must also have the contract management skills to ensure 
that those risks are in fact borne by the private sector.” This latter point is very important  in 
the case of PPPs since they involve long-term contracts that must be carefully crafted in 
order to minimize the occurrence of costly renegotiations, (Guasch, 2004) and yet must be 
flexible enough to allow for such renegotiations if necessary.  
The fact that most PPP models involve very complex and long-term contracts has 
also been criticized on several grounds. First the negotiations are very lengthy and the 
transactions costs are substantial, thus adding to the costs of the project under PPP. 
Secondly, it is impossible to completely avoid “contract incompleteness” especially in 
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long-term contracts, since all eventualities cannot be foreseen and contracted for in 
advance. Grout (1997, 64) illustrates this point with an example. In the 1990s it was 
commonplace to require microwave ovens as part of the quality standards for university 
accommodation contracts. However, given the 20-to-30 year lengths of contracts, this 
requirement could not have been anticipated in the 1970s. Hence, the government may not 
want to lose the flexibility of providing a modified set of public services if the need arises 
in the future. This introduces operating risks for the private partner and may lead to 
controversies between the partners. Entering renegotiation clauses is one option, but such 
renegotiation may be costly. Choosing a type of PPP model that does not include the 
operation or administration task may be a way to circumvent this problem, and some critics 
have advocated the “unbundling” of tasks performed by the PPP. As a matter of fact, as 
Siemiatycki and Farooqi (2012) note, “the provincial government in Ontario has not widely 
sought to transfer … operating risks, thereby avoiding the planning-related concerns that 
arise around loss of government flexibility…” (2012, 295) However, there are tradeoffs. 
Such unbundling also means that the adopted PPP model remains susceptible to the 
asymmetric information and moral hazard risks (mentioned above) that a more 
comprehensive PPP model can avoid. 
Another argument against PPPs is the difficulty in, not only correctly identifying, 
but also correctly quantifying, the risks borne by each partner.
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 Thus, arriving at a correct 
calculation of VfM and making an accurate comparison of the costs of PPP versus 
traditional procurement becomes very difficult. As Siemiatycki and Farooqi (2012, 291) 
note, the cost of the PPP model is lower than the traditional procurement method only after 
accounting for the risks borne by the private partner. Yet, since the details of how the risks 
are quantified are not revealed, verifying the VfM calculations becomes impossible.  
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Infrastructure Ontario’s web-site makes available the reports of two independent 
consulting agencies identifying a large number of possible risks and indicating the risks that 
are transferred to the public.
51
  However, since very little empirical data are provided, it is 
not possible to verify the assessments. This points to another major concern in relation to 
PPPs, (and public infrastructure spending in general), namely the lack of transparency and 
accountability.  
In relation to the impact of the infrastructure stimulus spending, Stoney and 
Krawchenko (2012) compare the programs in Canada, Australia and the US. They arrive at 
the conclusion that transparency, accountability and oversight in Canada were far inferior 
to those in the other two countries.  
“The Canadian government stands out among the countries in our case studies for its failure 
to implement measures aimed at ensuring accountability and transparency in decision 
making and in reporting mechanisms that aid in communicating program results. For 
Canada, no special auditing or oversight functions were adopted apart from regular 
departmental reporting and annual reports to Parliament from the Office of the Auditor 
General... in sharp contrast to those measures adopted in the United States and Australia, 
where accountability/reporting mechanisms specific to the stimulus funds, as well as 
independent audits, were conducted. [T]he dissemination of information and tracking of 
results as well as the evaluation of stimulus spending were much stronger in United States 
and Australia than in Canada… making it not only difficult, but also impossible to evaluate 
one of the key stated objectives [namely, job creation] of the stimulus program.” (pp. 15-
16). 
  
Bennett (2012) also notes a lack of data availability in order to assess the impact of the given 
stimulus: “no Canadian official agency had the kind of data that one might have found, for example, 
in the USA with respect to similar programmes.” This lack of data was also noted in the Auditor 
General’s Report. (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2010, p. 3).52  
A similar lack of transparency was noted by Hilton and Stoney (2007) in the context 
of the initial attempt at building a Light Rail Transit in Ottawa, a PPP project that involved 
a consortium led by Siemens. The project eventually failed and was abandoned in 2007.
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The exact nature of the project design and the contract itself were not revealed as the 
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private partner claimed confidentiality issues. The city councilors were obliged to vote 
without full cognizance of the details of the project. To the extent possible, the PPP 
contracts should be designed to limit the inclusion of confidentiality clauses in order to 
ensure transparency and accountability towards the public.  
As PPPs are increasingly adopted as a means of providing public services, it will be 
important to have well-designed contracts in order to reap the benefits and limit the 
drawbacks of the PPP model. 
 
FINANCING 
 
According to Budget 2016 the government will be financing most of these projects by 
borrowing to take advantage of the current historically low interest rates. As mentioned 
above, deficit financing of infrastructure is also the mode of financing that will yield the 
largest multiplier effects.  
As a consequence of debt-financing, the budgetary balance will move from a $1.9 
billion surplus in 2014-15 to deficits that are projected to first increase and then gradually 
decline in the next five fiscal years, with $5.4, $29.4, $29, $22.8, $17.7 and $14.3 billion 
respectively between 2015-16 and 2020-21. The debt as a percentage of GDP will also 
initially rise from 31% to 32.5% in 2016-17 before gradually falling to 30.9% in 2020-21.  
Canada currently has the lowest debt-to-GDP ratio among the G-7 countries and 
ranks below average among G-20 countries. Given current very low debt servicing charges, 
this provides the federal government with some leeway to use deficit financing to palliate 
for decades of neglect of the Canadian infrastructure. In addition, since infrastructure 
investment provides a flow of services for many years to come, it makes sense to use deficit 
financing as future generations will also benefit from current spending. 
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Yet, in view of probable increases in interest rates as the economy recovers and of 
the very large infrastructure gap evaluated at $172 billion by the FCM, the government will 
need to resort to alternative sources of financing in addition to the $120 billion that it has 
promised in Budget 2016. 
According to Budget 2016 the government intends to “where it is in the public 
interest, engage public pension plans and other innovative sources of funding—such as 
demand management initiatives and asset recycling—to increase the long-term affordability 
and sustainability of infrastructure in Canada.” (p. 88) 
While the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, the Caisse de depot et placement 
du Québec and the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan invest extensively in international 
infrastructure projects, they refrain from doing so in Canada due to lower rates of return. At 
The Economist's Canada Summit Conference, Finance Minister Bill Morneau recently 
stated “We've got these very successful investors in Canada that invest in infrastructure 
around the world and yet have not found the projects in Canada of the scale that makes 
sense for them… We'll need to ensure that there are appropriate risks and rewards for those 
investors." (Scuffham and Hopkins, 2016) 
 
Asset Recycling 
 
Budget 2016 refers to the possibility of using asset recycling, which refers to the sale or 
long-term leasing of public assets such as ports, roads or bridges to private interests in 
order to finance new infrastructure projects with the proceeds being allocated to an 
infrastructure fund.  
Canada has many mature assets such as harbors, airports and highways which 
generate a predictable stream of revenues. Furthermore, institutional investors are seeking 
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to invest in infrastructure worldwide. For example, the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan 
(OTPP) holds $17 billion of infrastructure assets internationally but less than 20% of it is in 
Canada. As the head of the infrastructure division of the OTTP, Andrew Claerhout 
indicated, “an airport investment has potential to generate big returns if an investor can 
improve how it’s managed and lure more airlines to its runways.” (Biatchford, 2016) 
This mode of financing new projects, also called capital recycling, has been adopted 
in many countries and in Canadian provinces, notably Australia and Ontario. For example, 
Port Kembla and Port Botany in Sydney, Australia, were sold for A$5 billion in order to 
invest the proceeds in new infrastructure. Furthermore, with the goal of leveraging $40 
billion of investment, the Australian government has set up a $5 billion 5-year program to 
encourage states and territories to pursue asset recycling. The latter are eligible to receive 
15 per cent of the sales price of the asset provided the proceeds are allocated to funding 
new infrastructure projects. (Australian Government, 2014) 
As Gordon (2014) notes, “there may be cases where ‘mature’ assets, such as ports, 
would be better privatised so proceeds can be reinvested in new areas, such as urban 
arterial roads, where need is greater. Public assets may also be more efficiently run by the 
private sector and a sale of existing publicly-owned facilities could increase returns even on 
‘mature’ facilities.” 
There are several examples of asset sales or long-term leases in Ontario. As an 
example of the latter, in June 2000, the Crown corporation, Ontario Power Generation, 
signed a long term lease with private sector consortium Bruce Power to take over Bruce 
station, the largest nuclear facility in the world. 
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 The 18-year lease could be prolonged for 
an additional 25 years. It was announced that Bruce would invest $13 billion over 15 years 
to refurbish the facilities. At the same time, the province would commit to pay $77 per 
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megawatt-hour for the electricity, which is below the $83 per megawatt-hour price of 
electricity in Ontario. (Morrow, 2015) Bruce Power would be responsible for cost overruns. 
An example of an asset sale is the current (partial) sale of Hydro One. After 
considering the loss of annual income of $100 million (remittances from Hydro One), the 
Advisory Council on Government Assets recommended that the Ontario government 
proceed with the sale of Hydro One to the private sector, arguing that the rate of return of 
new infrastructure projects is likely to exceed the rate of return of money locked in Hydro 
One. (Government of Ontario, 2014) In 2015, the government of Ontario proceeded with its 
plan to sell 60% of Hydro One while retaining the remaining 40% and regulatory control 
over electricity rates. The objective is to generate $9 billion of revenues: $5 billion to lower 
Ontario’s debt and $4 billion to invest in the Trillium infrastructure fund. (Morrow, 2016) 
In 2015, the government of Ontario launched other major initiatives, notably selling head 
office lands belonging to the Liquor Control Board of Ontario for $260. 
Asset recycling requires a careful assessment of its net present value, considering all 
the costs and benefits, as well as an open and transparent process. (Galston and Davis, 
2012) Assuming that the deal is advantageous from the government’s point of view, it is 
also necessary to ensure that the funds be indeed devoted to new infrastructure by 
establishing Special Purpose Vehicles to manage them. (Gordon, 2014). 
 
Infrastructure Bank 
An alternative source of financing is the creation of an infrastructure bank. Several 
countries around the world have established infrastructure banks such as the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), the Green Investment Bank in the UK and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank. 
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While Budget 2016 does not refer to the possibility of establishing an infrastructure 
bank, in its pre-electoral platform, the Liberal Party proposed the creation of a Canadian 
Infrastructure Bank to help provinces and municipalities in obtaining the necessary capital 
for infrastructure projects by providing loans and loan guarantees:  
“This new CIB will work in partnership with other orders of governments and Canada’s 
financial community, so that the federal government can use its strong credit rating and 
lending authority to make it easier – and more affordable – for municipalities to finance the 
broad range of infrastructure projects their communities need… The new CIB will issue 
Green Bonds
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 … [to] fund projects such as the electrification of transportation, smart grid 
technology, and transmission lines for renewable energy, electric vehicle charging stations 
and networks, retrofits of buildings, and clean power storage. When appropriate, the CIB 
will issue Green Bonds to the public so that they too can invest in such projects.” (Liberal 
Party of Canada, 2015b, p. 7) 
The EIB may be an interesting model for the CIB.
 
There are a number of issues to address.  
First, the EIB is financially independent, but it is owned by the member states of the 
European Union (EU) which contribute paid-in capital in proportion to their economic 
weight in the EU. It is authorised to make loans amounting to 2.5 times its capital. 
(European Investment Bank, 2015) In order to give loans, the EIB raises funds in the 
capital markets, for example by issuing bonds and other debt instruments. Its bonds may be 
purchased by institutional investors, such as pension funds and life insurance companies 
whose liabilities are long-term. Siemiatycki (2016) proposes to capitalize the CIB with 
federal funds that are in addition to existing federal capital grants.
 
Hodgson (2015) argues 
that provincial governments and even pension funds could become shareholders of the CIB 
thereby increasing its capital base. According to the Liberal Party’s platform, the CIB will 
issue green bonds which could be very long-term, extending to 30 or 40 years to match the 
lifetime of infrastructure assets (Liberal Party of Canada 2015a). 
Secondly, the EIB only considers loans for projects whose costs exceed € 20-25 
million. Siemiatycki (2016) also favours CIB involvement only for projects exceeding a 
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threshold of $10 million. Thirdly, the EIB has put in place an appraisal process based on 
“due diligence” which screens projects according to strict economic, technical, 
environmental, social and financial criteria. Project appraisal is conducted by a team of loan 
officers, economists, engineers, sector specialists, risk managers and lawyers. The projects 
are monitored throughout the life-time of the loan according to specific guidelines to permit 
early detection of contract breaches and deterioration of initial conditions. Environmental 
monitoring is also conducted by the Bank which “calculates and reports on the carbon 
footprint … for all directly financed projects that have material emissions. In addition, an 
economic price of carbon is incorporated in the accounting for environmental 
externalities.” (European Investment Bank, 2015). 
Following the example of the EIB, the CIB should select only efficient projects for 
funding, that is those that meet rigorous cost-benefit analyses based on economic, financial, 
technical and environmental criteria and, as Siemiatycki emphasizes, have been prioritized 
by municipal and provincial authorities. To this end, it should provide the necessary 
financial and technical expertise and monitoring as does the EIB. In addition, during the 
selection process, the CIB should also require recipients to include maintenance reserve 
accounts and regular inspections in view of the past neglect of infrastructure maintenance.  
Fourthly, the CIB could help lower the cost of municipal borrowing. Provinces and 
large municipalities such as Toronto and the Municipal Finance Authority of British 
Columbia borrow at rates that exceed the AAA rating of the federal government by more 
than 1%. The differential is even higher for smaller municipalities. For large projects, the 
cost savings would not be negligible. For other municipal or local governments, access to 
the CIB may even facilitate access to credit markets. Low interest loans by the CIB could 
69 
 
 
also exert some leverage and attract financing from nonprofit organizations with respect to 
social housing projects. (Siemiatycki, 2016 and Hanniman, 2014).  
Finally, access to financing does not solve all the funding problems. If the project is 
expected to generate a stream of revenues such as user fees or some specific other source, 
the asset owner may be able to finance the borrowing and operating costs. Such is the case 
of power grids, toll roads, electric vehicle charging stations and networks.  However, for 
projects such as public transit, water and waste-water treatment user fees may not suffice 
and provinces, territories and municipalities may have to resort to general tax revenues or 
transfers. In this case, the CIB will simply ease the liquidity problems faced by provinces-
territories and municipalities
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 but not the long term financing problem.  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
In this chapter we have provided an overview of the Liberal government’s two-phased 
infrastructure plan and of the salient features of Phase 1 projects, the only ones known at 
this time. We have looked at the economic benefits of infrastructure projects. We have 
argued that in order to reap these benefits, the projects undertaken in both Phase 1 and 
Phase 2 must be judiciously chosen to respond to the needs of Canadians, and efficiently 
managed within a good governance structure and with adequate oversight. To this end, we 
have analyzed the literature on efficient project management and some of the pitfalls that 
large infrastructure projects involve. We have stressed that adequate oversight is necessary 
where large public funds are concerned.  
The PPP formula has become a very popular method of delivering infrastructure in 
Canada and in the world. However, several challenges need to be addressed, such as 
maintaining transparency and accountability and drafting carefully designed contracts to 
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ensure that Canadians’ best interests are served. We have also discussed different financing 
options for projects such as asset recycling and a Canadian Infrastructure Bank. Canada has 
many mature assets such as harbors, airports and highways which institutional investors, in 
particular Canadian pension funds, seeking to invest in infrastructure worldwide would find 
to be attractive investments. However, we note that asset recycling requires a careful 
assessment of the net present value of the asset, considering all the costs and benefits, as 
well as an open and transparent process.  
In view of Canada’s large infrastructure needs, additional funding could be obtained 
by creating an investment bank. In its pre-electoral platform, the Liberal Party proposed the 
creation of a Canadian Infrastructure Bank to help provinces and municipalities in 
obtaining the necessary capital for infrastructure projects by providing loans and loan 
guarantee. The European Investment Bank (EIB) provides an interesting model for the CIB. 
Analogously to the EIB, it could be allowed to raise funds in capital markets, for example 
by issuing long-term green bonds that would be purchased by institutional investors such as 
pension funds or life insurance companies. Provincial governments and even pension funds 
could become shareholders so as to increase its capital base. Following the example of the 
EIB, the CIB should implement an appraisal process based on due diligence and select only 
efficient projects for funding, that is, those that meet rigorous cost-benefit analyses based 
on economic, financial, technical and environmental criteria among those prioritized by 
municipal and provincial governments. 
Infrastructure spending of the type envisaged in Budget 2016 will require 
coordination among the federal government, the provinces, territories and the 
municipalities. Contrary to the Conservative government’s unilateralism, the Trudeau 
government has indicated that it will adopt a collaborative approach. Cooperation among 
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levels of government, good project selection, efficient administration and good governance 
will be key aspects of the success of these projects.  
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Endnotes 
                                                   
1
 We would like to thank the editors G. Bruce Doern and Christopher Stoney as well as two 
anonymous referees for very helpful comments. 
  
2
 In Canada the infrastructure gap has increased steadily since the 1980’s and according to the 
Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) the infrastructure gap is in the order of $172 billion. 
See S. Mirza (2012). According to the International Transport Forum (OECD, 2015), transport 
infrastructure as a percentage of GDP has fallen to 0.8%, its lowest level since 1995. Mackenzie 
(2013, p. 14) also notes that: “In 2011, … the depreciated value of the general government capital 
stock in Canada amounted to 22% of GDP. Simply to maintain that level would require an annual 
investment of 2.9% of GDP. That level of investment activity compares with the 2.7% of GDP that 
was invested in the peak year of the stimulus program… To reach a target of 30% of GDP [as was 
the case in the 1970s] in ten years would require an annual investment in general government 
infrastructure of 4.3%—a higher investment rate than was ever achieved in the period from 1955 to 
2011. In 2013–14, that would require an investment of approximately $75 billion for general 
government infrastructure alone.” 
3
 Doern, Auld and Stoney (2015, Chapter 8) make a comprehensive analysis of Canadian 
infrastructure investment spanning a 50-year history.  
4
 In the context of the Conservative government’s 2008 Economic Action Plan, Doern, Auld and 
Stoney (2015, p. 283) discuss “the increasing politicization of infrastructure spending, with signage, 
advertising and branding taken to levels never seen in Canada before” and its “role in furthering 
distributive ‘retail politics.’”  
5
 Public capital may also include education and health infrastructure. 
6
 This argument is developed by J.R. Tybout (2000), S. Turnovsky (1996) and P-R. Agénor and B. 
Moreno-Dodson, (2006). 
7
 However, the maintenance and repair of public capital has often been neglected. For example, 
Gyamfi, and G. Ruan (1996) found that every dollar not spent on road maintenance leads to a $3 
increase in vehicle operating cost.  
8
 Calderón and Servén (2004) find an empirical link between indicators of infrastructure quality and 
economic growth.  
9
 That is, rising output increases tax revenues and makes it possible to finance additional 
infrastructure spending. Moreover, a recession may also induce policy-makers to launch new public 
investment programs.   
10
 Their study focuses on electricity, telephone and road construction. 
11
 Leduc and Wilson (2012) also use the VAR methodology with federal highway grants that are 
predetermined by the U.S. Congress (and thus exogenous to the state of the economy) and estimated 
the impact multiplier as 3.4, the peak multiplier (6 years out) as 7.8 and the mean multiplier as 1.7. 
Thus, they confirm that the multiplier is large for highway spending. When they use state 
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government total spending on highway construction, the impact, peak and mean multipliers are 
lower but still large: 2.7, 6.2 and 1.3. With a third measure, the multipliers are: 1.4, 3.0 and 0.6.  
12
 The real rate of interest is (approximately) the difference between the nominal rate and the 
expected rate of inflation. In the presence of deflation, the real rate is higher than the nominal rate. 
13
 Kraay (2012) and DeLong and Summers (2012) similarly have large values for the multiplier. 
Leduc and Wilson (2012) also estimated the multiplier for highway spending to be twice as large 
during a recession.  
14
 Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and Wieland (2010) underestimate the size of the multiplier because in their 
model fiscal policy does not have a significantly different effect when the nominal interest rate is at 
the zero bound and there is substantial economic slack.   
15
 Their methodology follows that of Auerbach and Gorodnichencko (2012.)  
16
 Gagnon, Gaudreault and Overton (2008) estimated that bridges, roads and water treatment plants 
in Canada had reached 57%, 53% and 63% of their expected useful life respectively. 
17
 The Liberal Platform had originally announced infrastructure spending in the amount of $17 
billion over four years, with $5 billion to be spent during each of the first two years and $3.5 billion 
in the third and fourth year. Instead, the Budget 2016 announcement presents two phases, as 
discussed below. There has evidently been a rearrangement of spending over a longer ten-year 
period with substantially larger allocations to infrastructure over this period than announced in the 
Liberal Platform. Liberal Party of Canada (2015a and 2015b).  
18
 To quote the Prime Minister, during his interview with Bloomberg on March 22, 2016, “We’re 
going to do … things that you don’t get to cut a ribbon and announce a shiny new building on.” 
(Bloomberg, 2016) This contrasts with the Conservative government’s very politicized approach to 
infrastructure investment pointed out by Doern, Auld and Stoney (2015).  
19
 The following relies on Chapter 2 of Budget 2016 entitled “Growth for the Middle Class.”  
20
 As indicated in Budget 2016 (p. 242): “The Gas Tax Fund is projected to grow from $2.0 billion 
in 2015–16 to $2.2 billion in 2020–21 as these payments are indexed at 2.0 per cent per year, with 
increases applied in $100 million increments.” 
21
 This Crown corporation became fully operational in 2009 with a board of directors that included 
several members with very close ties to the private sector. This aspect, according to Bordeleau 
(2012), creates a “public administration malaise” (p. 148) since it generates an incentive problem. 
Namely, it becomes unclear whether decisions relating to the spending of public funds will indeed 
be taken to benefit public welfare or instead, the private sector.    
22
 Canada failed to reduce emissions to the levels agreed on in the 1997 Kyoto Accord, and the 
Conservative government withdrew Canada from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011, the first (and only) 
country to do so. The US and China were not signatories of the Accord, a fact that was brought 
forward by the Conservative government among its justifications for Canada’s withdrawal. (Reguly 
and McCarthy, 2015). 
23
 Further initiatives to help the development of clean technologies are also included in Budget 
2016, such as $50 million over four years provided to the Sustainable Development Technology 
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Canada’s Tech Fund to develop “new technologies that address climate change, air quality, clean 
water, and clean soil” as well as  $82.5 million over two years to Natural Resources Canada to 
support the development of “clean energy technologies … reducing the environmental impacts of 
energy production and creating clean jobs.” (pp. 150-51). In addition, $50 million over two years 
will be given to Natural Resources Canada “to invest in technologies that will reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions in the oil and gas sector” (p.154); and $2 billion over two years to establish a Low 
Carbon Economy Fund. “The Fund will support provincial and territorial actions that materially 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions… Resources will be allocated towards those projects that yield the 
greatest absolute greenhouse gas reductions for the lowest cost per tonne.” (p. 157). 
24
 The urgent need for spending on clean water infrastructure became quite evident when 
contaminated water caused the death of seven residents and the illness of more than 2300 residents 
in Walkerton, Ontario in May 2000. Hence, such infrastructure responds not only to environmental 
concerns, but also to urgent health concerns.  
25
 Repairing roads and bridges is necessary to prevent tragedies such as the one in in September 
2006, in the City of Laval, Quebec, when the Concorde Boulevard overpass bridge, built in 1970, 
collapsed on top of Highway 19 killing five persons and severely injuring six others. Yet, it had 
received an approval for 35 more years of service during a maintenance check in 2005 just one year 
before the tragic event. (See Crisis and Disaster Management Research and Training Initiative, 
2014). This observation points to the necessity of using more modern techniques “to predict the 
time-dependent changes in structural load capacity of a reinforced concrete highway bridge 
investment” and other infrastructure investments in order to increase their life-cycle value and to 
eliminate or reduce investments during the operations stage, as advanced by recent research in civil 
engineering. (See Sundholm, Lepech and Wikström, 2015.)  
26
 The Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) has about 2000 members who represent 
almost 90% of the Canadian population and own 56.8% of Canada’s core public infrastructure such 
as water systems, roads and bridges, buildings, sport and recreation facilities and public transit.  
Infrastructure related to other waste management, affordable housing, energy systems, and 
information and communication technologies also owned by municipalities is not included in this 
figure. Provinces own 41.4% of core infrastructure while the federal government owns only 1.8%. 
(Canadian Infrastructure Report Card, 2016, p. 5.) 
27According to the Mayor of Calgary, the Prime Minister’s commitment was what all mayors had 
been requesting and it is “a really, really big deal.” See Curry (2016).  
28
 Risk refers to a random event whose probability distribution is known. It is therefore possible to 
assign probabilities to these events. Uncertainty, on the other hand, refers to random events whose 
probabilities are not known, and which may not even be elements of the set of events taken into 
account by the decision-maker. They cannot be assigned probabilities and in that sense are truly 
unexpected. 
29
 The uncertainties are even larger when the project involves innovative techniques or materials 
that have not yet withstood the test of time. 
30
 For example, speeding up projects to meet deadlines may lead to even greater cost overruns. 
(Lessard et al., 2014). 
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31
 For an analysis of the impact of irreversibility in the presence of uncertainty on investment, see 
Demers, Demers and Altug (2003) which also analyzes the real-options approach. 
32
 The appropriate approach to irreversible investment projects is based on real options which is an 
extension of the Black-Scholes financial options pricing method. The essence of this approach 
consists of maintaining flexibility in the decision-making process, not committing too soon and 
preserving the option to adapt to unforeseen circumstances and new information. See Miller and 
Lessard (2008). 
33
 In an analysis of 52 large projects with costs exceeding $500 million, Merrow, McDonnell and 
Argüden (1988, p. iv) note: “Doing something different -even slightly different- … dramatically 
increases the probability of operational problems.” 
34
 As Lessard, Sakhrani and Miller (2014) point out, the Eurotunnel Project involved both technical 
and institutional risks: “… the governments of UK and France had to pass new legislation to enable 
the new border crossing between the two nations, which represented a major institutional 
undertaking. Stakeholders with disparate interests had to be aligned by revamping regulation on 
both sides of the Tunnel…. the distance to be traversed in tunneling presented the major technical 
challenge…. Once the tunnel concept was locked in, the architectural decision to fast-track the 
project by concurrently tunneling from both ends raised the logistical challenge of excavating 
tunneling debris, further increasing the technical complexity of the project. … Safety-related design 
changes late in the execution process because of changing regulations delayed the project, thereby 
increasing costs and decreasing its profitability.” (p. 176) 
35
 Bad weather, strikes, delays in the delivery of inputs, construction in remote areas may also 
constitute significant risks for certain types of projects. 
36
 Wherever possible, taking a modular approach by breaking up a large project into consecutive 
smaller ones may provide greater flexibility in the planning and design of such projects “…creating 
opportunities for adaptive process management and no-regret policy.” See Priemus and van Wee 
(2013). 
37
 Flyvbjerg’s (2007) study provides an illustration for urban rail projects. In a study of 44 urban rail 
projects completed between 1966 and 1997, 18 of which North American, 13 European, and 13 in 
other parts of the world, the actual cost of the project exceeded its forecast by 35.8% in North 
America and 44.9% overall. The data for bridges and tunnels indicate similarly high cost overruns 
(33.8%). (p. 16) Depending on the type and magnitude of the infrastructure project, it is not 
altogether uncommon to see actual costs that are 200% of the projected ones. Just as costs are often 
underestimated, benefits of some projects also tend to be overinflated. Flyvbjerg (2005, p. 3) 
observes an overestimation of railway ridership by 105.6% on average over 25 analyzed projects.  
38
 Flyvbjerg (2005) appeals to Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory and optimism-bias, and to 
Lovallo and Kahneman’s (2003) delusional optimism.  
39
 Thus, in an article in the San Francisco Chronicle in July 2013, the Mayor of San Francisco 
defended the US $300 million cost overrun of the San Francisco Transbay Project by saying: “In 
the world of civic projects, the first budget is really just a down payment. If people knew the real 
cost from the start, nothing would ever be approved. The idea is to get going. Start digging a hole 
and make it so big, there’s no alternative to coming up with the money to fill it in.” The quote 
appears in Flybjerg (2014, p. 12). 
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40
 Merrow (2011) shows that poor project definition increases the level of costs and completion 
time by about 25% and also substantially increases their variability, thus raising the riskiness of the 
project. See chapter 10, Figures 10.6 and 10.7.  
41
 For a thorough discussion of how to accurately assess these broader benefits in the context of 
transport projects, see Venables (2016). 
42
 See also Salet et al. (2013) for an interesting account of how inadequate project definition and 
rigidity in the planning stage led to a suboptimal solution in the case of the high speed rail project 
(HSL South) in the Netherlands. They emphasize the need for the “framing and re-framing” of 
complex projects and for reaching out to different stakeholders to explore all the different views on 
the scope of the project.  
43
 In the case of willful misrepresentation of forecasts, Flyvbjerg advocates that perpetrators even 
face criminal charges. Flyvbjerg (2008, p. 138).  
44
 The following discussion of the Commissioner’s recommendations and the government’s 
responses is based on the Commissioner’s report published on the web page of the Office of the 
Auditor General of Canada. (See Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2016). 
45
 In relation to this point, Budget 2016, (p. 94) indicates that: “… Infrastructure Canada will work 
with Statistics Canada to improve infrastructure-related data.” 
46
 In a recent interview the Prime Minister “said he is working on a wholesale change in relations 
among levels of government in Canada, after several years when Harper met rarely with premiers 
and preferred not to deal directly with municipal governments.” (Wells, 2016). 
47
 See, for example among others, Iacobacci (2010), Gill and Dymick (2013), Lammam, MacIntyre 
and Berechman (2013), Vining, Boardman and Poschman (2005), Boardman and Vining (2010, 
2012) and Boardman, Siemiatycki and Vining (2016).  
48
 In cases where the government is in charge of designing the project, however, the scope for 
innovation on the part of the private partner may be more limited.  Koppenjan (2008). 
49
As de Bettignies and Ross (2004, p.147) note, however, it may not always be the case that 
governments can borrow at a cheaper rate. Provincial governments with large budget deficits may 
see their overall credit rating affected by further borrowing.  
50
 It must be noted that quantifying risks is as important to the assessment of the traditional 
procurement model as it is to the PPP model, since these risks are borne by one of the parties in any 
case, but remain mostly hidden in the case of the traditional model. As mentioned above, this is the 
reason that Flyvbjerg recommends the use of “reference groups” of similar projects when 
evaluating these risks. 
51
 The consulting agencies are the Altus Helyar Cost Consulting Group (2007) and more recently 
the MMM Group. Altus Helyar’s risk matrices date from 2007. See the risk matrix for DBFM and 
for BF types of PPPs respectively in 
http://www.infrastructureontario.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147488712 and 
http://www.infrastructureontario.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147488711. 
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 More recently, (September 2015) a new document prepared by Altus Helyar entitled “Assessment 
of Innovation through AFP Project Delivery,” provides some quantification for the contribution to 
innovation of a few PPP projects. However, the available empirical data are not extensive. 
52 Pal (2011) also evaluates the stimulus funding undertaken by the Conservative government during 
the last recession in 2008-9. He concludes that although it stabilized the economy, the program’s 
impact on jobs created was not evaluated and it lacked transparency. Furthermore, since it was not 
planned ahead, projects with long-term growth benefits could not be chosen. 
 
53
 It should be noted that the new Ottawa LRT project started in 2012 (also referred to as the 
Confederation Line) is also a PPP with the Rideau Transit Group consortium which includes SNC-
Lavalin and ACS Infrastructure among other partners. It is currently under construction. 
54
 Bruce Power is a private company owned by TransCanada Corp., the Ontario Municipal 
Employees Retirement System and the Power Workers’ Union. 
55
 “Green bonds are a way to finance projects that support important environmental objectives. 
They are also a way for investors to know that their money will be used in an environmentally 
sound manner.” Budget 2016, p. 154. 
56
 Some municipalities may not have access to borrowing because their debt-to-municipal-revenue 
ratio or debt service charges as a percentage of municipal revenue are too high.  
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Chapter 3 
 
CANADA NEEDS AN ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY, NOT  
A SMALL BUSINESS POLICY 
 
John Lester 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Federal and provincial governments have a substantial number of policies that support small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and their owners. The key motivation for providing extra 
support for SMEs is that they are considered a major source of employment growth and 
innovation, leading to rising living standards, but face barriers impeding their full development. 
These policy measures are delivered through the tax system, through government business 
enterprises and through direct spending programs. In the 2013-14 fiscal year, federal support 
targeted at small business and their owners amounted to $6 billion, or about 40% of all federal 
support for business.
1
  
Most of these measures are available to all SMEs. However, a very small number of 
firms are responsible for the bulk of employment creation and innovation, so broad-based 
support for small business runs the risk of harming rather than helping economic performance by 
encouraging small scale, less efficient production. A more satisfactory policy framework would 
have a more nuanced approach to dealing with the obstacles faced by SMEs and would promote 
a favourable environment for the entrepreneurs that have a high impact on innovation and 
prosperity.  
                                                             
1 See Table 2 in the text. Information on overall business subsidies is provided in Lester (forthcoming). 
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Despite emphasizing the importance of entrepreneurship and innovation, federal policy 
remained tilted towards broad-based support for SMEs under the Conservative government. It is 
too soon to draw firm conclusions about the policy direction of the Liberal government, but 
initiatives announced in the 2016 budget were focussed on innovative and growth-oriented 
businesses. The two percentage point reduction in the small business tax rate legislated under the 
Conservatives was partially reversed.
2
 In addition, funding to support innovation networks and 
clusters was increased and more funding to support high-impact firms was also announced.  
Federal measures to support small business and entrepreneurship can be grouped into three 
broad groups: financing programs, support for R&D and tax measures for SMEs that are 
particularly beneficial to entrepreneurs. The analysis in this chapter sets the stage for 
recommendations to: 
 Improve financing programs by eliminating the special low income tax rate for SMEs 
and restructuring the Business Development Bank of Canada; 
 Eliminate the gap between the federal R&D tax credit for large and smaller firms and 
restrict the “stacking” of benefits from other federal and provincial programs; and, 
 Use the savings from the above measures to fine-tune some existing tax measures that 
benefit entrepreneurs and implement some general tax changes that would be of 
particular benefit to high-impact entrepreneurs.  
 
HIGH-IMPACT ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Small business benefits from a highly positive image in Canada and many other countries. SMEs 
are correctly seen as the drivers of employment growth and as important contributors to 
innovation. Data from Statistics Canada confirms that SMEs create most of the jobs in Canada. 
Over the 2001 to 2013 period, SMEs (defined as firms with less than 500 employees) accounted 
for approximately 90% of net employment creation in the private sector (Table 3.1). Their 
                                                             
2 The reduction was to be phased-in over four years beginning in 2016. The half-point reduction in 2016 was 
allowed to stand. 
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impact on job creation arises, however, from a small fraction of firms: most small businesses 
start small and stay small or exit. MacDonald (2012) reports that in 2002, 94% of startups had 5 
or less employees and that almost half had stopped operating after 3 years. Dixon and Rollin 
(2014) examine employment dynamics in Canada over the 2000-2009 period and find that a 
large number of firms experience very little employment growth each year while a small number 
either grow or decline rapidly. The authors also find that age rather than size is a better predictor 
of rapid firm growth – young firms of any size are more likely to grow than mature firms. 
SMEs are also responsible for many new products and services that have a profound 
impact on our well-being. But these innovations are introduced by a small fraction of all small 
firms. Hurst and Pugsley (2011) estimate that 10-20% of US small firms could be described as 
innovative, in that they successfully develop and commercialize new ideas. Following 
Henrekson and Stenkula (2010), the owners of these firms are described as “high-impact” 
entrepreneurs to distinguish them from the typical owner of a small business.  
Programs that subsidize all SMEs are therefore inefficient because most of the benefits 
will be received by firms that do not grow or innovate. Policy should be focussed on ensuring 
that high-impact entrepreneurs do not face unwarranted obstacles to starting and growing firms. 
To do this, governments have to identify and act on market failures as well as mitigate 
unintended impacts of policy on high-impact entrepreneurs and their firms. Implementing this 
approach does not require governments to identify high-impact entrepreneurs before the fact; it 
Firm Size (employees) 0 to 4 5 to 19 20 to 49 50 to 99 100 to 499 500 and up Total 
Number of  jobs created 415,533  440,975  321,818  199,874  339,556  173,594  1,891,349  
Share of total 22.0% 23.3% 17.0% 10.6% 18.0% 9.2% 100.0%
Source: Cansim Tables 527-0004 and 527-0006 and calculations by the author.
Table 1: Net Private Sector Job Creation by Firm Size 2001 to 2013
88 
 
involves creating conditions favourable to their success. This approach is described as 
entrepreneurship policy because it focuses on the incentives for individuals to create and grow 
the innovative firms that make a disproportionate contribution to growth and prosperity.  
The next section reviews the rationales for providing support to high-impact 
entrepreneurs, focussing primarily on the innovative firms they operate. The emphasis is on 
startups and younger firms, which are the major source of employment growth and which 
experience entry barriers and more difficulties obtaining external finance for expansion than 
established firms. The analysis sets the stage for a technical assessment of existing federal 
programs in section 4 of the chapter. 
RATIONALES FOR SUPPORTING HIGH-IMPACT ENTREPRENEURSHIP
3
 
The most common rationales for supporting innovative startups relate to financing, R&D and the 
unintended impacts of tax policy. Other factors often cited as reasons for supporting innovative 
startups are barriers to entry erected by existing firms, spillovers from learning by doing, 
agglomeration or network effects and signalling effects from entry.  
The difference between private and social benefits is an important theme running through 
the analysis of these factors. When markets are functioning properly, private and social benefits 
are aligned so that individuals and firms acting in their own interest will generate a socially 
efficient outcome. When markets do not capture all of the social benefits (or costs) of private 
actions, individuals and firms acting in their own interest confer additional benefits (or impose 
additional costs) on society. The existence of these external benefits or costs, usually called 
externalities or spillovers, is a necessary condition for successful government intervention.  
                                                             
3 The discussion in this section was influenced by Boadway and Tremblay (2005). 
89 
 
Financial Barriers 
The conventional wisdom is that SMEs have inadequate access to financing for expansion and 
growth, leading to underinvestment in the sector. Economic analysis confirms that capital 
markets do not function perfectly, largely because lenders and investors have difficulty assessing 
the quality of specific projects and of the entrepreneur seeking finance. The consequences of this 
difficulty vary by type of startup.  
The most common form of formal outside financing for SMEs is bank loans. Given the 
difficulty assessing individual projects and individuals, loans are offered at interest rates that on 
average will cover costs by class of project. But many individuals seeking finance have better 
information on the quality of their investment than lenders, so borrowers with high-risk, high-
return (if successful) projects are more likely to apply for loans than those with low-risk, low-
return projects, who will consider the cost of financing too high. Defaults on the high-risk loans 
increase costs and loan rates, which in turn drives borrowers with low-risk projects out of the 
market.  
If this were the end of the story, the impact on investment would be ambiguous: too many 
lower-quality projects would be financed, but this would be offset by financing of too few 
higher-quality projects (Boadway and Keen 2006). The rational response of lenders loan losses is 
to spend more effort assessing project quality. This improves profitability but borrower mobility 
means that these extra costs cannot be recovered from higher risk borrowers. Faced with higher 
interest rates, lower-quality borrowers can apply for credit at a competing institution, which can 
undercut the interest rate offered by the amount of the assessment premium since they would 
have no need to undertake an independent assessment (Boadway and Sato 1999). As a result, 
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assessment costs get shifted to the higher quality loans, which makes overall underinvestment the 
more likely outcome.  
Subsidizing borrowing costs for all SMEs does not mitigate this problem. In contrast, a 
loan guarantee program addresses the market failure by reducing the effort lenders expend 
assessing loan quality, which lowers the interest rates charged on better quality loans. On the 
other hand, a loan guarantee reduces the interest rate charged on lower quality loans below its 
efficient level, so if the portion of the loan guaranteed is too high, economic efficiency could be 
harmed rather than helped. A second policy response to dealing with high assessment costs is for 
governments to become direct lenders. A government-supported bank could promote efficiency 
by pricing loans to risk and not recovering the cost of assessing loan quality. The potential 
improvement in efficiency may not be realized if the public sector bank is not as good at 
assessing risk as private sector banks, which is a legitimate concern since a public bank has less 
of an incentive to maximize profits. 
The higher risk associated with bringing an innovative product or service to market often 
results in recourse to equity financing. Parallel to the debt-financing case, investors cannot assess 
project quality as well as entrepreneurs, so they end up financing too many low-quality projects. 
However, with equity financing, costs do not get shifted among entrepreneurs, so there is no 
offsetting underinvestment (Boadway and Keen 2006). Braido, da Costa and Dahlby (2011) 
demonstrate that the over-investment result may not apply to initial funding of innovative 
startups (“seed capital”) if entrepreneurs need a premium to invest in their own risky projects. At 
a minimum, entrepreneurs will require a rate of return on their investment that compensates for 
the higher risk of the investment. However, borrowers contemplating allocating a substantial 
fraction of their wealth to a business venture may require an extra premium before they are 
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willing to make such a commitment. If so, entrepreneurs would invest less in risky projects than 
is socially optimal, which would justify government intervention to increase the supply of 
venture capital seed financing. 
While market forces may result an excessive supply of later stage venture capital, too 
little advice and screening will be supplied. Advice raises the profitability of entrepreneurial 
projects, but venture capitalists only own part of the enterprise, so they only get a partial return 
on their effort. Government support designed to increase the return to advice by venture 
capitalists could therefore improve economic performance. Project screening by venture 
capitalists provides entrepreneurs with a more realistic appreciation of the quality of their 
projects and could therefore result in fewer resources being wasted on low-quality projects. 
However, venture capitalists will invest in screening only to the extent that their private gains 
and losses are equalized. They will not consider the social benefits that arise from dropping low-
quality projects, so subsidizing venture capitalists to provide additional screening services and 
basic advice would be socially beneficial.  
Direct provision of advice by government agencies could also be beneficial. Such advice 
could be a substitute for screening by venture capitalists. Government-provided advice could 
also raise the probability of success of particularly high-risk conventional projects, for which 
venture capital financing would not be appropriate.  
R&D Spillovers 
There is a solid case for supporting R&D undertaken by SMEs and other firms. The line of 
argument starts with the observation that firms performing R&D cannot retain all of the benefits 
for themselves. Some of the knowledge created inevitably spills over to other firms, which they 
use to reduce production costs, create new production processes or introduce new products and 
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services. The firm performing R&D is focussed on its own benefits and costs when deciding how 
much to spend on R&D and does not consider these spillover benefits, so society has an interest 
in encouraging additional R&D. The nuance in the argument is that innovations reduce the value 
of investments by existing firms, which has a social cost, so the net benefit could in principle be 
positive or negative. Empirical work finds spillover benefits that are generally thought to be 
large enough to generate a net benefit. Recent work by Bloom et al. (2013) confirms that the net 
benefit is positive even if the loss in value of existing investments is taken into consideration. 
The outstanding issue is whether additional support for small firms is justified. 
Qualitative analysis does not provide clear guidance and there is only one study that provides 
empirical evidence on the social benefits of R&D by size of firm. Bloom et al. (2013) present 
evidence that the net benefit rises with firm size. Their explanation for this finding is that smaller 
firms operate in technological “niches”, which limits the scope for knowledge spillovers. The 
niche effect is substantial: spillovers associated with the smallest size category in their sample 
(less than 500 employees) are only 55% as large as spillovers associated with the largest size 
category. While it would not be prudent to advocate treating small firms less generously than 
larger firms based on one study, the case for more generous treatment is weak. 
Unintended Consequences of Tax Policy 
A number of tax policy measures have unintended impacts on entrepreneurship. In most tax 
systems, asymmetric treatment of corporate profits and losses raises the effective tax rate on 
startups. Existing firms are able to deduct losses incurred during the introduction of a new 
product or technology from other revenue streams. Losses can also be used to reduce taxable 
income in previous years. Startups incurring losses can only carry them forward for deduction 
against future profits. Since the losses carried forward are held constant in nominal terms, 
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startups will on average face a higher effective tax rate on innovation than existing, diversified 
firms. The impact of this asymmetry could be mitigated by ‘indexing’ the value of losses carried 
forward. 
Capital gains and losses are not treated symmetrically in most tax systems, which 
discourages risk-taking. Capital gains are taxed upon realization, but capital losses can only be 
deducted against capital gains. Investment in projects with a greater variance in rates of return 
will therefore face a higher effective tax rate than investment in less risky projects. Finally, since 
there is a substantial fixed-cost component to tax compliance, small firms will in general suffer a 
disadvantage relative to larger firms.  
Other Rationales 
A number of other factors suggest that the number of innovative startups will be too low from 
society’s perspective. These include barriers to entry and externalities associated with learning 
by doing, entry signalling effects and agglomeration or network effects.  
 Existing firms have an incentive to overinvest in capital, advertising and patents in order 
to deter entry. 
 Experience working with new technologies and production methods raises productivity. 
Some of this knowledge spills over to other firms, but this social benefit does not affect 
the decision to enter. 
 Entry also provides a signal about the profitability of products and processes that benefits 
other firms, causing entry to fall below the social optimum.  
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 Innovative startups may have less flexibility than larger firms about location decisions so 
it could be more difficult for them to take advantage of agglomeration or network 
economies.  
In addition, labour market imperfections have a clear adverse effect on the entry and 
performance of innovative startups. 
A general conclusion of this section is that, on balance, innovative startups face barriers 
that adversely affect entry and growth. Acting directly on these issues is not always possible and 
when it is, the cost of intervention can exceed the benefit. As a result, a bias to subsidizing 
entrepreneurial activity as a second-best policy may be appropriate..   
Assessment of Federal Programs and Policies 
Federal government programs that support small business and entrepreneurship are presented in 
Table 2. These programs are delivered through the tax system, through direct spending programs 
and through the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC). Official sources indicate that 
these programs have a total cost of about $5 ½ billion. However, the cost of programs delivered 
by the BDC is understated and the total cost of the enhanced Scientific Research and 
Experimental Development (SR&ED) tax credit overstates the extra benefit provided to SMEs. 
The adjusted cost of support programs is about $6 billion, which represents about 40% of all 
federal support for business.
4
  
Programs are classified as supporting small business or entrepreneurship largely on 
whether they provide support to all small businesses or whether they are restricted to SMEs with 
specific characteristics or undertaking certain activities. For example, the small business 
                                                             
4
 Lester (forthcoming) estimates that federal support for business from all sources was approximately $15 ½ billion 
in 2013. This support is provided through spending programs, tax incentives, losses on loans and equity investments 
and through the activities of government business enterprises.  
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deduction, loan guarantees and loans provided by the Business Development Bank (BDC) are 
available to all firms meeting the definition of an SME. In contrast, BDC venture capital 
financing and the enhanced SR&ED tax credit are restricted to innovative small firms. Based on 
adjusted costs, programs are tilted roughly 80-20 in favour of general support for small business 
as opposed to benefiting innovative startups and their owners. There are, however, a number of 
programs available to all SMEs that are particularly  
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Policy Description
Type of 
Support
Reported Adjusted
3
Financing Programs
Small Business Deduction 
Low rate of income tax on up to $500,000 of active business 
income; reduced to to zero as assets rise from $10 to $15 m. 
SB 3030.0 3,030.0    
Small Business Financing (Loan guarantee program)
Government pays 85% of loan losses, capped at about 12% of 
value of portfolio. Fees cover about 70% of program costs.
SB 59.2 8.3           
Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) Financing--direct provision of loans SB -433.8 822.8       
Subordinate financing--direct supply of higher risk instruments E -16.0 22.2         
Venture capital program E 11.4 51.0         
Consulting -- below-cost provision of business advice E 16.9 16.9         
Securitization--promote asset-based financing by small fincos SB -5.8 19.2
Venture capital action plan 1.4 1.8
Total BDC -425.9 933.9       
Labour-sponsored venture capital corporations tax credit 15% tax credit on up to $5,000 investment in these entities.  E 145.0     145.0     
Subtotal Financing Programs 2,808.3 4,117.2    
Other programs targeted at small business
Hiring Credit for small business Reduction in employment insurance premiums SB 225.0     225.0     
Spending programs supporting small business Regional development SB 177.4     177.4     
Youth employment strategy SB 5.1        5.1        
Community futures program SB 2.1        2.1        
Subtotal other programs 409.6     409.6     
Support for R&D and innovation
Enhanced SR&ED Investment Tax Credit Higher refundable tax credit for R&D small firms (35% vs.15%) E 1,455.0  831.4     
Industrial Research Assistance Program Subsidies and free advice for undertaking R&D. E 168.1     168.1     
Digital Technology Adoption Program Subsidies and free advice for firms adopting digital technologies. E 24.2      24.2      
Subtotal: Support for R&D and Innovation 1,647.3 1,023.8 
Spending programs supporting entrepreneurship Youth Business Foundation, Women's Enterprise Initiative E 14.9      14.9      
Non-targeted programs supporting entrepreneurship
Lifetime Capital Gains Exemption
Up to $800,000 capital gains tax exemption on disposition of 
shares in Canadian-controlled private corporations.
SB 580.0     580.0     
Deduction of Allowable Business Investment Losses
Capital losses deductible from ordinary income when they exceed 
realized capital gains.
SB 39.0      39.0      
Rollover of investments 
Sales of small business shares do not trigger a capital gain if the 
proceeds are re-invested in another small business
SB 4.0        4.0        
Employee Stock Option Deduction
Only half of the employee benefit is included in income. Available 
to all employees.
SB N.A. N.A.
Subtotal: non-targeted support for entrepreneurship 623.0    623.0    
Total Support 5,503.1    6,173.5    
Percent of total support
Entrepreneurship 33.1% 20.6%
Small business 66.7% 79.3%
1. Excluding agriculture and fishing. 2. Fiscal year 2013-14 for spending programs. 3. See text for explanation.  Legend: SB Small Business; E Entrepreneurship
Sources: Finance Canada (2014); Public Accounts of Canada 2014; Business Development Bank Annual Report 2014; Budget 2013; and author's calculations. 
Table 2: Federal Tax and Spending Programs that Support Small Business and Entrepreneurship
1
 2013
2
Cost ($ Million)
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beneficial to high-impact entrepreneurs. These include the lifetime capital gains exemption on 
the sale of small business shares and employee stock option deductions. Including these 
programs in the entrepreneurship category would raise its share of the total to 30%.  
Financing Programs 
The most expensive federal capital market initiative is the small business deduction (SDB), 
which provides a tax preference for SMEs financing capacity-expanding investment with 
retained earnings. The special low rate of income tax is available on up to $500,000 of active 
business income. The federal small business tax advantage has been 4% points since 2012, 
resulting in a maximum tax reduction of $20,000 per year. 
The SBD has two social benefits. First, it mitigates a problem some SMEs have accessing 
financing. Second, it stimulates additional investment by SMEs. The key social cost arises from 
the need to recover the tax revenue forgone by the measure. For example, if the financing source 
is higher taxes on larger firms, it imposes a cost by encouraging a shift in investment from large 
to less-efficient small-scale firms. Baldwin, Leung and Rispoli (2014) report that in 2008 labour 
productivity in SMEs (firms with less than 500 employees) was 55% of labour productivity in 
large firms in Canada.  
Dachis and Lester (2015) demonstrate that the SBD is harming economic performance as 
the cost of shifting capital from large to small firms outweighs the benefit of improved access to 
capital for smaller firms. (The benefit-cost framework used by Dachis and Lester is summarized 
in Box 1.) The net social cost represents about a fifth of the tax revenue forgone through the 
SBD, or approximately $600 million in 2013.
5
 A general point to be made is that because 
                                                             
5 This estimate overstates the long-run gain. The SBD is only available to finance capacity-expanding investment. 
Once a small business stops expanding, profits are taxed at the large business rate. As a result, the SBD is more like 
a long-term loan than a permanent tax reduction. Unfortunately, the value of the “loan repayments” is not included 
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government intervention can be costly, correcting a market failure does not always pay off. 
Mintz and Chen (2011) also recommend eliminating the SBD, but out of concern that a two-
tiered rate creates disincentives to grow.   
The small business financing program (SBFP) guarantees loans originating in the private 
sector. The government pays 85% of losses on defaulted loans, but for large lenders total default 
claims cannot exceed approximately 12% of the value of the loan portfolio. In exchange for the 
guarantee, lenders cap interest rates on loans and collect a fee for the government. In 2014, the 
total value of new loans registered with the federal government was $853 million, trending down 
from about $1 billion in 2011 (Industry Canada 2014). The cost of the SBFP net of fees collected 
was $8 million.  
A government-sponsored loan guarantee program allows higher-risk borrowers gain 
access to credit without driving up the cost for other borrowers. Applying the same methodology 
as in Dachis and Lester (2015), indicates that the benefit from providing additional credit is more 
or less offset by administration expenses and the cost of financing defaults less fees charged. 
Factors affecting the program’s effectiveness include a relatively substantial share of loans 
guaranteed that would have obtained conventional financing from a commercial lender – the 
program’s incrementality is less than 100% – and relatively low caps on interest rates that can be 
charged by lenders participating in the program.  
The SBFP should be retained with some fine-tuning to improve its performance. In 
particular, the interest rate caps should be revisited. An increase in the caps would raise take-up. 
With no change to the loan guarantee provisions, benefits and costs would rise by the same 
percentage, so the dollar value of the net benefit would increase. Ex post assessment of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
in the fiscal cost of the SBD, so the benefit from its elimination is overstated. See Dachis and Lester (2015) for 
additional detail.  
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borrowers who have been offered loan guarantees would raise program incrementality, but 
efforts have to be focussed in order to prevent additional administration expenses from absorbing 
the savings.  
The Business Development Bank (BDC) 
The BDC is a government business enterprise that provides debt and equity financing as well as 
advice to SMEs. The BDC’s mandate is to provide services that are complementary to rather 
than competitive with private sector suppliers. BDC makes an accounting profit based on a cost 
of capital of about 1%.
6
 BDC’s true cost of capital is substantially higher. Funds used by BDC 
could have been deployed elsewhere in the economy. Jenkins and Kuo (2007) recommend using 
                                                             
6 Calculated as interest and dividends paid to the federal government divided by loans and share capital provided by 
the federal government.  
Box 1: Benefit-Cost Analysis 
When governments implement policies that favour SMEs and entrepreneurship, the expectation is that 
the real income of Canadians will be higher as a result. Benefit-cost analysis provides a framework for 
assessing if this expectation is realized. 
When markets are functioning properly, capital and labour are being used as efficiently as possible, so 
there will be a benefit from government intervention only when markets fail to allocate resources to 
their best uses. This is in contrast to the popular view that the increase in output and employment 
arising from a business subsidy is proof of policy success. A benefit-cost analysis recognizes that the 
direct gains in output and employment will be more or less exactly offset by indirect losses caused by 
the higher taxes or lower spending required to finance the intervention.  
Further, raising taxes to finance a spending program will in itself harm economic performance through 
negative effects on incentives to work, save and invest. Empirical research (Dahlby and Ferede, 2012) 
indicates that on average raising an extra dollar of tax revenue reduces economic efficiency by 25 to 
30 cents. Shifting the burden of corporate income taxation among sectors (e.g. from small to large 
corporations) will also affect economic performance if the affected sectors are not equally productive. 
Government intervention in the economy imposes an additional cost by shifting resources from their 
most efficient private use. That is, government assistance allows projects to go ahead that have a 
below-market private rate of return and this lower return represents a loss in economic output. This 
loss occurs even if the policy is addressing a market failure.  
Additional administration and compliance costs arising from policy initiatives absorb resources that 
could be used more productively elsewhere, and so are included as a cost in the benefit-cost 
framework.  
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an 8 per cent real rate of return for this economic opportunity cost of capital in Canada. Using 
this estimate, BDC makes a substantial loss on its operations (last column in Table 2). However, 
making a loss is not necessarily a problem since there could be offsetting social benefits from the 
BDC’s operations.  
The Financing Program is a direct loan program that is described by BDC as offering 
financing to SMEs with a higher risk profile than those financed by private lenders, although an 
explicit comparison is not made. The value of the loan portfolio was $17.2 billion in the 2014 
fiscal year. A public direct lending program could result in a net social benefit if loans are made 
to relatively risky borrowers and if these loans are priced to risk, excluding the cost of assessing 
loan quality. An implication of these conditions is that the Financing Program should make a loss 
that is approximately equal to the cost of assessing loan quality. These conditions do not appear 
to be met.  
 The average interest rate and the default rate on Financing Program loans are lower than 
on SBPF guaranteed loans,
7
 suggesting that the risk profile of borrowers is too low.  
 The Financing Program recorded a profit of $433 million in 2014. However, evaluated 
using an 8% cost of capital, the loss was $920 million. This loss is more than 2 ½ times 
total operating and administrative expenses attributed to the Program, so it clearly covers 
more than the cost of assessing loan quality. 
In addition to indicating that the Financing Program imposes a net cost on society, this outcome 
suggests that the Financing Program is using its below-market cost of capital to compete with 
                                                             
7 In 2014, SBFP variable and fixed rate loans were capped at 6% and 7.9% respectively. The average interest rate on 
Financing Program loans was 5.4%. On average from 2000 to 2009, the SBFP default rate was 9.6%, compared to 
6.1% for the Financing Program. (The SBFP default rate was calculated using loan and claims data accessed at: 
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/csbfp-pfpec.nsf/eng/h_la00039.html (Tables 10a, 10b and 10c).) 
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commercial lenders. The Financing Program should therefore be restructured either to meet the 
conditions for an efficiency-enhancing public bank or to offer guarantees on loans issued by the 
private sector. A BDC loan guarantee program could be integrated with the SBFP to secure 
additional efficiencies. 
BDC’s Subordinate Financing Program targets high-potential firms that need financing 
to sustain growth or to transition from one owner to the next (BDC 2015, 24). The program 
makes debt and some equity-like investments that have subordinate status relative to other debt 
issued by firms. The value of the portfolio in 2014 was approximately $575 million. Subordinate 
Financing clients have a higher risk profile than Financing Program clients: interest income per 
dollar of loan issued was 9.3% compared to 5.4% for the Financing Program.  
The Subordinate Financing Program therefore may meet the minimum requirements for a 
successful public direct lending program. The net social cost of the program represents about .6 
cents per dollar of financing provided, or less than $4 million in fiscal 2014. The benefit-cost 
analysis does not capture the role that the Subordinate Financing program may be playing in 
providing financing for projects too risky for conventional debt but not suitable for venture 
capital financing because the expected return is too low. As a result, the net social benefit is 
understated.  
The benefit-cost analysis suggests that the Subordinated Financing Program should be 
fine-tuned rather than eliminated. Consistent with the analysis in the preceding section, it would 
be worth investigating if more resources should be allocated to screening and advising loan 
applicants. The possibility acting as a passive investor in partnership with commercial lenders 
should also be investigated. (Details on how this would work are provided below in the section 
describing BDC’s venture capital business line.) 
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BDC also provides advice to entrepreneurs at below-market rates. The percentage of 
costs recovered through fees has been on a downward trend since 2010; in 2015 the cost 
recovery rate was 41.3%, a bit more than half its value in 2010. A further decline is expected for 
fiscal 2016. Providing technical advice to innovative startups is sound policy that is likely to 
generate a net social benefit. The case for providing subsidized business management advice to 
all startups to address an externality is much less compelling.   
The BDC is an important player in the venture capital market, accounting for about a 
sixth of new investments on average over the last two years. BDC makes venture capital 
investments directly at every stage of a technology-based company’s development and makes 
indirect investments via funds, some of which are led by private and other public sector funds. It 
was not possible to undertake a formal benefit-cost analysis of BDC’s venture capital activities. 
Data availability is an issue, but assessing BDC’s newish strategic direction (discussed below) 
would be particularly challenging. Nevertheless, two policy recommendations based on the 
analytical framework developed above can be made.  
First, as discussed above, there are reasons to suppose that the seed capital market is 
characterized by underinvestment, so BDC should continue its efforts to increase supply in this 
segment. While in principle direct investment should be avoided, BDC has made a plausible 
infant industry argument that would justify a period of continued direct investment (Business 
Development Bank of Canada 2011). BDC should nevertheless begin a shift from direct seed 
capital investments to passive or side-car investments with angel investors. In this approach, 
BDC would offer private investors leveraged returns by capping its return while leaving its entire 
investment at risk. The cap would be set with the intention of encouraging angel investors to 
offset the reluctance of entrepreneurs to invest in their own risky projects. The size of the 
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subsidy required to achieve this objective is unknown. The BDC should therefore experiment 
with relatively small subsidies – e.g. 3 to 7% of the investment – to gain some understanding of 
the market.  
Second, there is an ongoing need to encourage private investors to supply more advice to 
firms they support. Continued presence by BDC in the form of passive investment with 
leveraged returns for its partners is one solution. The social benefits of mitigating this market 
failure are difficult to assess, so BDC should proceed cautiously. A prudent starting point would 
be to set a cap that raises the expected value of private sector returns by 1-3 % points. The BDC 
adopted a new strategic direction in 2011 (Ibid 2011). A key element of this strategy is to use its 
influence to improve the quality of fund managers and to increase the size of venture capital 
funds in Canada. These are sensible objectives that would be best achieved through indirect 
rather than direct investment by BDC. For example, BDC can select a small number of the most 
talented managers as partners and encourage them to increase the size of funds they manage. In 
the longer-term, BDC Venture Capital should invest only with private sector partners. Its goal 
should be to increase the supply of seed capital and to encourage later-stage venture capitalists to 
supply more advice to their clients.  
Support for R&D 
The two largest programs supporting R&D by SMEs are the enhanced SR&ED investment tax 
credit and the Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP). The enhanced SR&ED credit 
provides a 35% refundable tax credit on up to $3 million of R&D undertaken by SMEs. R&D 
performed by other firms is eligible for a 15% non-refundable credit. In 2013, the enhanced 
credit cost approximately $1.5 billion, although the additional cost of the higher credit for 
qualifying SMEs was about $825 million.  
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IRAP offers financial assistance and free business and technical advice to SMEs. 
Program funding in 2013-14 was $168 million. On average in 2009 IRAP assistance, including 
advice, accounted for 24% of project costs. IRAP provides financial assistance to firms through 
contribution agreements. The monitoring and reporting requirements of this type of funding are 
much more burdensome than for grants and tax credits.  
A benefit-cost analysis of the enhanced SR&ED tax credit and IRAP indicates that in 
both cases the net social benefit is negative (Lester 2012). High compliance costs, and in the case 
of IRAP, high administration costs, are a factor in this outcome, but the key consideration is 
excessive subsidization. A firm claiming the federal and provincial SR&ED tax credits receives, 
on average, a 43% subsidy. Almost all firms obtaining support from IRAP also benefit from 
federal and provincial tax credits, which means they are likely to have more than half of their 
project costs paid by the government. In contrast, the average subsidy rate for a large firm 
benefiting from federal and provincial tax credits is about 20%. 
Taken at face value, the benefit-cost analysis suggests that the federal enhanced SR&ED 
tax credit should be eliminated. However, the benefit-cost framework does not adequately 
capture the large, long-lasting impacts on living standards of some innovations. Another 
consideration is that subsidizing R&D performed by SMEs compensates for other barriers 
experienced by innovative startups that cannot be corrected. A more prudent policy approach 
than eliminating the enhanced credit would be to set it at the same rate as for large firms. This 
would reduce the combined federal-provincial credit rate to about 25%. And it would save the 
federal government about $800 million a year. 
The benefit-cost analysis of IRAP, although based on the 2009 version of the program, 
highlights the need to reduce administration costs of the program. The contrast with the 
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enhanced SR&ED tax credit, which costs about 2½ % of program expenses to administer, is 
striking. Part of the explanation for the difference is economies of scale -- the SR&ED tax credit 
is received by almost ten times as many firms – but substantial savings would be realized by 
applying the same risk management practices used to monitor tax credits. This would involve 
establishing client characteristics that trigger in-depth reviews and randomly selecting clients for 
detailed assessment.  
If the enhanced credit rate were reduced to 15%, a restructured IRAP could offer 
subsidies of around 25% without causing the overall subsidy to exceed half of the value of the 
project and without causing a substantial imbalance between social benefits and costs. However, 
if the SR&ED incentive remains at current levels, the maximum subsidy rate would have to be 
reduced to about 15% to keep the overall subsidy rate under 50% of project costs.  
Tax Measures Supporting Entrepreneurship 
The federal government has implemented a number of tax measures available to all SMEs but 
which are particularly beneficial to high-impact entrepreneurs because their income is more 
variable and has a substantial capital gain component. These measures comprise the lifetime 
capital gains exemption (LCGE), allowable business investment losses (ABILs), rollovers of 
investments in small business shares and the employee stock option deduction.  
Up to $800,000 in capital gains on the sale of qualifying shares in Canadian-controlled 
private corporations (CCPCs) is exempt from taxation over the taxpayer’s lifetime. There is no 
explicit size limit on the exemption but most CCPCs have well under $10 million in assets.  
There is a solid case for exempting capital gains earned on the sale of assets used to generate 
active business income. An increase in the flow of net income generated by business assets will 
increase the market price of the business by an amount equal to the present value of the rise in 
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the income stream. If the assets are sold, the income stream will be taxed twice: once as a capital 
gain and a second time when it is distributed as dividends. On the other hand, exempting capital 
gains would result in unintended revenue losses as taxpayers characterize other sources of 
income as capital gains.
 8
 However, by restricting the exemption to SME shares, the LCGE 
appears to be a reasonable compromise between efficiency and protecting the tax base, so no 
changes are recommended. 
While allowing capital losses to be deducted only from capital gains is justifiable as a 
measure to protect the tax base, the asymmetric treatment may be particularly burdensome for 
owners of young firms, who may be more likely to have capital losses without offsetting capital 
gains. The deduction for allowable investment business losses (ABIL) permits losses incurred on 
shares or debt issued by a small business to be deducted from ordinary income. This selective 
measure can be justified as an offset to the other barriers faced by innovative startups that cannot 
be addressed directly by policy.    
A more general solution to the problem of asymmetric treatment of capital gains and 
losses should be considered. Allowing all capital losses to be deducted from ordinary income 
after they have been applied to realized and accrued capital gains (in order limit the benefit of a 
tax deferral) would raise efficiency. To the extent that losses cannot be fully deducted from 
current income, carry-backs and “indexing” capital losses would improve efficiency. There 
would be an offsetting loss through higher compliance and administration costs – determining 
the value of unrealized capital gains could be relatively expensive. The net effect is unknown, 
but with the advances in computerized systems a net positive impact is possible.   
                                                             
8 The preceding points were made by Mintz and Richardson (1995), although Mintz and Chen (2011) recommend 
replacing the LCGE with a reduction in the capital gains tax on shares issued by a CCPC when it goes public.  
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Tax on the capital gain realized from the disposition of small business common shares 
can be deferred provided that the proceeds are reinvested in another small business. This roll-
over provision extends the deferral of capital gains, thereby reducing the effective tax rate. Given 
that exemption of capital gains on small business shares is sound policy, deferral of capital gains 
is an appropriate second-best policy for investors that have used up their LCGE. 
Stock options confer a benefit equal to the difference between the cost to the employee 
and the fair market value of the stock at the time the option was granted. The employee stock 
option deduction allows half of this benefit to be excluded from taxable income. The additional 
benefit for employees of CCPCs is deferral of tax on the benefit until the stocks are sold. The 
cost of the stock option is not a deductible expense for firms, so there is a net subsidy only for 
firms subject to the lower small business corporate income tax rate and for unprofitable firms. 
As recommended by Mintz and Venkatachalam (2015), full taxation of employee stock 
option benefits combined with deductibility of the cost by corporations would improve tax 
neutrality with respect to forms of employee compensation. Maintaining the current system for 
young CCPCs – under 5 to 7 years old, for example – would preserve a small benefit for high-
Table 3: Summary of Key Policy Recommendations
Financing programs
Eliminate the small business deduction
Business Development Bank
Transform the BDC’s Financing Program into a loan guarantee program and consolidate it with the Small 
Business Financing Program 
Seed capital: subsidize supply through leveraged returns for private investors
Venture Capital: Eliminate direct investment; subsidize provision of advice via leveraged returns.
Support for R&D and innovation
Reduce the enhanced SR&ED tax credit rate from 35 to 15%
Limit stacking of federal and provincial subsidies to 50% of project costs 
Apply SR&ED risk-management approach to IRAP 
General tax policy initiatives to support entrepreneurship
Allow deduction from ordinary income of capital losses net of realized and accrued gains 
Allow non-capital losses to be carried back indefinitely and “index” their value when carried forward
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impact entrepreneurs. This departure from neutrality could also be justified as an offset to other 
barriers faced by innovative startups that cannot be addressed directly.  
CONCLUSIONS 
 The key policy recommendations made in this chapter are summarized in Table 3. Small 
business has a well-deserved reputation as the engine of job growth and a key contributor to 
innovation in Canada. The federal government has responded by implementing a generous set of 
policies intended to promote growth and innovation by SMEs. Unfortunately, a large fraction of 
this spending is wasted.  
 The most expensive program, the small business deduction, improves access to financing 
for all small businesses but on balance harms economic performance by encouraging 
small-scale, less-efficient production.  
 BDC’s Financing Program also helps small firms access financing, but the benefits could 
be achieved at a dramatically lower cost by switching to a loan guarantee program from a 
direct lending program. 
 Excessive subsidization of R&D performed by small business is a major concern. It 
makes us poorer, not richer. 
Overall, a better approach would be to focus policies on ensuring that innovative startups do not 
face any unwarranted barriers to entry and growth. The intermediate result would be fiscal 
savings, higher-quality entrepreneurship and a more innovative economy. The ultimate impact 
would be a more prosperous Canada.  
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Chapter 4 
ARE SUNNIER DAYS AHEAD? LIBERAL PLANS FOR 
THE CANADIANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
 
Michael J. Prince and Pamela Moss 
We know that there are still far too many persons with disabilities who face social and 
economic barriers to realizing their potential and being fully active participants in 
society. Too often, persons with disabilities are confronted with stigma, discrimination 
and, ultimately, denied the most basic human rights. We will work to ensure the full 
diversity of Canadians is reflected in their government and in its decisions … We have 
a duty to help eliminate the systemic barriers that persist in our society, and we will 
work with the provinces, territories and others to make sure that all Canadians have 
equality of opportunity. 
Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, 2015 (Prime Minister of Canada 2015e) 
Around the cabinet table, some of the most compelling conversations we had [were] around the 
disability community and the concerns around protecting vulnerable Canadians. Because, yes, 
defending people’s choices and rights is part of being a Liberal – but protecting the vulnerable is, 
too. 
Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, 2016 (Wells 2016), remarks on the medical aid-in 
dying legislation  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Under the Trudeau Liberal government two primary features of the trajectory for disability 
policy are an identity-based rights approach to dismantling systemic barriers of discrimination 
and the protection of vulnerable Canadians through legislation. Indeed, the principles of 
inclusion and diversity resonate throughout the actions of the Liberals thus far in their nascent 
administration. After Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced his cabinet in November, 2015, 
discussion of the traditional historical divisions in Canada between Francophone and 
Anglophone communities and between different regions of the country was not centre stage as it 
has been in the past. Rather, commentaries mostly focused on what the people in the cabinet 
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actually looked like. Trudeau made history by putting himself in charge of Intergovernmental 
Affairs and Youth. Of the remaining 30 posts, two-thirds were from minoritized groups.  
While much was made over the declaration of gender parity, there were also other 
historically significant milestones for which Prime Minister Trudeau received kudos. For the first 
time in Canada’s history, nearly a quarter of the ministers were not white, two Indigenous people 
were given prominent portfolios in the government, and four Sikh Canadians were named as 
members in the cabinet. Also equally historical, but not with such popularized accolades, was the 
appointment of two ministers with visible disabilities to the cabinet: Carla Qualtrough as 
Minister of Sport and Persons with Disabilities and Kent Hehr as Minister of Veterans Affairs 
and Associate Minister of National Defence.
1
 
What the cabinet looks like is important because the embodiment of the ideals of 
inclusion and diversity creates expectations about who gets to make decisions and how they get 
made. Arranging the heads of official positions based on identity is novel in Canadian national 
politics.  While it may appear, at least initially, that appointing a cabinet that would both 
symbolically and in practice mirror the diversity of Canadians, it may be more difficult to reflect 
this diversity in making decisions, especially when it comes to dealing with disability issues and 
including persons with disabilities. These acts promise to deliver government services at the 
most through identity-based groups and at the least via a sensitivity to identity as an organizing 
element of Canada’s constituencies. For disability policy, Trudeau’s establishment of a Minister 
of Sport and Persons with Disabilities, with the foremost policy responsibility of establishing a 
Canadians with Disabilities Act, suggest that there will be new ways of doing things in the 
administration of disability issues. The appointment and commitment not only raise expectations 
for a diverse community that has rarely been part of a national agenda, but also signal an 
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innovative measure to tackle systemic barriers and advance the full inclusion of persons with 
disabilities.  
Innovation comes with caution, and difficulties are already cropping up. Outside the 
mention of persons with disabilities in the ministerial title and the mandate to create a Canadians 
with Disabilities Act, there is little else to indicate how to accomplish these goals. Identity as a 
politics around which to organize political decision-making is fraught with problems. Whose 
identity matters most? How can a policy capture the complexity of disability when individuals 
and groups of individuals have difficulties in understanding themselves as members of groups? 
How might the administration of programs defined by an idealized definition of disability be 
implemented without compromising the singular reality of living with a disability or disabling 
condition? Already, persons with disabilities have been aligned with sport, especially the Rio 
2016 Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games, with a Minister who herself was a Paralympian. 
Does this arrangement indicate that physical disabilities will dominate discussion of the 
preparation of the Act? Will persons with disabilities recognize themselves as part of this 
identity-based constituency?  
The extent to which these problems emerge will depend primarily on what plans 
Trudeau’s Liberal Government put into practice that would reflect their own commitment to 
inclusion and diversity. Given their hopeful propositions thus far in light of both how 
government works and how disability politics play out in the community, we are left wondering 
if there will be sunnier days for persons with disabilities in Canada. What measures can be taken 
to dismantle systemic barriers facing persons with disabilities in Canada when identity is the 
fulcrum around which change is organized? Which Canadians will be included in the Act? How 
is disability going to be defined in the Act? What processes will be put into place to solicit input 
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from a wide range of persons with different types of disabilities? How will the government make 
the most of the existing knowledge located in the numerous and varied disability organizations? 
In the rest of this chapter, we address these questions. First, we describe the portfolio within 
which persons with disabilities are positioned. We next discuss two sets of challenges the 
Minister of State faces: structural tensions within and between ministerial portfolios across the 
government and the potential for democratic spaces for engagement with persons with 
disabilities in Canada. We follow with observations as to what a Canadians with Disabilities Act 
might look like. We close with conclusions regarding the challenges facing the Minister 
responsible for persons with disabilities in the Cabinet. 
 
MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIO: MANDATE, PRIORITIES AND THE 2016 BUDGET 
Including persons with disabilities as part of a ministerial designation, Minister Carla 
Qualtrough is making history. It is the first time at the national level that this constituency of 
Canadians has been expressly named in the duties and functions of a member of Cabinet and 
the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada. Persons with disabilities finally join other social groups 
officially named in formal federal cabinet positions and portfolios over the last 40 years, such as 
multicultural communities, seniors, women, children, and youth, in addition to groups 
traditionally represented by federal cabinet portfolios, namely, indigenous peoples, immigrants, 
and veterans. As well, in this 42
nd
 Parliament, there is the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of Persons with 
Disabilities. 
As Minister of Sport and Persons with Disabilities, Carla Qualtrough holds a 
relatively unique position as far as Canadian government ministries are structured. She is 
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tasked with the responsibility for both a long-standing portfolio of amateur sport which has 
been part of federal ministries since 1961 and a new portfolio that has yet to be integrated 
into the daily workings of government. Her reporting lines are mixed. In her role as Minister 
of Sport, Qualtrough supports the work of the Minister of Canadian Heritage, Mélanie Joly. 
In her role as Minister of Persons with Disabilities she supports the work of the Minister of 
Families, Children and Social Development, Jean-Yves Duclos, who is responsible for the 
department of Employment and Social Development Canada. The Minister of Employment, 
Workforce Development and Labour, MaryAnn Mihychuk, also supports the work of the 
Minister of Families, Children and Social Development. This mélange of dual and tri-
reporting lines of various junior ministers to more senior ones means that junior ministers 
will be competing for attention with other heritage and social development Ministers. One 
potential effect is a tempering of zeal to keep disability policy at the forefront of social 
change within the Liberal government. 
This multi-support tapestry characterizes much of the seemingly innovative features 
of Trudeau’s identity-based cabinet. The ministerial mandate letters2 reveal a multilayered 
system of ministerial activity, a system that defines two types of Ministers of State: one that 
presides over a Ministry and another that is assigned to assist existing Ministers in carrying out 
their statutory duties (Chenier 1985). Although all Ministers of State are individual in key 
respects around charge for specific activities, such as responsibility for particular constituencies 
of Canadian citizens, there is still a hierarchy in reporting. Mandate letters reveal that Ministers 
of Employment, Workforce Development and Labour, of International Development and La 
Francophonie, of International Trade, of Small Business and Tourism, of Science, and of Women 
– all of whom are women – report to other Ministers: Ministers of Canadian Heritage, of Family, 
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Children and Social Development, of Foreign Affairs, and of Innovation, Science and Economic 
Development (Prime Minister of Canada 2015a). Unique to the Minister of Sport and Persons 
with Disabilities is that her responsibilities are split between two other Ministers. Although 
numerous references punctuate ministerial mandate letters for various Ministers to work with 
other Ministers in order to achieve goals set out in the individual mandate letters, the hierarchical 
relationships with Sport and Persons with Disabilities carry an additional patina of horizontal 
relationships across Ministers who report to the Prime Minister. In many ways, the two 
constituencies do not overlap: the vast majority of persons with disabilities do not identify as 
athletes. A message being sent with this combination, even if inadvertently, is that disability is 
something to be overcome, much like Paralympians who are an elite sub-group of persons with 
disabilities.  
The primary goal of the Minister of Sport and Persons with Disabilities, according to 
her mandate letter from the Prime Minister, is twofold: “to promote healthier Canadians 
through sport and recreation, and to ensure greater accessibility and opportunities for 
Canadians with disabilities” (Prime Minister of Canada 2015d). To these ends, as a Minister 
of State, Qualtrough is to assist more senior Ministers on two clearly circumscribed matters 
of federal public policy and administration pertaining to two discrete clientele constituencies 
for two separate government departments. Although not the political head of any government 
department, something that requires parliamentary sanction, Qualtrough is the political head 
of these specified constituencies and, on those matters, she is, based on her mandate letter 
from the Prime Minister, the recognized liaison between the public service and Parliament.  
Substantively, at least in the initial stages of the government’s plans, Minister 
Qualtrough’s top priorities are to:  
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 Lead an engagement process with provinces, territories, municipalities, and 
stakeholders that will lead to the passage of a Canadians with Disabilities Act.  
 Work with the Minister of Infrastructure and Communities to deliver on our 
commitment to support the construction of recreational infrastructure that allows 
more children access to sport and recreation.  
 Work with the Minister of Health and the Public Health Agency of Canada to support 
a national strategy to raise awareness for parents, coaches, and athletes on concussion 
treatment.  
 Work with the Minister of Canadian Heritage to include sport and recreation in 
championing government-wide efforts to promote the celebration of Canada 150, with 
a particular emphasis on celebrating the achievements of athletes and persons with 
disabilities.  
 Lead preparations for the 2016 Rio Olympics and Paralympics and future 
international sporting events.  
 Create greater links between our elite athletes and young Canadians to promote health 
and achievement among youth (Prime Minister of Canada 2015d). 
 
Minister Qualtrough will be judged – and made accountable – in terms of her 
demonstrated efforts and concrete achievements as the champion of these core values and 
policy priorities that entail vertical and horizontal dimensions of her mandate. Celebrating 
the achievements of athletes and persons with disabilities for Canada 150 and leading 
preparations for the 2016 Rio Olympics and Paralympics, for example, are vertical priorities 
that serve both constituencies, especially those few that are members of both. Leading an 
extensive public engagement process that leads to passage of a Canadians with Disabilities 
Act is a priority that, in order to effectively ensure greater accessibility and genuine 
opportunities for persons with disabilities, must extend horizontally across the federal 
government and Parliament, the federal public service and broader federal public sector.  
Supporting this horizontal dimension of her mandate, the Minister is assisted by the 
Office for Disability Issues (ODI). Established in 2001, the mandate of ODI is to support the 
lead minister for disability issues in the federal government and work with all sectors of 
Canadian society to ensure the equitable access and full participation of persons with disabilities 
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in all activities within federal jurisdiction (Office for Disability Issues 2002). The principal 
function of the ODI is to share information and support networking with other federal 
government departments as well as with non-governmental organizations. The ODI has modest 
program responsibilities, including the administration of the Enabling Accessibility Fund, which 
supports capital costs related to improving physical accessibility for persons with disabilities in 
Canadian communities and workplaces, and the Social Development Partnership Program, which 
provides funding for non-profit organizations to advance the social participation and community 
development needs of persons with disabilities. 
What does the Trudeau government’s 2016 budget tell us about Liberal plans for the 
disabled? While the budget has been called a “social-policy-is-back budget” (Battle, Torjman 
and Mendelson 2016), people with disabilities are not a notable theme in it (Government of 
Canada 2016). No substantial new investments in programs and services for people with 
disabilities were announced and relatively few elements of the government’s disability agenda 
were signalled. There were some modest investments: $2 million over the next two fiscal years 
in support of consultations with provinces and other stakeholders on introducing a federal 
disabilities statute; $4 million over the next two fiscal years to enhance the Enabling 
Accessibility Fund to improve the physical accessibility and safety of community facilities for 
people with disabilities; and, in the renewed Youth Employment Strategy, a mention of disabled 
youth in regards to the Skills Link program.
3
 Tellingly, while there are enhanced investments in 
training for the Canada Job Fund Agreements and for the Labour Market Development 
Agreements ($175 million in additional funds for 2016-17), no new finances were allocated to 
the Labour Market Agreements for Persons with Disabilities in the 2016 federal budget. Given 
explicit statements by Prime Minister Trudeau acknowledging the economic barriers many 
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persons with disabilities still face and his government’s commitment to introduce a Canadians 
with Disabilities Act during this mandate, subsequent federal budgets will very likely include 
more significant investments and program initiatives.   
CHALLENGES FACING THE MINISTER OF SPORT AND PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES 
 
Given the composition of the Sport and Persons with Disabilities portfolio, with its dual policy 
fields, constituencies, and ministerial supporting structure, Minister Qualtrough faces two 
distinctive challenges: those that are structural in nature and those that deal with inclusion and 
diversity. Structural tensions exist because of the federal condition of the Canadian state.
4
 
Jurisdiction for delivering the recreation and sport programs that can actually bring the stated 
objectives to fruition lies with the provinces. As well, because persons with disabilities occupy 
multiple constituencies, such as children, indigenous people, people of colour, religious 
minorities, immigrants, women, and youth, there is the added inter-ministerial tension of having 
to work across several departments beyond Canadian Heritage and Employment and Social 
Development. Diversity and inclusion as policy principles for persons with disabilities, much 
like other minoritized groups, require thoughtful strategies and procedures to assemble equitable 
means and bring about full participation. Diversity among persons with disabilities, unlike other 
minoritized groups, is based on a classification of bodily status ascribed by a professional class 
of experts. Innovative policies flexible and sensitive enough to the wide range in type of 
disability, including for example physical, mental, invisible, and episodic disabilities, could 
facilitate inclusion. 
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Structural Tensions 
Both symbolic and substantive elements of the vertical and horizontal dimensions 
epitomizing the portfolio of the Minister of Sport and Persons with Disabilities frame how to 
recognize and talk about the structural tensions. The central symbolic element, noted already, 
is the explicit recognition of persons with disabilities in the federal cabinet with their own 
designated representative. In addition to being a high-profile symbolic response to the concerns 
of a client group, Chenier (1985) indicates a minister of state can serve other functions: a training 
ground for new cabinet ministers; a means for exercising political control over a segment of the 
public service; and a role for coordinating policies and programs within a department or across a 
number of government departments and agencies.  
Establishing a ministerial position for persons with disabilities creates a new 
institutional bridge directly between outside groups and the executive of government, 
between the claims-making of societal interests and the decision-making of cabinet, and 
between the identification of policy objectives and the constituency the policy is directed at. 
The minister also symbolically embodies a link of political responsibility to the national 
electorate as well as an organized space of political opportunity for democratic engagement 
by movement activists and community groups. For individuals and families among those 
most discriminated against and disadvantaged in Canadian social and economic life, this is a 
significant political measure (Prince 2009; 2016).
5
  
Substantively, there are three sites of structural tension: intra-ministerial, inter-
ministerial, and federal/provincial. The Minister is responsible for two discrete, but 
occasionally overlapping, constituencies. Among national, provincial and local organizations 
in the disability community, expectations of the Trudeau government are high. A Minister of 
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Persons with Disabilities, who herself is disabled and an ex-Paralympian, represents core 
public values and aspirations of the disability community: values of accessibility and 
opportunity, equality and inclusion, rights and responsibilities, human dignity and respect, 
social participation, and economic self-sufficiency. Yet placing the responsibility of persons 
with disabilities alongside sport repeats a fundamental binary that disability activists have been 
trying to dismantle for generations: the normal functioning body acts as the model against which 
to gauge an abnormal dysfunctioning one.
6
  
Contrasting the two may signal the orientation of what the Liberal Government sees as 
disability: either physical in nature or lack of health with recreational programs as a fundamental 
strategy for inclusion. Given that biomedicine organizes knowledge around what constitutes 
disability, especially with regard to adjudication of eligibility for benefits claims, there seems to 
be a potential problem when trying to move forward with decisions about persons with 
disabilities. The only mention of links to Health Canada in the mandate letter is for concussion 
awareness programs for children, coaches, and parents. 
Depending on how well the Liberal vision of collaborating Ministers actually works out, 
in this case in the general social policy field, Qualtrough’s success in delivering on her horizontal 
mandate items is uncertain. She will need to liaise across several departments, offices, and 
ministries not necessarily included in the mandate letter. Though not unique to a Minister 
responsible for specific constituencies in a federal cabinet, her positioning as a junior Minister 
matters because her efforts to liaise as the representative of either sport or persons with 
disabilities cross so many boundaries without the authority of being a senior Minister of State. 
How well will the Minister of Health and Health Canada accept or integrate substantively 
different definitions of disability than those based solely on biomedicine? Will people with 
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debilitating and disabling chronic illness be considered a person with a disability in the new Act? 
What components will Employment and Social Development, at the direction of Minister 
Duclos, integrate into a poverty reduction strategy that will address the varied needs of persons 
with disabilities? On what matters will the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship 
consult Qualtrough about accepting persons with disabilities as potential new citizens and not 
excluding anyone because of a disability or disabling chronic illness?  
Minister Qualtrough is tasked with manoeuvring between and among various Ministers 
and departments to achieve her mandate. For example, an implicit yet undoubtedly important 
part of Qualtrough’s mandate on sport and her future actions around sport, relates to the prime 
minister’s pledge to implement all the calls to action by the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. Calls to action deal with the history and legacy of residential schools and 
advancing the process of Canadian reconciliation. Of the Commission’s ninety-four calls to 
action, five expressly deal with sports and reconciliation, addressing, among other things, the 
federal government’s Physical Activity and Sport Act, community sports programs, an elite 
athlete development program for Indigenous athletes, sports halls of fame, and programs for 
coaches, trainers, and sport officials culturally relevant for Indigenous peoples. 
 The Commission touches on disability issues in just two specific ways: in terms of the 
justice system, on people with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder; and, in terms of health, on 
measuring indicators of chronic diseases, mental health, and illness and injury incidence (Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission of Canada 2015). Qualtough’s ability to work with the Minister 
of Indigenous and Northern Affairs, Carolyn Bennett, matters in her ability to achieve the goals 
of her mandate.  
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Living in a federated political system, Canadians are simultaneously a citizen of their 
province and of the country (and, for Indigenous peoples, of their nation and territory). In matters 
of human affairs and social development, provincial government activities are extensive and 
substantial. Provincial states are crucial to determining the quality of social citizenship – that is, 
equality of opportunity, personal well-being, and community cohesion – in the country. In their 
provincial community, Canadians have certain rights or entitlements, duties and responsibilities, 
political socialization and identifications, and potentially numerous forms of interpersonal 
attachments and memberships. At the same time, the fiscal side of Canadian federalism remains 
central to social policy in the provinces and in supporting basic rights and equality of 
opportunity. Issues about disability as well as persons with disabilities themselves cross federal 
and provincial boundaries. The spirit of that which Minister Qualtrough may be able to 
accomplish federally may be taken up unevenly across provinces. 
 
Acting Within Democratic Spaces for Engagement 
Cabinet portfolios and specific cabinet appointments can themselves influence public 
perceptions and beliefs, which in turn affect the expectations and actions of community 
groups. Minister for Democratic Institutions, Maryam Monsef, is responsible for ensuring 
that Trudeau’s Liberal government delivers on its promises for transparency and 
accountability (Prime Minister of Canada 2015b). She will work “closely with colleagues” as 
Ministers and generate “constructive dialogue” across constituencies in civil society “including 
business, organized labour, the broader public sector, and the not-for-profit and charitable 
sectors” (Ibid). For persons with disabilities and disability movement organizations, democracy 
is closely linked with equity in that policy and regulatory interventions need to take into account 
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the long history of discrimination and marginalization both of individuals and as a community. It 
is also linked directly with a politics of inclusion and recognition of diversity. 
Terms are significant in the way that democracy operates in the Canadian federal 
government. In opening up constructive dialogue, Minister Qualtrough will need to be specific as 
to who are persons with disabilities under consideration for purposes of any new federal 
legislation of the potential scope of a national act. Delineating a constituency for persons with 
disabilities is not an easy task. Disability policy in Canada is a rather incoherent field of services 
and programs; a fragmented field evident in the various definitions of disablement in effect and it 
is an uncoordinated field with a complicated array of organizations and programs. Compared to 
other policy domains – education, health care, or criminal justice as cases in point – disability 
has a lower profile in Canadian politics and policy discourse. The wide variation among groups 
means that the language used to describe disability is often specific to a group of disabilities (e.g. 
invisible disabilities, impairments) or a specific type of disability (e.g. spinal cord injury, mental 
illness). Breaks in solidarity within the disability movement – locally, provincially, and 
nationally – commonly arise out of how group members make connections among terms used to 
describe disabilities. 
 Many individuals do not identify as a person with a disability and instead claim either a 
temporary disabling condition or just sick. The move to include chronic illness, contested illness, 
and mental illness under an umbrella term that would define disability as a temporary or 
permanent disruption of a bodily system creates a new category of episodic disability (Brown et 
al. 2012; Moss and Teghtsoonian 2008; Prince 2008). There is also the question of what to do 
about aging among persons with disabilities and whether to include the frail elderly among those 
with disabilities is a point of debate (Aronson 2000; Guay et al. 2014). Although it may seem 
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rather fussy to figure out who is disabled and who is not, as policy analysts and advocates know, 
terms are incredibly important in messaging the public and the government as to what is 
important within the movement.  
The capacity of disability organizations to engage with the federal government is 
circumscribed by the spaces available to make known their individual and collective interests, 
concerns, and suggestions and the terms they use to convey them. There are four spaces within 
which disability groups organize in order to have a say in national policy, all of which have both 
symbolic and real effects on everyday life: (1) the disability movement; (2) the general public 
and media; (3) government and parliamentary processes and structures; and (4) the judiciary 
(courts and tribunals). Although not exhaustive of the types of spaces in which disability groups 
conduct their work, these spaces cover a range of activities that permit engagement with the 
federal state. These spaces have both discursive and material aspects in that documents set up the 
conditions within which the group can engage (e.g. legislation, vision statements, group bylaws) 
alongside the specific places where the engagement happens (e.g. courtrooms, news media, 
community halls). Disability groups are active in (1) setting policy agendas and advancing 
claims to political parties (especially during an election campaign) and to the state (various 
public authorities to ensure political parties live up to their election promises); (2) raising 
awareness and generating knowledge about disability, about the organization of public spaces, 
processes, and policies in relation to discrimination and marginalization of persons with 
disability, and about what issues disability groups and persons with disabilities think are 
significant; (3) participating in public consultations, including the Canadians with Disabilities 
Act; and (4) seeking equality rights through the legal system with litigation.  
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Devising a method to include the entire menu of salient issues sets up the consultation as 
fragile from the beginning which can potentially undermine the process itself because the 
priorities of individual disability groups do not always coincide with either individual or 
collective interests. There are groups involved in setting agendas for the national disability 
movement that then become strategic stakeholders in debates around disability and resource 
allocation and program funding, as for example, the Canadian Association for Community 
Living, the Council of Canadians with Disabilities, and DisAbled Women’s Network. Groups 
engage in generating  knowledge about disability through awareness campaigns including 
organizing events on particular days designated for disability or illness, such as 3 December as 
International Day of Persons with Disabilities and 11 May as International Chronic Fatigue 
Syndrome/Myalgic Encephalomyelitis and Fibromyalgia Awareness Day. Fundraising for 
charity and social networking for individual support for persons with disabilities, their family 
members, and their caregivers are singularly focused on one particular task. Groups have also 
advocated for social and physical inclusion through accessibility that includes measures for 
dismantling systemic barriers particularly around hiring practices in the workplace and poverty 
reduction strategies (Prince and Peters 2015).  
Bodies themselves too need to be taken into consideration in setting up a democratic 
space for constructive dialogue. When taking into consideration the embodied dimensions of 
disability, commonplace activities for consultation, such as local and cross-provincial travel, 
face-to-face communication, and scheduling of public meetings, can be challenging for disability 
activists, especially in the absence of supports and accommodations. Mobility limitations and 
fatigue, for example, circumscribe the how and the where disability activists can engage in 
public processes. Even though there is funding for care attendants to fly with persons with 
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disabilities who have demonstrated a need for constant care, not all persons with disabilities 
qualify. As well, those people with chronic, contested, and mental illness and those who are deaf 
and/or blind may tire easily when engaged in sustained interaction.
7
 Alternate communication 
methods, such as signing and Braille, need to be made available in all venues. In Canada, there is 
also a need for more than one sign language, such as Langue des signes du Québec, or LSQ, for 
French and American Sign Language, or ASL, for English. Physical impairment and support 
service needs vary widely. Early, late, and long meetings comprising engagement processes are 
not perhaps the best option. Thus a longer than usual lead time for planning participation may be 
particularly important in creating a democratic space for persons with disabilities. 
Competing knowledge systems inform definitions of disability, such as law, biomedicine, 
and science. In the federal government, it is legal, biomedical and scientific knowledge that set 
up the parameters for determining those who are disabled. Yet reflected in the mandate letter for 
Minister Qualtrough is a human rights approach to understanding disability. The Charter, in 
particular, bestows a highly significant constitutional status on persons with disabilities, 
encouraging disability groups to express their interests in the language of equality rights and to 
seek clarification of these rights and others through tribunals and the courts. By virtue of direct 
identification in the Charter, disability and persons with disabilities have constitutional status. 
Section 15 offers an officially authorized space for disability groups to legally defend and 
advance their material, procedural, and cultural concerns. To define and enforce these 
fundamental rights and freedoms, such as mobility and equality, litigation has become an 
important strategy of individuals with disabilities and organizations representing their interests. 
This has raised the profile of the Canadian judiciary in the disability field and the wider social 
policy domain. Restoration of the Court Challenges Program with the Liberal government’s first 
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budget, with $12 million new dollars over five years, covers these costly proceedings brought 
forward by groups contesting rights violations and infringements (Government of Canada 2016, 
182).  
In everyday life, however, barriers when framed in rights of equality are mostly 
insurmountable. Disability advocates, families and community groups have learned that judicial 
victories are not necessarily make a case of winner-take-all. A rights-based approach to seeking 
equality through litigation can be lengthy, financially expensive, and emotionally stressful for 
individuals involved. It also risks fragmenting wider campaigns for obtaining services or 
supports for all groups. In addition to court rulings against disability claims, even victories can 
result in further delays due to appeals, discretion of public agencies in interpreting decisions, and 
then the frustratingly gradual, partial implementation of changes. Thus, the overarching structure 
of the legal system can only bring formal equality to some while continually reinforcing other 
barriers of access for many others.  
A rights-approach to understanding disability, already established through the Charter 
and clearly reflected in public announcements and the wording of the mandate letter, is not the 
only approach that could achieve a barrier-free society for persons with disabilities. Given that 
biomedicine and science provide the base upon which human rights rest, there is a need to 
incorporate information about how these knowledges reinforce the marginalization of persons 
with disabilities into policy measures and legislation. Even though, “because of its complexity, 
there is no single, harmonized ‘operational’ definition of disability across federal programs,” 
definitions take concrete form through the adjudication process of applications for eligibility of 
benefits (Human Resources and Skills Development Canada 2013, 2).
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This type of exclusionary barrier reproduces the very barriers that uphold the 
marginalized status of persons with disabilities. Including insights from the experience of living 
with a disability can be important in informing issues that greatly affect persons with disabilities 
and their families. Concern over a bias toward physical disabilities has been part of a discussion 
for some time, particularly with the prominence of celebrity activists with spinal cord injuries 
(Edwards 2015; Riddle 2013; Siebers 2013). Concerns about physician-assisted suicide have 
been voiced by several, though not all, disability groups across Canada arguing, among other 
points, that ideas about quality of life, death with dignity, and choice not override the experience 
of being alive for persons with severe disabilities. The effects of structural positioning of 
disability issues within the federal government mean there is no obvious space for input into the 
issues that persons with disabilities have a major stake. 
 
DRAFTING THE ACT: A HORIZONTAL PROJECT 
The crucial piece of Minister Qualtrough’s mandate for persons with disabilities is the 
drafting and passage of the Canadians with Disabilities Act. Formal authority for this 
particular horizontal policy development – a governance space that fosters policy and 
program coherence as well as social inclusion and equality for people of all disabilities – 
derives from several sources: the UN Convention for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Canadian Human Rights Act, Employment Equity 
Act, National Transportation Act, various other federal statutes and programs, and Treasury 
Board Secretariat policies. Crosscutting aims and activities include removing discriminatory 
practices, providing accommodation, and ensuring equal and respectful treatment of persons with 
disabilities (Human Resources and Skills Development Canada 2013). 
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To advance real change in the supports, services and opportunities for persons with 
disabilities, developing a Canadians with Disabilities Act is both a challenge and opportunity for 
Minister Qualtrough and the ODI, as well as for Parliament and the disability community. This 
undertaking is the most important policy initiation role of the Minister, involving her in 
discussions and engagement with federal officials and parliamentarians, provincial and 
territorial governments and municipalities, most likely indigenous organizations, and other 
stakeholders that include not-for-profit and charitable sectors, business interests, organized 
labour, disability associations and self-advocates. A novel ministerial post, in a new 
government with a mandate to formulate original legislation, encouragingly signifies an 
inclination to new open ways of making policy. With a willingness to adopt innovative 
policy strategies, a commitment to revive and introduce fresh financial investments, and an 
affinity to using state-of-the-art methods of monitoring and evaluating the implementation of 
policy reforms (in the form of digital technologies, real-time updates sent directly to 
constituencies through social media, and cross-country public consultation forums via claims 
of democracy and transparency). 
 In politically ambitious language characteristic of the Trudeau Liberal government, 
the mandate letter for the Minister of Families, Children and Social Development describes 
the purpose of a national disabilities act as “to eliminate systemic barriers and deliver 
equality of opportunity to all Canadians living with disabilities” (Prime Minister of Canada 
2015c).
 
Unquestionably, this kind of statement, as per the earlier discussion of ministers of 
state, “serves as a signal to the affected constituency that their concerns will now receive 
more attention, both quantitatively and qualitatively” (Chenier 1985, 405). The Trudeau 
Liberal government’s expressed commitment to disability rights legislation, we would suggest, is 
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a specific policy response to sustained advocacy efforts by disability organizations and their 
leaders. Leading up to, and during the 2015 election, active political efforts by disability groups 
were directed at the major federal parties and their platforms, with the aim of advancing the 
inclusion and participation of persons with disabilities in Canadian life.  
As a horizontal project, a new act for persons with disabilities in Canada – if it is to 
be more than a framework for future legislation – will need to articulate federal jurisdictional 
matters of accommodation, communication, safety and security, housing, social participation 
(cultural, political and recreational), education and training, employment, income security and 
tax measures, health care, caregiving, national transportation, infrastructure (green, public transit 
and social), and disability-specific supports and services. This horizontal mandate spans all age 
groups of persons with disabilities, from preschool children, youth, and young adults, 
through prime working-age adults, older workers, and seniors. This mandate also extends 
interdepartmentally across several federal government portfolios and cabinet ministers.  
The ODI has been tasked with setting up the consultation processes in preparation for 
drafting the Act as well as communicating with the public about disability. The name of the Act 
is in flux for the ODI is framing engagement processes around “Federal Accessibility 
Legislation”. The consultative mechanisms through which the diverse community of persons 
with disabilities will participate are somewhat different than conventional processes. First, the 
ODI has introduced a funding scheme open to disability organizations in partnership with other 
disability organizations. Grants of $700,000 per year over two fiscal periods are available, which 
must include accommodation expenses. A single disability organization is designated as 
applicant and must have a minimum of four co-applicants for each funding request. Second, the 
ODI opened an online consultation process scheduled to solicit input between July 2016 and 
132 
 
 
February 2017. The objective is “to promote equality of opportunity and increase the inclusion 
and participation of Canadians who have disabilities or functional limitations”. (Employment and 
Social Development Canada 2016). 
This particular organization of consultation already is proving to be problematic for the 
very reasons we outline here. Imposing collaboration across five or more groups sets up groups 
to hash out differences prior to presenting a cohesive view, which in many cases will be a 
generic version of what is already known to exist. Group identity and formal organizing skills 
will inevitably create holes where policy fields within disability are just emerging and sorely 
need attention, such as medium-term disability insurance and what counts as financial hardship 
in accommodation cases.  Online consultation encourages smaller groups and individuals to 
make submissions which presumably will run the gamut of types of disabilities including 
disabling illness. We anticipate vulnerability to be a key element of debility in these online 
submissions. Being able to capture the human aspects of vulnerability in the legislation will be a 
difficult undertaking for how does a piece of parchment grasp an outpouring of the hope, fear, 
intimacy, worry, and doubt that are part of living with a disability? Given the size of these new 
tasks, it will be interesting to see how the ODI manages the influx of information , especially 
with reduced staffing over the past several years across programs delivering benefits to groups of 
persons with disabilities (Macdonald 2013; see also Galloway 2015) 
To be sure, responsibility for drafting the Act is both an opportunity and a challenge. 
Our vision of the Act is one that does not impose artificial boundaries on unruly bodies that 
reproduce traditional identities based on similarities. Our vision of the Act is one that is 
porous and fluid, one that works to include persons with disabilities and disabling conditions 
in their own context. Specifically, the Act needs to make reference to existing federal 
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legislation and programs in, for example, transportation and telecommunication, and in programs 
the Canadian Pension Plan benefits for persons with disabilities. As well, legislation needs to 
reflect the mandate about removing systemic barriers so as not to erect new barriers or new 
discriminatory practices, including for example reflections on how physician-assisted suicide is 
wrapped up in existing systems of knowledge that marginalize and exclude particular groups of 
vulnerable children and seniors with disabilities.  There is a call for a new Health Accord 
between the provinces, territories, and the federal government. A new Accord will have to be 
commensurate with what is going to be included in the Act, recognizing that there is a delicate 
and tenuous relationship between understanding disability as a medical condition and refusing 
medical bias in defining what disability is.  
An Act inclusive of diversity with an eye on full participation as citizens needs to 
connect with the Liberal’s commitment to a federal poverty reduction plan. Of the top priorities 
for the Minister of Families, Children and Social Development, one is “the development o f a 
Canadian Poverty Reduction Strategy that would set targets to reduce poverty and measure 
and publicly report on our progress, in collaboration with the Minister of Employment, 
Workforce Development and Labour. Our strategy will align with and support existing 
provincial and municipal poverty reduction strategies” (Prime Minister of Canada 2015c). 
Minister Duclos has extensive experience with poverty reduction strategies and should be 
aware that persons with disabilities need to be included. While the mandate letter for the 
Minister of Families, Children and Social Development did not reference the Minister of 
Sport and Persons with Disabilities in regard to developing a Canadian poverty reduction 
strategy, it is vital that Minister Qualtrough participate in setting the vision, policy goals and 
design of such a federal strategy. Experience with the formulation of poverty reduction plans 
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in some provinces suggests that the rights and needs of persons with disability tend to be 
overlooked, particularly when plans entail a repackaging of existing services, unless 
disability organizations are actively engaged in the organizing and policy development 
processes (Brown 2015; Prince 2015a). A similar risk of marginalization could apply, we 
believe, at the federal level of public policy and administration. 
 
CONCLUSIONS: DISCURSIVE TENSIONS AND STRUCTURAL CAUTIONS 
In this chapter, we have conceptualized and problematized how the legislative development 
process on federal disability policy could unfold organizationally and discursively in the next 
few years. The Trudeau Liberal government’s commitment to create national disabilities 
legislation raises a number of issues and questions, of which we have discussed only some here. 
How the structural tensions, processes of inclusion, and the drafting of a Canadians with 
Disabilities Act play out will be revealed over the term of the government. In preparing to draft 
the Act, Minister Qualtrough as Minister of Sport and Persons with Disabilities will need to 
reconcile three sets of structural tensions within three powerful discourses.  
One set of structural tensions involves the inherent limitations of the cabinet role of a 
minister of state for achieving a major policy innovation and the coordination of disability 
policies across the federal government and wider federal public sector. This issue is a familiar 
one in contemporary Canadian government and public administration. A second set comprises 
the policy development processes to be used on this legislative project for consulting and 
extensively engaging with disability groups and other social organizations and thus, 
fundamentally, about the nature of participation and democracy exercised. This entails more than 
deploying consultative and evidence-based mechanisms for policy formation. Differences of 
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viewpoints, differences in material practices and embodied experiences, all expressed by diverse 
interests and claims are unavoidable. 
 The third set includes the scope and potential effect of such legislation. Disability 
measures comprise an important part of social policy activities by the federal government and 
even more so by provincial governments and other public authorities within their jurisdictions. 
This relates directly to the actual correspondence between the everyday lived experiences of 
persons with disabilities and their families, and the jurisdictional status of their membership in 
federal policy and program communities. While there are important issues and needs that must 
be addressed at the federal level – certainly enough to occupy the full mandate of this Trudeau 
administration – most systemic challenges, service gaps, and living requirements of persons with 
disabilities lie within the responsibilities of the provinces. In light of these circumstances of our 
federal and human condition, intergovernmental relations are crucial to advancing the inclusion 
and participation of persons with disabilities. This is where the Liberals’ plan for a federal 
poverty reduction strategy assumes significance both in what it could mean for federal 
programming and for how any federal strategy connects with comparable strategies in the 
provinces.  
These structural tensions must be negotiated within three powerful discourses 
informing disability issues. The first discourse is definitional within biomedical, scientific, 
social, and cultural discourses around definitions of disability and determinations of who is a 
person with a disability. Framing disability in terms of human rights or as a network of 
systemic barriers conflict head on with the way in which disability is justified and practiced 
in everyday life in that medical practitioners are the arbiters of ascribing disability as a 
bodily descriptor. The second discourse is political among the various disability movement 
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organizations that can be described as a fragmented social movement. Managing the fractious 
relationships across groups will need a deep understanding of and sensitivity to how to make 
sense of disability itself. The third discourse is ideological between the values of inclusion 
and diversity for the Trudeau Liberals and the bureaucratic logic of implementation of 
disability issues.  
The multiple sites where disability has been being negotiated have been located 
primarily within bureaucratic processes within federal departments. A somewhat dramatic 
shift in policy will no doubt clash with decades-old practices that have been transformed 
numerous times with the effect of tightening eligibility and restricting payouts (Stapleton et 
al. 2015, 175).
8
 That Minister Qualtrough has been given a green light to be innovative and 
initiate a more inclusive way of writing legislation, her ability to deal with these tensions 
may determine her success. Alongside this flexibility comes great expectations for the 
Minister to achieve distinction in drafting a Canadians with Disabilities Act. Exclusion of 
anyone who claims to be a person living with a disability or of any major areas of federal 
policy will denote failure. Thus, the Act will need to be robust and woven into the existing 
legislative and programmatic landscape. Effects of the implementation in terms of cost, 
process, and revision of existing programs have not been costed out and are yet to be 
determined. 
We are still left with the question, will there be sunnier skies for persons with disabilities in 
Canada? The enthusiastic optimism of Prime Minister Trudeau and his Liberal government is a 
refreshing respite from the years of austerity talks. Unfortunately, we cannot be as enthusiastic or 
optimistic that sunny skies are the forecast for persons with disabilities in Canada. Encouraged? 
Yes. Confident? No. Hopeful? Cautiously so.  
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Endnotes 
                                                             
1
 Because of the nature of invisible disabilities, and the stigma still attached to disclosure (Prince, 
2015b), there is no way of knowing who, if anyone, lives with an invisible disability.  
 
2
 Mandate letters for all Ministers in Prime Minister Trudeau’s cabinet are available online (see 
Prime Minister of Canada 2015a). Letters are located with each Minister’s profile. 
 
3
 Arguably, if a much wider view on disability policy is adopted, mention could be made of 
planned investments in the 2016 federal budget in chronic health and long-term care; support for 
caregivers; increases to Canadian student loans and grants; an increase in the Child Disability 
Benefit as part of the new Canada Child Benefit; and the increase to the Guaranteed Income 
Supplement for low-income single seniors, many of whom have functional limitations in their 
activities of everyday living. These announcements, however, were identified as initiatives in 
health care, helping middle class families, post-secondary education, and retirement income 
security for current seniors. Furthermore, no disability lens analysis was applied to these 
measures in the budget that could have specified the kind of impacts for particular constituents of 
persons with disabilities. If a cross-government approach to disability issues is to be achieved, 
this is the kind of analysis that will be required to support such a horizontal policy approach.   
  
4
 Canada’s past, present and foreseeable political future is some variant of federalism and 
intergovernmental relations. For a classic study, see Smiley (1987). 
  
5
 For disenfranchised persons with disabilities, see Ben-Moshe, Chapman and Carey (eds. 2014).  
 
6
 On the construction of the abnormal, see Foucault (2003). See also, Silva and Howe (2015) and 
Giulianotti (2015) 
 
7
  Descriptions of groups of communities of persons with disabilities is problematic when it 
comes to identify and self-disclosure. Words and turns of phrase can include people who do not 
consider themselves disabled and exclude those who do. Mental illness alienates those with 
mental health issues just as those with chronic illness may not be endure disabling effects of a 
disease. When marked with an uppercase ‘D’, people identify with Deaf culture and lifestyles. 
Whereas a lowercase ‘d’, refers to partial or complete loss of hearing among those outside Deaf 
culture. Our choice in language errs on the side of inclusion. 
  
8
 For example, refusal rates for applications for disability benefits through the Canada Pension 
Plan is about 50 percent, with heavy reliance on medical practitioners filling out forms, for 
which applicants pay. The program uses a strict definition of disability, “severe and prolonged is 
incapable of gainful employment” which means that a person must be 100 percent disabled for 
100 percent of jobs available. See Prince (2016) and Stapleton et al. (2015). 
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Chapter 5 
A NEW GOVERNMENT AND ITS “NEW INNOVATION AGENDA” 
David Castle and Peter W.B. Phillips 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 After nine years of Conservative government, the Liberals regained a majority 
government (184 seats) in October 2015 with an attenuated Conservative opposition (99 
seats) in a newly expanded Parliament of 338 seats. The Liberals campaigned on promises 
that their government would deliver the kind of change Canadians were seeking, mainly 
ushering out Stephen Harper and his policies and style of government. Yet while the 
electorate knew well what they would be forfeiting with a change of government, less clear is 
what change the Liberals intend in both the style and substance of the science, technology 
and innovation (STI) agenda. 
 This chapter assesses the Liberal government’s early steps to develop a new agenda 
for STI by first evaluating the current conditions for STI, some attributes of which result 
from now two-decade old Liberal programs and policies, and some of which are attributable 
to the Harper Conservative agenda of the last decade. The question under examination in this 
chapter is whether there are early signs that the Liberal government’s agenda for STI will be 
a truly new agenda, whether it ends up being continuous with the past Conservative agenda, 
and whether new initiatives are a resumption of previous Liberal policies under Chrétien and 
Martin.  
What evidence is there that something new is afoot in Ottawa? An analysis of the 
cabinet structure and membership initially suggests STI could factor more in policy debates 
and possibly in policy actions. Renaming Industry Canada as the department of Innovation, 
Science and Economic Development, promising to reinstate a science advisor, and continuing 
142 
 
 
the Minister of State for Science suggests renewed emphasis on STI, but also a return to past 
practices. New ministerial mandate letters, subsequent department restructuring and 
commitments to support STI provide early indications that these changes could substantively 
address the long-standing gap between basic science and industrial application, on the one 
hand, and science’s role in providing evidence for decision-making on the other. 
 Yet while these portents for a new innovation agenda are promising, and are being 
buoyed by public declarations in support of a new focus on STI, particularly around climate 
change (e.g. see chapter 6 in this years 2016-2017 How Ottawa Spends), other aspects of 
government initially appear to be stuck in the past. Take for example the re-emergence of 
old-style industrial policy, which seems out of character with the new rhetoric around STI. 
Within 30 minutes of the swearing of the new government, the Government of Quebec 
challenged the new minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development to match a 
Quebec $1 billion US$ subsidy to Bombardier. How the federal government responds could 
signal whether we are truly on a new policy track or returning to a focus on large, strategic 
plays. 
 
CURRENT CONDITIONS FOR STI 
 In many ways, the past decade of science and innovation policy has been a 
disappointment both in terms of overall supports and in terms of program and policy 
development. While there have been some successes, for the most part Canada has not kept 
up with other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. 
Using an internationally recognized benchmark of Gross Expenditure on R&D as a percent of 
GDP (GERD),  as of 2014 Canada had slipped back to about 1.6%, down from over 2% in 
the early 2000s; this puts Canada’s effort at half the average OECD effort (see Table 1). The 
downward trend is a matter of concern in this chapter, but can be conditioned by three 
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observations. The first is that GERD is a 50+ year old metric developed by the National 
Experts on Science and Technology Indicators (NESTI) group for the OECD for the so-called  
 
Table 1: S&T indicators, Canada, US and OECD 
  Canada OECD US 
Year 2014 2014 2013 
Gross expenditure on R&D (GERD), 
US$ Million Current PPP 
$25,813  $1,178,899  $436,078  
$ per capita $726  $930  $1,442  
% GDP 1.61 2.37 2.74 
% GDP avg 2011-2013 1.79 2.6 2.35 
% Financed by       
- Industry 45 61 61 
- Government 35 28 28 
% performed by       
- Industry 50 71 51 
- Higher Education 40 18 40 
- Government 9 11 10 
FTE Researchers in 2012 161,590 4,411,450 1,265,064 
Per thousand total employment 9.06 7.78 8.74 
Source: OECD, 2016, Main Science and Technology Indicators 2011-2014, 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MSTI_PUB 
 
Frascati Manual. R&D metrics are an indicative, but not uniquivocal, measure since every 
national innovation system parses its economic sectors, sources of funds, and measures of 
success slightly differently, despite the OECD’s best efforts to standardize these measures. 
For example, Statistics Canada’s annual survey methodology and robustness of data 
collection has changed over the decades.  
Irrespective of the slippage that might exist in country comparisons, a second 
observation is that R&D expenditures, however they are constituted, are both a direct but 
partial measure of expenditure on science and technology and an indirect measure or proxy 
for overall support to innovative activity. Third, evidence of changing R&D expenditures 
does not assume a static economic or political backdrop. In Canada, declining R&D 
expenditure might reflect weak policy and administrative support for STI,  or it might be a 
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symptom of  Dutch disease (reliance on natural resource booms against other sector 
development). Despite these caveats, the new government faces an uphill climb to make 
globally competitive Canada’s science and innovation performance. 
 Renewed federal investment in STI after 1999, especially through a number of new 
research institutions, moved Canada into the top tier of scholarly research in a number of 
areas, but little of this appeared to influence the shape and scope of the larger economy. The 
emergence, under the Chrétien  Liberals, of the Canadian Foundation of Innovation, Genome 
Canada, National Centres of Excellence, the Canada Research Chairs programs and then the 
Conservatives contribution of the Canada Excellence Research Chairs and the Canada First 
Research Excellence Fund, increased the number of highly qualified people, the number of 
researchers and our scholarly output (Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development 2012; Council of Canadian Academies 2012).  
 Supporting the mix of new and old programs gives the appearance that the 
Conservative government was making progress on their investments but, in reality, following 
the 2008 financial meltdown the Canadian government pulled back on investments in R&D. 
By 2014-15, total outlays on S&T totalled $10.3 billion, down by 14% from a peak of $12.0 
billion in 2010-11. Outlays on R&D dropped to $6.5 billion, down by 16% from $7.7 billion  
while related scientific activities (RSA) dipped to $3.8 billion from a peak of $4.4 billion , a 
reduction of 13%. These developments reflect an attempt to bring budgetary discipline in 
times of austerity, but the Conservative view that more commercial outputs must arise from 
STI investments drove other significant changes in Canada’s innovation ecosystem.  
The Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) program, a federal 
tax incentive program to encourage Canadian businesses to invest in research and 
development, at its peak in 2010-11 supported more than $4.5 billion dollars of private R&D, 
costing the treasury almost $3.5 billion of foregone revenue. In response to a range of advice 
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from the Council of Canadian Academies (CCA) and the Jenkins Panel, the Conservative 
government in the 2012 budget made capital expenditures no longer eligible for SR&ED 
investment tax credits starting in 2014 and lowered the rate for calculating the prescribed 
proxy amount from 65% to 60% effective January 1, 2013, with a further reduction to 55% 
effective January 1, 2014. The net effect is that the implicit tax expenditure (and by inference 
the subsidy to private R&D) dropped to an estimated $1.8 billion by 2014-15.  
 The latest breakdowns of expenditures by the federal government are from 2012-13, 
when the total outlays for both R&D and RSA almost reached $11 billion (see Table 2). At 
that time, about 25% of the total outlays flowed through the three leading granting agencies: 
Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), Natural Science and Engineering Research 
 
Table 2: Federal expenditures on science and technology, by major departments and 
agencies 
 2012/2013 
p
 
Total 10,946 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 364 
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited 430 
Canada Foundation for Innovation 559 
CIHR 1,010 
CIDA 407 
Canadian Space Agency 345 
Environment Canada 668 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada 267 
Health Canada 584 
Industry Canada 486 
National Defense 367 
National Research Council Canada 722 
Natural Resources Canada 690 
NSERC 1063 
SSHRC 692 
Statistics Canada 654 
Other 1,639 
Statistics Canada 2012. Federal Scientific Activities 
2012/13. 
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Council (NSERC) and the Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC). The 
rest, about half R&D funding and half Related Science Activities (RSA), flowed through an 
array of departments and agencies with either regulatory or sector development 
responsibilities (or in some cases, both functions). 
As the new Liberal government considers how to develop and implement its proposed 
“New Innovation Agenda”, it will have to face some uncomfortable realities. In the first 
instance, business expenditure on R&D (BERD) is significantly lower than in most other 
OECD countries and to a great extent it is more vulnerable to disruption, due to the large 
concentration of R&D in a few firms in a few sectors in Canada. Complicating this is the 
reality that most government funding flows through the higher education sector—only a 
small amount is directly engaged with firm-level R&D. In 2013, for example, federal 
spending on R&D (i.e. excluding related science activities), was almost all directed to 
intramural research and activities in the higher education sector. Only about 7% of federal 
R&D funds flowed to firms to do firm-based R&D. When one maps and considers the flows 
between funders and performers of R&D, it is clear  that federal influence on business is 
quite limited and other difficult to measure influences, such as the impact of private non-
profit entities, might have more impact because foundation funding is often direct and 
leverages others investments . 
 One of the challenges the federal government faces is that the different regions have 
different capacities to engage in research (see Table 3). In per capita terms, economy-wide 
R&D is highest in Ontario and Quebec; the West invests about 20% less than the national 
average per capita and the Atlantic region only reaches 55% of the national effort. Provincial 
governments, for the most part, are not major players. The governments of Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and Quebec are, relatively speaking, the most engaged in R&D, but, except in 
Alberta, their share of the total activity in their provinces is modest. Industry is relatively 
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more engaged in Alberta and Quebec, where half or more of the funds come from business. 
Universities provide about one in five dollars of funding nationally; in the Atlantic Provinces, 
with weak provincial and business capacity, universities are the anchor, funding about 42% 
of total R&D. Not-for-profit and foreign investment in R&D is relatively modest. One result 
of this uneven distribution of capacity is that the federal government plays a different role 
(and has different potential) in each region and province. The federal government on average 
directly funds about 19% of total R&D, ranging from as low as 12% in Alberta to as high as 
37% in PEI.  
 
Table 3: Provincial distribution of gross domestic expenditures on research and 
development— By funding sector, 2013 
 
 
Canada Atlantic Quebec Ontario West 
All sectors ($ millions) 31,972 1,196 8,391 14,081 8135 
Per Capita 909 504 1,029 1,039 742 
% Canada 100% 4% 26% 44% 25% 
 
Sources of funds (%) 
     
Federal government 19 30 15 22 17 
Provincial governments 6 3 8 4 7 
Business enterprise 46 21 49 45 48 
Higher education 20 42 18 18 20 
Private non-profit orgs 4 3 3 4 4 
Foreign 6 1 6 8 4 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2014. 
 
 
 The implications of this for the Liberal’s new Innovation Agenda are relatively well 
researched. The Conservatives undertook a number of expert consultations, including the 
Science and Technology Innovation Council (STIC) annual reviews from 2007 to 2014, the 
Competition Policy Review Panel (the Williams committee) in 2008 and the Expert Review 
Panel on Research and Development (the Jenkins panel) in 2010, and made a number of 
special references to the CCA to review the state of science and technology in Canada. All of 
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the reports came to similar conclusions. First, the efforts to refinance basic research were 
generally judged to be positive. The CCA report on the State of Science and Technology in 
Canada in 2012 summed up what is now the predominant view, powerfully reinforced by the 
2015 Science, Technology and Innovation Council (2015) report : Canadian scholarly output 
"is healthy and growing" but with limited economic impact. In 2005-10, Canada produced 
more than 4% of the world’s scientific papers and almost 5% of the most cited papers (with 
less than 0.5% of the world's population), and output rose by almost 60% over the previous 
five years, the only G7 country posting an above average increase. The challenge comes in 
translating those outputs into social and economic use. While Canada has a high number of 
well-cited patents, overall Canada files a relatively low number of patents, which is judged to 
be one of the causes of a net $5 billion outflow of royalties in 2010 (Ibid).  
Moreover, in spite of what is arguably the best after-tax package of incentives for 
R&D, Canadian business both perennially underinvests in research and is slow and hesitant 
in commercializing new technologies (Science, Technology and Innovation Council 2011, 
2015). The end result is disappointing productivity levels and growth. The OECD (2012) 
reported that multifactor productivity (MFP) in Canada actually fell between 2002 and 2011. 
Performance relative to the US has been particularly poor: average hourly labour productivity 
in Canada declined by more than 11% relative to the US after 1998 and MFP in constant 
purchasing power parity terms trended flat to down in Canada but jumped about 35% since 
the late 1980s in the US. 
 
THE NEW LIBERAL INNOVATION AGENDA 
The new Liberal government has committed to a “New Innovation Agenda” but its scale and 
scope remains unclear. The 78 day election campaign, the longest and most expensive in 
modern times, offered ample time to have a rich debate about science, technology and 
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innovation policy in Canada, but for the most part the opportunity was forgone by all three of 
the leading parties. A few small and targeted promises were made, especially from the 
victorious Liberal Party, yet none of the debates and very little of the campaigning or 
reporting focused explicitly on science, technology or innovation. At the five debates—three 
unfocused sparring, one thematically organized on security, and the other on the economy—
little of the formal questioning pertained, even obliquely, to science, technology and 
innovation topics, and none of the take-away moments from the debates reflected any of the 
parties’ views on science, technology or innovation. 
 The party platforms in some ways are more helpful in understanding the focus and 
emphasis the new government (and the opposition) might put on science, technology and 
innovation policy (Liberal Party of Canada 2015; Stoney and Doern 2015). During the 
campaign, and core to the electoral debate, was a focus on the macroeconomic choices 
Canada can make. The biggest divergence in the parties was on fiscal priorities, with the 
Conservatives and NDP proposing to maintain balanced budgets (with the Tories offering 
legislation to entrench that promise), while the Liberals broke ranks, took leadership risks, 
and proposed to accelerate spending on infrastructure (up by 1% of GDP to $10B annually) 
and to run a significant short term deficit to accommodate that growth. As part of that 
commitment, the Liberals proposed to allocate up to $6 billion of the infrastructure budget 
over the next four years (or about 15%) for green infrastructure, for a range of potentially-
innovative water and wastewater facilities, climate resilient infrastructure, clean energy, 
clean-up of contaminated sites to facilitate new construction and protection against changing 
weather patterns (Liberal Party of Canada, 2015, 11-15). 
Taxes also generated significant debate. While the Conservatives proposed to hold 
steady on tax policy, the NDP and Liberals both proposed rebalancing the tax load by shifting 
taxes more to higher income Canadians and reducing the burden on the middle class. While 
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the NDP favoured doing a similar rebalancing on the corporate side, the Liberals were more 
restrained, simply offering modest cuts to the small business tax rate (from 11% to 9%), 
offset by measures to prevent professionals from using this system to avoid income tax.  
 Science, technology and innovation platform promises varied between parties. The 
Conservatives mostly proposed to continue their support for the existing set of programs in 
areas such as the Tri-Councils, CFI and NRC, while the NDP proposed a number of 
industrial-style innovation programs for major sectors, such as autos. The Liberals offered  
their more aggressive “new Innovation Agenda” (Liberal Party of Canada 2015, 15). In total, 
they proposed in their first term to invest more than $1.6 billion into new or expanded 
spending on science, technology and innovation, including: $200 million per year over the 
next three years to support technology incubators, research facilities and financing for small 
businesses; $200 million each year to support innovation and the use of clean technologies in 
natural resource sectors, including forestry, fisheries, mining, energy, and agriculture; $100 
million per year for the next three years for IRAP; $100M over four years for agricultural 
research; and $80 million over four years for the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (15-16). 
Other parts of the innovation package included: setting aside a portion of federal procurement 
budgets for "promising new Canadian technologies and businesses, consistent with 
international trade agreements”; establishing Canada Research Chairs in sustainable 
technology; reinstating the Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital Corporation tax credit; and a 
general promise to base decisions related to GM crop production on sound science and 
transparency. 
 While the actual scale, scope and components of the new agenda is fairly 
straightforward and unsurprising, it is clear the new administration will present a different 
style of governing. The unveiling and swearing in of the new cabinet was heralded as the 
“return to government by cabinet”, with individual ministers presented as sources of power 
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and influence in their own right. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made significant effort to 
signal that he was ending the tight central control of the PM and PMO exercised by Stephen 
Harper. This was reflected in the following days as more than a dozen individual ministers 
engaged in scrums with media to lay out early priorities for the government (some of which 
directly focused on science, technology and innovation policy and governance).  
 The cabinet structure and membership suggests science and innovation could factor 
more in policy debates and possibly in policy actions. While the superstructure of 
departments and agencies has not changed in any obvious way, the new government has 
signalled a change in emphasis, renaming Industry Canada as the department of Innovation, 
Science and Economic Development (ISED), while the Minister of State for Science 
continues, creating the sense of a double focus on science in the new government, even 
though there were also two ministers in earlier periods. Early opinion suggested the new 
Science minister, Dr. Kirsty Duncan, a medical geographer who served on the International 
Panel for Climate Change, would focus on “renewal” of the federal science system, which 
many assert declined under the Harper government.  
Some speculate that the science portfolio may rebalance investment in research, 
focusing more on “basic” research driven by curiosity, in contrast with applied science, 
research and development. Meanwhile Environment Canada was renamed Environment and 
Climate Change, and Public Safety was enjoined with Emergency Preparedness. The 
orientation of the new Innovation Agenda, plus the addition of two ministers interested in 
infectious diseases (Kirsty Duncan and Jane Philpott, a medical doctor named as Minister of 
Health), may signal a subtle shift of the innovation agenda toward a focus more on 
sustainability and “pan-Canadian collaboration” (on health and other public priorities) and 
away from broader firm-based industrial innovation (Liberal Party of Canada 2015, 9).  
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 One innovation of this government, in vogue in some of the provinces, is the 
development and public release by Prime Minister Trudeau of ministerial mandate letters that 
assign lead responsibility and set deadlines for many of the election platform commitments. 
Before delving into the mandates, a few points warrant consideration. First, the mandate 
letters for the science and innovation ministers are far less specific than the election 
promises; most talk about process rather than specific measures. Furthermore, none of the 
money ideas in the Liberal election platform are in the mandate letters. Second, the mandate 
letters suggest they will use science and evidence to make government policy and regulatory 
decisions, but then promise incubators, new programs in value added agriculture and various 
other initiatives that are hotly contested and not obviously supported by evidence.  
Third, and related, none of the mandate letters offered any sense that the federal 
government would look to other countries for ideas and innovations; rather, the letters 
focused on engaging domestic agencies, local authorities, and the various provincial and 
territorial powers in the innovation agenda. Fourth, the mandate letters suggest there will be a 
lot of interconnectedness of the Ministers in completing their mandates. This could, if well-
orchestrated, lead to new synergies in government, or it could lead to chaotic or stalled 
delivery. At the moment, however, horizontal collaboration between federal departments is a 
gesture at a preferred governing style, without corresponding mechanisms developed to 
overcome the counterbalancing structure of government: vertically integrated and budgeted 
ministries, accountabilities (including for specific legislative acts), and cultures of work. For 
example, the Department of Fisheries, Oceans and Coast Guard is expected to work with the 
Ministries of Environment and Climate Change, Transport and Natural Resources to deliver 
on resource protection, climate change initiatives and marine transportation, as well as 
coordinate its activities with a wide variety of other federal and provincial partners and 
through the regional DFO offices. For ministries and departments more accustomed to 
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attending to their internal hierarchies, the mandate letters signal significant change and 
uncharted waters for some. 
 The mandate letters also indicate the new style of government and how it would like 
to engage with both its scientists and the scientific community. This change, some would say 
reversal of the last decade of government, is likely to achieve more immediate results than 
horizontal governance between departments. The mandate letter for the Minister of Science 
explicitly directs her to “create a Chief Science Officer mandated to ensure that government 
science is fully available to the public, that scientists are able to speak freely about their 
work, and that scientific analyses are considered when the government makes decisions.” 
(Trudeau 2015a). One early target of this new approach is to contribute to the review and 
reform of Canada’s environmental assessment processes “to ensure that environmental 
assessment decisions are based on science, facts, and evidence.” (Ibid).  
 Meanwhile, Nadeem Bains, Minister of Innovation, Economic Development and 
Science, was directed to “develop an Innovation Agenda that includes: expanding effective 
support for incubators, accelerators, the emerging national network for business innovation 
and cluster support, and the Industrial Research Assistance Program.” (Trudeau 2015b).These 
investments will target “key growth sectors”. Secondly, the minister was directed to both 
review “our programs that support innovation, scientific research and entrepreneurship” to 
increase alignment between federal efforts and provincial and industrial capacity and to the 
Minister of Finance to “ensure tax measures are efficient and encourage innovation, trade and 
the growth of Canadian businesses; and working with Regional Development Agencies to 
make strategic investments that build on competitive regional advantages.” (Ibid). While this 
sounds promising, most new governments in the past 50 years in Canada have promised to 
right the errors of their predecessors and make federal programming more effective; success 
is not guaranteed.  
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 A few selected new investments were signalled in the mandate letters. Minister Bains 
was directed to examine programming to make new investments in clean and sustainable 
technology and processes for fisheries, in the auto sector to assist them to compete in the 
context of greater market liberalization reflected in the Trans-Pacific Partnership and to 
support the Minister of Science to establish new Canada Research Chairs in sustainable 
technologies (Ibid). Meanwhile, the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-food (Trudeau 2015c) 
was directed to develop a new Agri-Food Value Added Investment Fund to attract investment 
and create good jobs in food processing, once again in response to liberalizing markets. The 
new fund (value not disclosed yet) is designed to provide technical and marketing assistance 
to help food processors develop new value-added products that reflect changing tastes and 
market opportunities. 
  
THE POTENTIAL FOR THE NEW INNOVATION AGENDA TO TRANSFORM 
CANADA 
 
Doern, Castle and Phillips (2016) recently assessed the Canadian science and innovation 
policy landscape over the past 50 years in the context of eight science, technology and 
innovation policy domains: macro S&T policy; the S&T departments and agencies; the 
granting councils; intellectual property (IP); industry; agriculture and biosciences; genomics; 
and the internet, communications and social media (broadly ICT). Here we use this structure 
to offer some observations about the prospects for the Liberal’s new Innovation Agenda to 
transform Canada’s economic and social prospects.  
 The macro S&T and innovation policy domain can be parsed into two halves: the role 
of science in policy; and the policy for science. The new government has locked onto and 
engaged initially with the role of science in the policy system and in government. The return 
to dual science ministries, the reappointment of a chief science advisor, the “un-muzzling” of 
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public scientists and the commitment to science-based decision making represent modest but 
widely welcomed changes in the style of governing. Science-based and evidence-informed 
policy and regulation as a concept and as discourse arose mainly in the late 1980s and early 
1990s in the wake of free trade agreements that normalized and codified policy and 
regulatory norms and practices. These agreements sought to ensure that any future efforts to 
create policy or regulations would not become illegitimate barriers to trade; rather, by making 
them science-based, evidence-based or based on “sound science”,  it was hoped they would 
erect dams against the feared flood of policy and regulatory protectionism triggered by 
reduced capacity to use tariffs to control trade.  
Even early on, however, notions of “science” in policy and regulation always 
involved not just the natural sciences but also the social and managerial sciences, including 
and drawing on related kinds of evidence such as that supplied in regulatory benefit-cost 
analysis, red-tape analysis, and concepts of justice that are at the heart of administrative law. 
In the era of distributed governance, policy and regulatory systems have widened to include 
guidelines and codes underpinned by the system-wide assessment and governance system. 
All of this has led to greater interest in and consideration of related science activities (RSA), 
which now account for about one third of all federal outlays on science, technology and 
innovation. RSA is embodied in the brains, experience, and social networks of front-line 
S&T personnel and has been extended from safety as a predominant goal to more complex 
notions of risk-benefit and smart regulation. Policy and regulation over the past decade has 
aspired to not just involve pre-market assessment of products, processes and developments 
but also extended to longer-term, post-market, life-cycle monitoring. The Liberal government 
has signalled in the context of the environmental impact assessments of a number of 
significant oil and gas pipelines that it will open the processes to address a broader range of 
considerations. Making these changes actually work will require seriously addressing what 
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“science-based” decision making means and how economic, social and cultural 
considerations will be assessed and accommodated alongside objective, statistically-validated 
scientific evidence.  
 Policy for science, technology and innovation is sometimes harder to pin down, as it 
includes all the system-defining S&T policy statements, rules, and budgetary decisions 
regarding science, technology and innovation. Change in this area is often much more 
complicated, and unlikely to deliver significant impacts in the short to medium term. 
Sustaining enthusiasm to make fundamental and long-term choices is much more difficult, if 
for no other reason than that any resulting benefits are likely to be delayed significantly—
recent evidence suggests the average lag between an inventive or innovative discovery and 
the peak of any resulting benefits is in the range of 17-20 years (Alston et al 2010). This long 
lag helps explain why science and innovation policy tends to slip from the agenda.  
Equally challenging is that most of the structures underlying effective government 
policy are shared by many policy areas, making them harder to change simply to address 
innovation priorities. Many of the underlying concepts currently driving S&T policy emerged 
under the Chrétien  Liberals and are widely accepted and supported within and beyond 
government, so there are limited degrees of freedom for change. And, while governments can 
put a focus on policy for science and innovation, the structures of government have 
significant potential to limit the impact of those changes. Budgets, budget processes, and 
annual policy and investment decisions, regulatory policy, processes, and related science 
activities, and the ongoing public service renewal process may have a greater long-term 
impact than any specific innovation measure. Many of these efforts will undoubtedly change 
and contribute to, but likely will not be driven by, the emerging innovation agenda.  
 The S&T departments and agencies, viewed by many as the core of federal S&T 
capacity, are due for some renewal. R&D and RSA in executive government and the special 
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agencies are complicated. As mentioned earlier, the federal government is relatively more 
important that any single other actor in the Canadian S&T field, with only a few provincial 
programmes and a handful of large firms reaching the scale of the federal effort. This puts the 
federal government in the sights of almost all those organizations hoping to gain through 
renewed S&T policy in Canada. After 1988, more than five years of program cuts, combined 
with some recent managerial decisions, worked to limit the federal government’s capacity to 
either act definitively in areas of federal responsibility or to partner with the provinces, 
universities or industry to advance priorities of mutual interest. Health Canada, Environment 
Canada, Fisheries and Oceans, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada and the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agencies generally stepped back from leadership in recent years. The Liberals 
have promised, either in the election platform or in the ministerial mandate letters, more 
funding and a more aggressive agenda for all of them.  
 These promises have created expectations that new investments will bolster or build 
new federal capacity or influence in these areas. One outstanding issue that has not been 
addressed yet is that many of these agencies have been forced by budgetary cuts or 
encouraged by management fads to adopt matrix management, which for the most part has 
undercut the ability of these organizations to partner effectively with industry or government. 
AAFC and the National Research Council are particular targets for renewal. The Research 
Branch of AAFC moved to a matrix management system as early as 2003, and since then it 
has had great difficulty exercising leadership in this federal constitutional field. The NRC 
was slower to adapt to new management styles, but in 2011 the Council eliminated all of the 
Institutes, replacing them with Research Platforms, in an attempt to emulate the German 
Fraunhofer system. While a few of the platforms have had some success in leveraging private 
interest, much of the NRC research effort has not been able to align to this model and has 
languished. These two agencies, in particular, have been major contributors to past innovative 
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capacity in Canada—renewal of their mission, mandate and capacity would go a long way to 
advancing federal influence on the national economy.  
 Meanwhile, the granting agencies and universities are chomping at the bit for change, 
but there is no sense of if or how the government can do much that will change the system.  
The three independent federal granting councils – the Natural Sciences and Engineering 
Research Council of Canada (NSERC), the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), 
and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC)–provide 
funds to approximately 140 eligible institutions, primarily university academics and 
researchers in hospitals. Over the past decade the principles of merit review (in addition to 
peer review), leveraging, and large scale networking, all introduced under the Chrétien  
Liberals, have become embodied in the Councils and generally accepted by the broader 
research community. 
 The announcement in the mandate letters of new Canada Research Chairs for 
sustainable development and the post-election confirmation of a second round of the Canada 
First Excellence Research Fund are fair indications that the granting agencies may need to 
live with this new reality for some time to come. The federal budget in March 2016 sustained 
and in some ways enhanced the CFI, Genome Canada and the NCE programs (all built on 
merit review, leveraging and large scale networked science), signalling that change will not 
come as quickly as some might like.  
 The industrial structure to a great extent defines what can be done with innovation 
policy and instruments. Just because a government wants to go in a different direction doesn’t 
mean that it will be able to engage differently with industry. At the front of the queue are a 
number of large Canadian-based multinational firms seeking support to compete 
internationally. Recent research (Milke 2013) shows that Canadian R&D subsidies and tax 
credits are highly concentrated in a few sectors and most of the funds are directed to a small 
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subset of firms. The top 25 companies using these programmes, representing about half of all 
the funds invested, were regular dippers, drawing an average of 25 times from the support 
programs (in one case up to 83 times). The main beneficiary was the aerospace sector: in all, 
13 aerospace firms (out of the top 25 recipient firms) collected about 38% percent of the 
funds. Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. received the most money over the decades, almost $3.3 
billion via 75 disbursements; Bombardier and de Havilland were the second- and third-largest 
recipients, each receiving disbursements worth $1.1 billion over the years (Milke 2013). This 
goes a long way to explaining how Canada remains a global competitor in the aerospace 
sector but also highlights the challenge of the current types of programming. How the federal 
government responds to Bombardier could signal whether we are truly on a new policy track 
or returning to a focus on large, strategic plays as has been historical practice. Bombardier, 
one of the perennial national champions of high tech Canada, has suffered a series of delays 
recently in its new CSeries of narrow-body, twin-engine, medium-range jet airlines, causing 
serious erosion in its market value. As a result, the Government of Quebec on 29 October 
2015 committed US$1 billion of new support for the company and, within 30 minutes of the 
swearing-in of the new government, challenged the new minister of Innovation, Science and 
Economic Development to match the Quebec contribution. No decisions were made before 
early autumn. 
 Effective intellectual property systems are widely viewed as necessary for an 
innovative, knowledge-based economy. Federal laws and policies underpin this domain, but 
to a great extent policy regarding intellectual property is not controlled by the federal 
government alone. The current system of formal and informal IPRs has been constructed 
through a mix of national litigation, international negotiation and firm-level strategies. Over 
time, the IPR system has expanded the scope of private property, especially in the life-
sciences and ICT areas, by lengthening the term of protection, by extending the scope of 
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claims and by processes that facilitate multijurisdictional management of property claims. In 
some ways, Canada has been pulled into a fast-flowing international stream of intellectual 
property. Instead of pushing for this, both federal and provincial governments in Canada have  
sought to preserve some balance between public and private interests and to optimize the 
socio-economic benefits of innovation. Technology issues re-emerged in the early days of the 
new government in response to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade pact. Key 
technology businessmen, such as Jim Balsillie, immediately voiced serious concerns about 
possible adverse impacts for Canada in some of its provisions related to increased intellectual 
property rules and standards insisted on by the US and achieved in the TPP.  
Balsillie, former co-chief executive officer of BlackBerry, has helped form and now 
chairs a new lobby group to represent the ICT sector and entrepreneurs in Ottawa — the 
Canadian Council of Innovators (CCI). It draws its membership from technology firms that 
are: Canadian-based; rapidly growing through sales, not acquisitions; generating at least 
US$15 million a year in revenue; and scaling up for global expansion. For the most part it 
represents a set of ICT firms centred in the Waterloo-Toronto-Ottawa corridor. The CCI 
came out early in 2016 against Canada ratifying the proposed Trans Pacific Partnership trade 
deal involving 12 countries, including the U.S., Canada, Japan and Australia. Balsillie argued 
that the TPP proposal to extend copyright protection to life plus 70 years would hurt 
Canadian innovators, especially in the ICT domain. While IPRs are important, it is not 
entirely clear whether the system can accommodate all of the specific interests of every 
sector.  
 The agriculture, food, biosciences, and biotechnology domain is set in the 
fundamental reality that agriculture and food occupy a unique place in the hearts and minds 
of people. As the first and until relatively recently the most important social and economic 
activity in Canada, agriculture and food has historically held an important place in the 
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science, technology, and innovation space for Canada. While agriculture is to a great extent 
now off the national innovation agenda, it offers some real opportunities. Food security is on 
the global political agenda and Canada is likely to be a major contributor. The agricultural 
sector is Canada’s annual mega project, directly investing and generating more than $100 
billion of economic activity annually and sustaining 2.1 million jobs, about 12% of total 
employment. Canada is the fourth largest food exporter in the world.  
The sector involves a complex and integrated supply chain which includes input and 
service suppliers, primary producers, food and beverage processors, food retailers and 
wholesalers, and foodservice providers. The activities along this supply chain generate 
significant economic benefits both in rural areas and in many of Canada’s large urban 
centres. More than half of the value added in the sector is located in urban settings. The 
sector has grown faster than the overall economy since 2007 and there is significant room to 
invest more in research and development to improve productivity and quality, to expand 
value-added processing in Canada and to expand Canada’s global market share. With 
Growing Forward II, the federal-provincial strategy for agriculture, past its midway point, 
discussions are already underway about what might follow. Successive versions of the 
agricultural policy framework have become more focused on science and innovation in 
agriculture—the next is likely to sustain that trend. 
 Genomics and life sciences technologies are related to, but go well beyond, the issues 
and concepts found in the agricultural, food, biosciences, and biotechnology domain. In 
addition to many applications in the agri-food sector, there are a range of opportunities in the 
fisheries, forest, natural resource and health sectors. The mandate letters suggest that fisheries 
are already on the national agenda. The lead in this area is Genome Canada, which made a 
major (>$500 million) pitch for multi-year funding to sustain and expand its programming 
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and research in all these areas. The budget allocated $237.5 million as a first tranche of this 
funding, signalling  this government intends to sustain efforts in this area.  
 The emergence of the internet of things may define this government, and perhaps 
resolve the long-standing debate about how we see ourselves. While Canada has spawned a 
range of ICT success stories—particularly Nortel and Blackberry—none of them has secured 
a long-term future in global marketplaces. The ICT industry looks askance at government, 
alleging that its policies and programs remain in the “staples trap”, sapping the strength of 
innovative, technology-based firms and industries. One cannot deny that natural resources in 
Canada are still powerful parts of Canada's political economy. Some assert that they in fact 
constitute a form of embedded staples trap that harms the continuous development of both 
economic and social innovation.  
Others see a more nuanced story here. Canada’s natural resource development 
historically was anchored in S&T work and applications. Canada was one of the first and 
most globalized economies. But once the first phase of development was over, nation 
builders downplayed our historical resource-based roots and projected an image of Canada as 
a vibrant manufacturing and services-producing economy. In spite of all the efforts to 
develop capacity that is disconnected from our resource roots, it remains true that much of 
Canada’s industry that is thriving is also inextricably connected to the primary sector – 
providing inputs and processing outputs, financing and developing new production 
technology, and moving and marketing those products. There have been efforts to show the 
interconnectivity and mutual prosperity from further engagement between some of the 
resource sectors – e.g., agriculture in the 1980s and oil and gas in the 2000s – and 
manufacturing and services sectors, but that message is still often subsumed into a partially 
but importantly misleading two-category discourse of old economy/new economy.  
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For the most part, policy analysts and policy advocates actually ignore the resource 
sectors as a source of international industrial competitiveness and instead assert Canada 
needs to move towards a knowledge-based economy focused on inventing, producing and 
selling disembodied technologies and information-rich products and services. The internet of 
things may make this dispute moot as the introgression of digital sensing and artificial 
intelligence into the goods-producing industries may make them as knowledge and 
information intensive as the services sectors. If the new Innovation Agenda comes to grips 
with this challenge, the historical tension between natural resource development and 
advanced industrial development may vanish. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
We can now bring the three main lines of analysis in this chapter together, which are: 
1) the current conditions for STI; 2) the new Liberal innovation agenda; and 3) the potential 
for the new innovation agenda to transform Canada. With respect to the current conditions for 
STI, the past decade’s steady decline to 1.6% of GDP expenditure for STI in Canada is 
worrying – Canada should aim for at least 2.5%. Given the importance of growing the 
knowledge economy, remaining internationally competitive, and acknowledging higher rates 
of inflation in R&D than other parts of the economy, chronic underfunding of research has 
become a localized structural deficit. The Conservative government intended to stimulate 
private sector R&D to shore up innovative capacity and boost MFP. But they did so during a 
tumultuous economic period, were receiving recommendations from various panels that sent 
the government swimming upstream against Canada’s low R&D business culture, and it was 
never clear from a government policy standpoint that improved commercialization and R&D 
performance would feed back into federal supports to STI and generate a flywheel effect. 
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 The Liberals have inherited this situation, but their “innovation agenda” speaks 
primarily to their intended style of government. They propose to change how government 
works by focusing on government-by-cabinet, a commitment to science-based evidence, 
horizontal collaboration between ministries and departments, and public mandates for 
ministers that make clear the intention of government to put resources into policy areas that 
are either focused directly on or underpin the core STI effort. At the time of writing 
Trudeau’s government passed it’s ten month window, having solidified an early reputation 
for adopting an open and internationalized style of government. But where STI policy is 
concerned, ministries have only recently settled down with key staffing appointments and 
organizational ramping up. It is too soon to tell whether their style of government will mean 
the continuation of the current conditions for STI, or a transition to a new policy. 
 What is at stake in continuation versus transition becomes clearer with our third 
analytical framework that could tap into the potential for the new innovation agenda that 
would transform Canada’s STI landscape. Take for example the role of the Chief Science 
Advisor in the macro S&T and innovation policy domain. Many interpret this as a return to 
the pre-Harper Conservative approach of a national science advisor, such as when Dr. Arthur 
Carty gave science advice directly to the Chrétien Liberal PMO. This is positive  for many 
who see it as a form of restoration of the role of science in policy; the Canadian Science 
Policy Conference (November 2015) dedicated a session to national science advice and 
showcased the work of New Zealand’s Sir Peter Gluckman, who exemplified the value of this 
model when it works. The other option is for Trudeau’s government to appoint a science 
advisor that has an intramural function – policy for science – by taking on the role of 
providing the mechanisms to support and sustain the horizontal governance of STI indicated 
in the ministerial mandate letters. This approach could be more innovative and consistent 
with the government’s new collaborative and consultative style.  
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In our framing of the central issues for setting a new STI agenda for Canada, we 
singled out the capacity of the S&T departments and agencies; how science and innovation 
policy meshes with Canada’s industrial structure; the efficacy of intellectual property 
systems; and critical domains such as agriculture, food, biosciences, and biotechnology; 
genomics and life sciences; and the internet of things. Will real change be possible in these 
domains? Changes in governments offer a window for policy reform, yet portfolios like 
science and innovation often find it difficult to take advantage of the opportunity. While 
governments can and often do quickly put a new face on the role of science in policy, they 
find it much harder to develop new policies for science and innovation activities. The Harper 
government was quick to change the role of science in policy, replacing expert advisory 
groups with STIC, “muzzling scientists” and winding down the office of the Chief Scientist; 
the Liberal government has similarly acted quickly to reverse many of the Harper choices. In 
contrast, Harper made only small and iterative changes to the policy for science and 
innovation, for the most part building upon the structures, principles, discourses and 
partnerships bequeathed by the outgoing Chrétien /Martin government. Given the challenges 
facing the new government, now that the first “100 days of decision” and the almost twelve 
months of gestation are complete, one might expect a similarly modest and incremental set of 
changes in policies, programs and institutions to emerge. The good news is that the mandate 
letters signal a plan to keep innovation on the agenda; the reality is that there is little yet to 
signal any material change in the policy.  
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Chapter 6 
LIBERAL ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE GOVERNANCE: REBALANCING THE 
ENERGY/ENVIRONMENT DOMAIN POST-HARPER 
Glen Toner, David Cherniak and Kevin Force
1
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Justin Trudeau Liberal government approach to governance in the energy/environment 
policy domain can only be understood in the context of the 2006-2015 Stephen Harper 
Conservative government approach. The Liberal policy platform and governance approach were 
built “against” the Harper record – with respect to both the content of Harper’s oilsands-first 
focus and indifference to climate change and his confrontational style of policy development and 
implementation. Harper intentionally politicized the energy/environment domain in the interests 
of wedge politics; a governance strategy designed to divide Canadians into ‘friends’ and 
‘enemies’ simultaneously undermining opponent’s legitimacy and enraging the Conservative 
base who can then be tapped for donations.  
This governance strategy targeted the minimum number of Conservative voters required 
to win a majority, but was a “high risk roll of the dice” with “no guarantee the wedge will break 
their way” (Toner and McKee 2014). It did not. Indeed, Harper’s gamble failed miserably and in 
the October 2015 election Conservative victories retreated primarily to the party base in the West 
and in rural Canada. Conversely, Trudeau crafted a campaign targeting the 65% of voters 
spurned by Harper and won with support in the cities and in all regions.  
The Liberals’ goal in this field is to shift the energy/environment domain away from 
Harper’s energy development fixation toward a position nearer the centre of the spectrum where 
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energy and environmental considerations will both be taken into consideration in policy 
decisions. This chapter is a sequel to the Toner and McKee (2014) analysis of Harper’s 
governance approach in the energy/environmental policy domain and explores whether the 
“window of opportunity” provided by the confluence of strengthened scientific evidence on 
climate change in the 2014 IPCC Report and domestic electoral politics in 2015 will allow the 
Trudeau Government to deploy a contrasting governance approach that will shift the balance of 
power within the domain. To achieve this shift Trudeau will have to undue much of what Harper 
did – in terms of both substance and process. The Conservative parliamentary opposition and 
their remaining provincial allies can be expected to oppose this transition. 
This chapter has three parts. Part one contrasts Harper’s and Trudeau’s vastly different 
political ideas and governance approaches to energy/environment policy. While the Liberal’s 
engagement approach is what the provinces have been seeking, the history of federal-provincial 
politics teaches us that collaboration will be challenging (Simmons 2016). Still, engagement and 
collaboration is an inherently more mature approach to governance than the confrontational 
“friends and enemies” approach of the Conservative decade. VanNijnatten argues that Canadian 
governments have historically exhibited ambivalence when it comes to attempting to graft more 
environmentally friendly policy tools onto regimes fundamentally favouring extractive activities 
and that federal leadership will be required if we are to coordinate our environmental protection 
and sustainability efforts (VanNijnatten 2016). In their sweeping review of 50 years of 
environmental policy and governance in Canada, Doern, Auld and Stoney (2015) argue that 
environmental ideas, policies, and institutions have almost always come out second best when 
attempting to challenge the entrenched policies, institutions and actors in the energy and resource 
sectors. They characterize the historical outcome as a condition of “Green-Lite” wherein 
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environmental progress is relatively modest in the face of constant pushback by developers and 
their political and bureaucratic allies on the energy side of the domain (Ibid 2015).  Given these 
historic constraints, the critical question for the next four years is whether the Trudeau 
government, with its strong majority and cross-Canada representation, can sustain a governance 
approach that will allow it to implement its commitments and disrupt these historical patterns to 
make environmental policy considerations central to decision making in the environment/energy 
policy domain, in a manner that can begin to transition Canada to a low carbon future.
2
 
Part two assesses the Liberal’s dramatically different approach to governance of climate 
change policy at home and on the international stage. 21
st
 century energy policy is intimately 
intertwined with environmental policy and now substantially driven by greenhouse gas (GHG) 
related issues. The Liberals assumed power just before the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP21) convened in Paris in 
December 2015, thrusting the climate change file into the limelight and testing Liberal campaign 
commitments immediately. The Liberals identified a broad agenda of programs on climate 
change including: infrastructure investments to enhance the efficiency of the Canadian economy 
and strengthen the growth of renewable energy; rebuilding environmental protection and 
assessment policies ravaged by the Conservatives, while taking science seriously. It is simply too 
early in the mandate to evaluate the implementation process. Part two focuses therefore on early 
actions…recognizing that the ghost of the Jean Chrétien government’s failure to deliver on an 
earlier era of climate change commitments will stalk current Liberal efforts. Part three assesses 
several hydrocarbon energy projects and processes that will test the Liberals’ approach to 
governance in this domain.  
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JUXTAPOSING THE HARPER AND TRUDEAU GOVERNMENTS’ APPROACHES TO 
ENERGY/ENVIRONMENT POLICY GOVERNANCE 
The Tone of Wedge Politics 
The spirit of Harper’s wedge politics governance approach can be reduced to “polarize,” 
“patronize,’ and “demonize” (Toner and McKee 2014). Polarizing the energy-environment file 
reflected an ideological determination to replace the sustainable development (SD) paradigm 
associated with the Mulroney Conservatives, the Chrétien /Martin Liberals and the United 
Nations (Toner, Meadowcroft and Cherniak 2016). To undermine SD the Conservatives adopted 
the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers ‘responsible resource development’ (RRD) 
framework. RRD rejected the SD goal of integrating environmental, economic, and social factors 
in decision making and privileged economic considerations and rapid resource development. 
Patronizing multi-million dollar taxpayer funded advertising campaigns designed to ‘re-educate’ 
sceptical Canadians about the correctness of RRD attempted to convince Canadians that their 
only hope for hospitals, schools and other social programs depended on the frenetic extraction 
and export of oilsands bitumen. On their lands, First Nations stood in the path of many projects 
and had to be turned, especially in light of court decisions that governments had a constitutional 
obligation to consult: patronizing quick trip ‘lectures’ by Conservative Natural Resources 
Minister Joe Oliver to First Nations leaders just served to enrage First Nations (Fekete 2013). 
A leaked memo from Harper’s Prime Minister’s Office used explicit Nixon-era ‘friends 
and enemies’ language to demonize the parliamentary opposition, bureaucracy, media, scientists, 
and environmentalists as ‘enemies’ (Ottawa Citizen 2013).  Conservative Ministers attacked 
scientists and environmentalists as ‘radicals’ and accused them of money laundering. Harper 
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launched a multi-million dollar Canadian Revenue Agency audit of environmental groups and 
instructed the RCMP and CSIS to spy on environmental and science groups.
3
 Harper’s flippant 
comments about Canada being an ‘energy superpower’ and that President Obama’s approval of 
the Keystone XL pipeline was a ‘no-brainer’ were indicators of an ideologically infused naivety 
that served only to overinflate the value of  Canadian currency in international financial markets, 
annoy the White House, and push swing voters away.
4
 
The Substance of Wedge Politics 
To institutionalize the wedge politics governance approach Harper used omnibus budget bills in 
2013 and 2014 to roll back much of the SD policy and program capacity built by Mulroney and 
Chrétien. This was done by slashing federal environmental regulations and program spending 
with respect to:  the Fisheries Act, the Species at Risk Act, the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act, the Navigable Water Protection Act, the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, 
the National Energy Board (NEB) Act and the National Round Table on the Environment and 
Economy Act, among others. Hiding the rollbacks in omnibus bills ensured they did not have to 
be debated openly in relevant parliamentary committees. All of this, including the streamlined 
NEB process, was designed to expedite oilsands and mining projects, move bitumen to tidewater, 
and limit serious climate change commitments. The multimedia Economic Action Plan 
advertising campaigns in Canada and the advertising campaigns in Washington in support of 
TransCanada Pipelines’ Keystone XL project were very expensive but futile. Little was 
accomplished except mobilizing those Canadians who cared about the environment and the 
sustainable development of the economy to coalesce against the Conservatives. Picking fights 
with the U.S. President and aligning yourself with the opposition Republicans was a destructive 
way to engage with your largest trading partner but consistent with a wedge politics framework. 
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The Tone of Engagement Politics 
In contrast to the secrecy and centralized control of the Harper government Trudeau promised a 
governance approach that would engage policy actors in and out of government. Rejecting 
Harper’s ‘war on science’ Trudeau committed to respect the public service and allow scientists to 
speak about their work. Rather than deny climate change Trudeau promised to move climate 
change to the forefront of domestic and international policy by making it a cabinet priority and 
by reengaging with the international climate change process. The Liberals committed to undo 
much of the legislative agenda implemented by Harper in order to reinstate SD as a guiding 
principle, deploy evidence based policies, and to re-engage premiers and mayors as partners. 
Indeed, financial investments in GHG mitigation strategies in public transit and renewable 
energy and adaptation strategies in water and sewer and flood management systems were key 
campaign themes. First Nations’ involvement on a range of sustainability issues was emphasized 
and the campaign spoke in terms of nation-to-nation relations.  
The Substance of Engagement Politics 
For six years Harper simply refused to meet Canada’s premiers as constitutional partners, while 
Trudeau hosted a first ministers meeting on climate change a month after the election followed 
by a second meeting in early March 2016. Provincial, city, opposition, business, aboriginal, and 
environmental group leaders were invited to join the Canadian delegation to COP21. In an 
historic transparency initiative, Trudeau made the traditionally secret ‘ministerial mandate 
letters’ public. These letters instruct ministers to reverse much of the Conservative agenda, to 
institutionalize campaign commitments to reengage scientists, and recommit to evidence based 
policy by creating a Department of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Innovation,  
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and a Minister of State for Science. Over a dozen ministers had SD goals documented in their 
mandate letters requiring them to integrate SD principles into policies and legislation. 
The prioritization of climate change is reflected in renaming Environment Canada as 
Environment and Climate Change Canada, and by creating a cabinet committee integrating 
Environment, Climate Change and Energy and making it one of the five key commitments 
identified in the Speech from the Throne. It should no longer be possible for cabinet to discuss 
energy policy without the air and water quality and climate change impacts being front and 
centre, a fundamental feature of SD (McCarthy 2015). Paraphrased below are the critical 
energy/environment policy responsibilities assigned to ministers in the mandate letters:  
Environment and Climate Change: establish national emissions-reduction targets, ensure provinces and territories have 
targeted federal funding and the flexibility to design their own carbon pricing policies; review Canada’s environmental 
assessment processes to regain public trust; ensure that decisions are based on science, facts, and evidence. 
Natural Resources: work with provinces and territories to develop a Canadian Energy Strategy to protect Canada’s 
energy security, encourage energy conservation, and bring cleaner, renewable energy onto a smarter electricity grid; 
modernize the National Energy Board; work in partnership with the United States and Mexico to develop a North 
American clean energy and environment agreement. 
Fisheries and Canadian Coast Guard: review the previous government’s changes to the Fisheries and Navigable Waters 
Protection Acts, restore lost protections, and incorporate modern safeguards.   
Finance: enhance tax measures to generate more clean technology investments; create a new Low Carbon Economy Trust 
to help fund projects that materially reduce carbon emissions; fulfill G20 commitment to phase out subsidies for the fossil 
fuel industry.  
Global Affairs: develop a North American clean energy and environment agreement; make Canada a leader of 
international efforts to combat climate change .  
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Indigenous and Northern Affairs: amend environmental assessment legislation to enhance the consultation, engagement 
and participatory capacity of Indigenous groups in reviewing and monitoring major resource development projects; 
promote economic development and create jobs for Indigenous Peoples. 
National Revenue: allow charities to do their work free from political harassment; clarify the rules governing “political 
activity,” with an understanding that charities make an important contribution to public debate and public policy.  
Infrastructure and Communities: rebuild Canada for the 21st Century with significant new investments in public transit, 
green infrastructure including investments in local water and wastewater facilities, clean energy, climate resilient 
infrastructure like flood mitigation systems; establish the Canada Infrastructure Bank to provide low-cost financing for 
new municipal infrastructure; launch a new Canadian Green Bond to enable additional investments when a lack of capital 
represents a barrier. 
Innovation, Science and Economic Development: support investments that will make our resource sectors world leaders 
in the use and development of clean and sustainable technology and processes, and establish new Canada Research Chairs 
in sustainable technologies. 
International Trade: support strategic investments in clean technology to make Canadian firms world leaders in the use 
and development of sustainable technology and processes that can be exported globally. 
Science: invest in scientific research, including an appropriate balance between fundamental research to support new 
discoveries and the commercialization of ideas; create a Chief Science Officer mandated to ensure government science is 
fully available to the public; scientists can speak freely about their work. 
Transport: review the previous government’s changes to the Fisheries Act and the Navigable Waters Protection Act, 
restore lost protections; formalize a moratorium on crude oil tanker traffic on British Columbia’s North Coast. 
Hence, the goal is to adopt an SD orientation, work with provincial/territorial/city 
governments, reverse the Conservative legacy, and develop a forward looking clean energy 
and environmental protection governance approach to Canada’s economy.   
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ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT POLICY MERGE IN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC) consolidated 
the scientific certainty of anthropocentric climate change leading countries to embrace the goal 
of instituting mitigation policies that will cap global temperature rise to 2 degrees above pre-
industrial levels (it has just passed 1 degree). 2015 was the warmest year on record and extreme 
weather events around the world underscored the costs of inaction.  In 2015 global investments 
in renewable energy grew by US$329 billion outpacing investments in oil, gas, and nuclear 
showing movement on the mitigation agenda is already underway (Bloomberg 2016).  
The Liberals’ governance approach to COP21 could not have been more different than 
Harpers. This process started with a first ministers meeting on November 23rd that included a 
briefing by climate scientists revealing Canada’s rate of warming is about twice the global rate 
(Fekete 2015a). Trudeau invited premiers to join the Canadian delegation to Paris arguing he did 
not want to unilaterally impose a target like Chrétien did without buy-in from the provinces or 
without a joint plan to achieve the target. The Liberals did not create a new GHG target prior to 
Paris stating that Harper’s commitment to reduce emissions by 30 percent from 2005 levels by 
2030 should be considered a floor that Canada would exceed once a target had been arrived at 
after engaging provincial leaders. Even without a new target Canada was asked to take on a 
leadership role in Paris when Environment and Climate Change Minister Catherine McKenna 
was chosen as one of 14 ministers tasked with bringing COP21 to a successful conclusion. At the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference in Malta just before COP21 Trudeau 
committed to increasing Canada’s contribution to the United Nation’s Green Climate Fund  to 
help developing countries operationalize both mitigation and adaptation policies to $2.65 billion 
over five years (Canada 2015b). In Paris, Canada joined the U.S., China, and 17 other leading 
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countries in launching Mission Innovation, a commitment to dramatically accelerate public and 
private sector clean energy innovation. Under this initiative, Canada committed to investing an 
additional $100 million each year in clean technology (Canada 2015a). The Mission Innovation 
project included a significant commitment from over 20 leading global private sector innovators 
led by Bill Gates and Richard Branson. This partnership between government and industry is 
dedicated to a “dramatically scaled-up public research pipeline, linked to a different kind of 
private investor with a long term commitment to new technologies who is willing to put truly 
patient flexible risk capital to work” (Breakthrough Energy Coalition 2015). 
These international initiatives are intended to support various provincial climate change 
plans. The Liberal government of British Columbia instituted a carbon tax in 2008 which was 
credited with reducing GHG emissions while the economy grew, while the Quebec Liberal 
government officially joined California in a cap-and-trade system for carbon emission reductions 
targeted at major emitters.  The Liberal government of Ontario announced in 2016 a climate 
change program that included joining the California and Quebec cap-and-trade system, 
enhancing building efficiency codes and retrofits, and expanding the uptake of zero emission and 
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. Even the small ‘C’ conservative government of Saskatchewan 
committed to producing 50% of its electricity from renewables by 2030 and in May 2015, 
Albertans replaced a 44 year Conservative dynasty with an NDP government that in November 
announced a new strategy to shed its status as an ‘international pariah’ by phasing out coal-fired 
electricity by 2030 replacing it by two-thirds renewable energy generated electricity, placing a 
hard cap on annual GHG emissions from the oilsands, reducing emissions of the potent GHG 
methane by 45% by 2025, and applying a $20 a tonne price on carbon emissions in 2017 rising 
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to $30 (the current BC price) in 2018. Almost 90% of Canadians will soon live under a carbon 
price regime led by provincial actions.  
The engagement politics governance approach was on display when Trudeau met the 
premiers in March 2016 to develop an intergovernmental climate change strategy. The 
Vancouver Declaration on Clean Growth and Climate Change that emerged was built on the 
2015 provincial and territorial Canadian Energy Strategy and on the Paris COP21 Agreement. 
First Ministers stated they would “leverage technology and innovation to seize the opportunity 
for Canada to contribute global solutions and become a leader in the global clean growth 
economy” (CICS 2016). This was the first time first ministers had sat down in over a decade to 
craft a joint approach to climate change and they understood the need to show progress now that 
collaboration was an option. To address differences first ministers created working groups to 
identify options for action in four areas: clean technology, innovation and jobs; carbon pricing 
mechanisms; specific mitigation opportunities; and adaptation and climate resilience. Each 
working group was instructed to assess impacts on economic and environmental outcomes and to 
report to the ministerial tables charged with overseeing their work by September 2016. Ministers 
will review these reports and provide their recommendations to First Ministers by October 2016, 
and make the working group reports public. 
In March Trudeau travelled to Washington to meet President Obama. While trade and 
security issues were addressed, climate change and low carbon energy systems were a central 
component of the discussions. In pursuit of commitments made at COP21 both countries 
committed to build on the Canada - U.S. Air Quality Agreement by reducing methane emissions 
in the oil and gas sector by 40 - 45% by 2025. They agreed to continue to strengthen fuel 
efficiency standards for appliances and cars and light trucks and to extend these to on-road heavy 
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duty vehicles. Accelerated clean energy and technology innovation through Mission Innovation 
and other R&D programs were to be complimented by increasing integration of renewables to 
the interconnected grid, bringing more wind, solar, hydro power online. There was also a 
substantial section on shared Arctic Leadership to conserve Arctic biodiversity through science 
based decision making that incorporates indigenous traditional knowledge in order to build a 
sustainable Arctic economy and strong communities. (U.S.- Canada Joint Statement 2016). 
Trudeau was also feted at a state dinner, the first for a Canadian prime minister in 19 years 
signifying a substantive change in the way Canada was viewed in Washington. Climate change 
was also be prominent when Trudeau hosted the North American Leaders Summit in Ottawa in 
June and when Obama addressed a joint session of Parliament. However, the future of enhanced 
cooperation for the two national governments depends in large part on the outcome of the 2016 
Presidential election (Fife 2016). 
The first Liberal budget underscored the fundamental transformation of the substance and 
style of the governance approach in this policy domain from the Harper to Trudeau eras. It 
announced over $7 billion of initiatives to ensure Canada is ‘a champion of clean growth’ and 
makes ‘a speedy transition to a low-carbon economy.’ Included were $2.9 billion over the next 
five years to address climate change, including $518 million for local governments to upgrade 
infrastructure; $2 billion over two years for a low-carbon economy fund, beginning in 2017-18; 
$132.5 million over five years to research and develop clean technologies; $62.5 million over two 
years to build charging stations for electric vehicles and hydrogen and natural gas refueling 
stations; $128.8 million over five years to retrofit buildings and to improve standards for vehicles 
and products; $142 million over five years to add  and restore national parks. There were also 
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multi-billion dollar investments in science and innovation in both the university and government 
sectors to reinforce clean energy and environment initiatives (Canada 2016). 
 
ENERGY PROJECTS AND PROCESSES 
The Liberals inherited an energy/environment policy domain that was becoming increasingly 
unstable driven by both domestic and international policies pursuing environmental, economic 
and health objectives and by supply/demand and price fluctuations in international hydrocarbon 
markets. While oil prices around $100 a barrel in 2011-13 stimulated rapid investment in 
oilsands projects and raised hopes for a string of liquefied natural gas terminals on the B.C. 
coast, slumping demand and increased production in 2014-16 weakened prices and shrunk oil 
and gas investment in Canada.  OPEC’s capacity to stabilize prices collapsed when Saudi Arabia 
refused to slash production and shifted its position from swing producer to global policeman 
penalizing unconventional producers in the deep offshore, fracking, and oilsands plays by 
forcing them to reduce their higher cost production (Financial Post 2015).  
The world has seen price hikes and slumps before, as recently as 2008-09, but the current 
situation reveals a new geopolitics of oil in which producers maximize production to enhance 
returns without consideration for price. Simply put, OPEC members have little else to sell and 
are utterly dependent on maximizing oil and gas revenues. Even non-OPEC producers like 
Russia have few options but to maximize exports, especially in the face of sanctions introduced 
in response to Vladimir Putin’s adventurism in Crimea and Ukraine. The critical historical 
difference now is that international demand reduction from cyclical slowing of global economic 
growth is reinforced by structural changes in economies that are integrating conservation systems 
and reducing the energy intensity of their economies, such as Europe, and from economies 
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moving from a manufacturing to a service base such as China. In most of the developed world 
economic growth has already been decoupled from increased oil consumption. In early 2016 
international oil prices fell below $40 while oilsands bitumen dropped below $20 hammering the 
Canadian oil and gas sector.  
Another critical factor for Canadian hydrocarbon exports has been the dramatic increase 
in American oil and gas production. Substantive increases in oil and gas production from multi-
stage fracking of shale and tight oil and natural gas formations has resulted in the U.S. becoming 
largely self-sufficient, even capable of exporting both oil and gas (Energy Information Agency 
2015). Natural gas prices also declined as a result of significant U.S. and international production 
increases. These price reductions have had significant impacts on the profitability calculations of 
oilsands and LNG projects and investment declined precipitously in 2015-16. Questions are 
emerging as to whether new oilsands and pipelines projects, if they were built, could become 
‘stranded assets’ over the next 2-3 decades never recovering the investment of their owners, as is 
happening to coal fired electricity plants in the face of climate change policies (CBC 2016). Still, 
there are still some hydrocarbon issues in play in 2016 that the Liberals will have to deal with. 
While they support increased oil and gas production, the Liberals committed to making 
decisions on major energy projects in a more balanced manner by fixing the NEB pipeline 
approval process. In her mandate letter the Minister of Environment and Climate Change was 
instructed to review Canada’s environmental assessment processes to regain public trust and 
help get resources to market and introduce new, fair processes that will: restore robust 
oversight and thorough environmental assessments of areas under federal jurisdiction; ensure 
that decisions are based on science, facts, and evidence; and provide ways for Canadians to 
express their views and opportunities for experts to meaningfully participate, including 
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provisions to enhance the engagement of Indigenous groups in reviewing and monitoring 
major resource development projects. The Minister of Natural Resources was instructed to 
modernize the NEB to ensure that its composition reflects regional views and has sufficient 
expertise in fields such as environmental science, community development, and Indigenous 
traditional knowledge. 
Anticipating defeat, Harper made a spate of appointments to federal boards and 
agencies in the dying days of his government. The NEB is viewed as being particularly close 
to the energy sector during the Harper era (Doern et al, 2015:155-162) and Harper 
reappointed Conservatives whose terms expired immediately after the election. Steven Kelly 
was actively submitting evidence before the NEB on behalf of Kinder Morgan’s Trans 
Mountain project when he was appointed. He had to resign from representing Kinder Morgan 
before the NEB, and his evidence had to be ‘expunged’ from the panel record ‘to reassure the 
public’ before his appointment commenced six days before the election (Hume 2015). The 
NEB comes about as close as possible to the condition of ‘regulatory capture’ wherein an 
agency is captured by industry interests with significant career interchange between the 
regulator and the industry with bias built in through political-industrial collusion.  
The 2015 Report of the Commissioner of Environment and Sustainable Development 
(CESD 2015) criticized the NEB for doing an ‘inadequate’ job tracking the petroleum 
sector’s compliance with pipeline-approval conditions and found that there have been 
significant problems in the regulator’s reviews of firm’s emergency procedures. On 27 
January 2016, the day after the Commissioner’s report was released, the Liberals introduced 
plans to address the Conservatives’ 2013-14 amendments to the NEB approval processes and to 
begin to address the appointments problem. They created a two stage process which will allow 
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current projects to be reviewed by the NEB under existing Conservative rules while a revised 
project assessment and regulation regime is crafted over the next two years. The Liberals 
diminished the influence of the NEB on current projects by establishing a parallel processes 
designed to engage a broader cross section of stakeholders who were intentionally excluded from 
the NEB processes by the Conservatives. With respect to integrating climate change science into 
project assessments, for the first time in Canadian history the lifecycle GHG emissions produced 
at both the upstream production stage and the transportation to markets stage will be considered 
(Fekete 2016b). Consultative processes independent of the NEB will be established to engage 
with Aboriginal people.  
 In order to allow these new scientific assessments of upstream GHG emissions and 
broader non-NEB consultative processes to work, the Liberals extended the review time from 15 
months to 21 months for TransCanada’s Energy East pipeline with a likely decision in mid-2018 
and extended the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain pipeline decision from August to December 
2016.  The Liberals argued that these broader processes were required to regain the legitimacy 
that had been lost under the Conservatives and to allow cabinet to take SD informed final 
decisions by integrating economic, environmental and social factors, and not simply privileging 
economic considerations (Fekete 2016a). With the changes made in the first few months the 
Liberals are underscoring the very different governance approach they will deploy compared 
to the Conservatives. 
The Edmonton to Vancouver Trans Mountain pipeline expansion will change the oil 
transported from refined products and synthetic and light crudes to diluted bitumen and triple 
the volume. Given these changes along with the 7 fold increase in oil tanker traffic into 
Vancouver, the project is opposed by Vancouver area municipalities and coastal First 
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Nations, both of whom fear the threat of a bitumen spill. In January 2016 the Government of 
B.C. announced that it could not support the project precisely because it failed to provide 
sufficiently detailed spill response plans (Shaw 2016). In 2016 the NEB will begin review of 
the TransCanada Pipelines’ Energy East project to ship bitumen from Alberta to refineries in 
Quebec and an export terminal in New Brunswick. TransCanada has already started 
community outreach campaigns along the route in Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick and 
even at the early pre - environmental assessment process stage has met a mix of reactions 
including a set of conditions from the government of Quebec.  
While the Liberals have agreed to let the Energy East assessment proceed under the 
Harper era rules, they appointed three temporary NEB members for the review and expand 
public input. The Energy East project stirred regional tensions when the Mayor of Montreal 
Dennis Coderre, a former Liberal MP, and 81 other Montreal regional mayors announced in 
early January that they opposed Energy East on environmental grounds fearing the impacts of a 
pipeline spill of bitumen on Montreal area water systems. Rona Ambrose, interim leader of the 
federal Conservatives played the national unity card, arguing that Energy East is a nation 
building project that everyone should support. Ambrose’s attack on Quebec politicians provoked 
the Parti Quebecois to claim that “They’ve given themselves the right to act like the owners of 
Quebec in the name of Canadian unity.” (Clark 2016) Ambrose’s position also caused tensions 
within the Conservative caucus with Quebec MPs rejecting the proposition that the Montreal 
mayors’ position is a threat to national unity while noting that Ambrose had not leveled the same 
charges at Vancouver area mayors who have come out in opposition to the Trans Mountain 
expansion project (Ibid.).  Low oil prices has slowed oilsands investment likely restricting 
production to existing projects and the already approved access of Montreal refineries to 
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Canadian crude oil by the reversal of Enbridge’s Line 9 from Sarnia may undermine as least 
some of the energy security and international trade arguments favouring the Energy East project.  
In 2014 the NEB recommended, with 209 conditions, approval of Enbridge’s Northern 
Gateway pipeline project to carry bitumen through the Rocky Mountains to Kitimat on the North 
Coast of British Columbia and by tanker to international markets. This project was opposed by 
First Nations communities on the route, particularly the coastal First Nations who virulently 
rejected the project on the grounds that a bitumen spill would endanger the coastal ecosystem 
and fishery central to their economy and culture. In the campaign, the Liberals stated their 
opposition to Northern Gateway on environmental and NEB process grounds and Trudeau’s 
mandate letter instructed the Minister of Transport to formalize a moratorium on crude oil 
tanker traffic on British Columbia’s North Coast, including the Dixon Entrance, Hecate 
Strait, and Queen Charlotte Sound which would effectively kill the project (Hoekstra 2015). 
 Trudeau did support TransCanada’s Keystone XL pipeline to move bitumen from 
Alberta to U.S. Gulf Coast refineries but this project was rejected by the Obama 
administration shortly after the Liberal victory, a decision supported by Hilary Clinton. 
American opponents of Keystone XL opposed it on the grounds that it “enables” the 
expanded production of “dirty oil” and attendant GHG from the oilsands. In early 2016 
TransCanada launched a lawsuit against the U.S. Administration and mounted a NAFTA 
challenge. The fate of this project is outside the Liberal government’s power and the only 
hope, it would appear, for Keystone XL is if the Republicans capture the White House in 
2016. 
CONCLUSIONS 
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Clearly, ideas matter in the energy/environment policy domain. The contrasting governance 
approaches of the Liberals and Conservatives bring this into stark relief. Sustainable 
development and responsible resource development (RRD) embody very different visions of the 
future and a different emphasis on what ideas matter in decision making. With RRD, the Harper 
government walked the talk of the wedge politics governance approach. With respect to both 
tone and substance they identified their friends and picked fights with those they viewed as 
getting in the way as they deployed policies to tilt the playing field as steeply as possible toward 
the energy end of the energy/environment domain.  
Harper chose to appeal to the smallest possible slice of the electorate required to retain 
power but in the process alienated many voters handing power to a Liberal party that had 
designed its  governance approach on energy/environment policy to correct what it viewed to be 
an imbalance created by the Conservatives. Has the Trudeau government, in its first 10 months 
in power, begun to walk the talk of SD by instituting a more equitable balance in the 
energy/environment domain?   
While it is too early to answer the question definitively, the tone and substance of the 
ministerial mandate letters, the financial commitments made in the budget to support climate 
change initiatives and low carbon energy systems suggest the Liberals are following through 
on their campaign commitments. The tone and substance of engagement with the 
provinces/territories and cities and the broader policy community including Indigenous Peoples 
is a stark rebalancing of the energy/environment domain. Elevating the prominence of science in 
the mandate letters and the budget shows a commitment to sustainability. The idiom of SD is 
prominent in the throne speech, the mandate letters and in renaming departments and 
committees. The process changes to ongoing pipeline project assessments and the promised 
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legislative modifications to the NEB reflect a serious commitment to a more inclusive and 
balanced governance approach.   
The Liberal vision of Canada simultaneously reducing domestic consumption of 
hydrocarbons while continuing to produce oil and natural gas for export will be put to the 
test by international market forces that may be questioning the value of Canada’s oil and gas. 
International energy markets may simply lose interest in buying GHG intensive bitumen in a 
world that is awash in cheap oil and beginning an overall shift away from hydrocarbon 
energy as carbon pricing regimes become entrenched over the next couple of decades. 
Trudeau has spoken favorably of the Trans Mountain project in the past but has withheld 
commitment on Energy East until the regulatory process is completed. Some oil pipelines or 
LNG plants will almost certainly be approved by the Liberal cabinet. Economic growth from 
hydrocarbon energy exports while protecting the environment is possible, but such decisions 
will not please everyone.  
Whether it is Trans Mountain, Energy East, or the Pacific NorthWest LNG export 
project in Kitamat (Jang 2015) the Liberal cabinet will face tough decisions which may 
generate support of governments in the producer provinces but also stir opposition in major 
cities and local communities along the projects and in at least part of the broader scientific 
and environmental community. The Liberals will not be able to please everyone with the 
outcomes of these decisions regardless of the degree of inclusiveness of the process.  
Doug Macdonald has argued that the Harper government had simply no interest in 
collaborating with the provinces on a Canadian Energy Strategy or any “interest in a policy 
thrust which sees climate change action as an economic opportunity” (Macdonald 2011). 
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Moreover, Macdonald asserted that the ‘carbon provinces’ of Alberta and Saskatchewan had 
essentially exercised a veto over national climate change policy for two decades. But times 
have changed. Trudeau’s governance approach has enthusiastically embraced the 
provincial/territorial Canadian Energy Strategy project and underscored the opportunities 
associated with climate change action for both the oil and gas and the low carbon sectors. 
Indeed, it is international market forces, not climate change policies, which have devalued 
the oil and gas assets of the carbon provinces and exposed the economic and social 
vulnerability of overdependence on hydrocarbons.  
Hammering out a federal-provincial agreement on a pan-Canadian climate change by 
the end of 2016 will be challenging but made easier with the vast majority of provinces 
prepared to move forward. Provinces covering nearly  90 percent of the population that have 
carbon pricing mechanisms will continue to act and be able to  take advantage of the 2016 
federal budget funds designed to assist provinces and cities.  It remains to be seen whether such a 
process can bring all provinces/territories into a Pan-Canadian climate change strategy by year’s 
end. It also remains to be seen whether the Liberals ensure that carbon pricing mechanisms 
establish some common level of commitment for all Canadians, or if adjustments are made to 
accommodate regional specificities.  The Liberals engagement governance approach, compared 
to the Conservatives wedge politics approach, likely increases the chances of success. 
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Endnotes 
 
1
 All three authors were students of Professor Jim Lightbody in the Department of Political 
Science at the University of Alberta. This chapter is dedicated to Professor Lightbody. 
 
2
 For insight on the transition to a sustainable future see Global Commission on the Economy 
and Climate, The New Climate Economy 2015. In March 2016, a coalition of business, labour, 
think tank, Indigenous, and NGO leaders released a vision for transitioning Canada onto a 
sustainable path. See Smart Prosperity, New Thinking: Canada’s Roadmap to Smart Prosperity, 
March 2016. 
 
3
 For an assessment of the role of public agencies like the Alberta Energy Regulator, the National 
Energy Board, CSIS and the RCMP in partnership with private firms Enbridge and TransCanada 
to “supress dissent” around pipeline projects see Carter, 2016. 
 
4
 In the previous edition of How Ottawa Spends, the editors trace Harpers evolution ‘from leader 
to loner,’ as the Conservatives slid from initial political success to a failed and increasingly 
isolated one man government. They go on to note that even sympathetic conservative journalists 
like John Ibbitson and Conrad Black acknowledged that, “in the end it was Harper’s controlling 
one man government hubris, his contempt for democratic conventions and institutions and 
continuous negative politics that ensured his demise, along with his utter failure to reach out to 
Canadians he disagreed with” (Stoney and Doern, 2016).  
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Chapter 7 
 
 
THE INTER-EXECUTIVE ACTIVITY OF MINISTERIAL POLICY  
ADVISERS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA 
 
R. Paul Wilson 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Ministerial political staffers are frequently discussed with respect to their “vertical” activities 
within the traditional bilateral relationship between ministers and permanent public servants and, 
in particular, whether, as contributors to "new political governance" (Aucoin 2012), they further 
public service politicization (Benoit 2006; Eichbaum and Shaw 2007a, 2007b; Tiernan 2007; 
Wilson 2016).  However, while their relationship with the public service is important, it is not 
the whole story.  Power within Westminster systems of government flows across a complex web 
of relationships in and around the core executive (Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990; Rhodes 1995).  
Because of their shared political affinity and personal ties with ministers, political staffers are 
well placed to exercise influence within multiple networks that criss-cross government and 
politics. (Craft 2016; Gains and Stoker 2011; Eichbaum and Shaw 2010; Rhodes and Tiernan 
2014; Yong and Hazell 2014; Zussman 2009). Examining this “horizontal” dimension 
(Connaughton 2010; Craft 2016: Maley 2000, 2011) illuminates the mechanisms of co-
ordination and information transmission on the political side and provides insight into how 
decisions are shaped within the black box of ministerial offices.   
It has long been recognized that political staffers actively work across departmental 
boundaries.  For example, Lenoski observed how, under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, "the 
political staff network contributes to the reinforcement of the solidarity in which, to survive, 
collective ministerial responsibility has to be firmly rooted" (1977, 172).  Bakvis (1997, 119) 
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recognized how staffers act "...as a primary node in a network or more likely a number of 
networks of specialist advisers and contacts, channelling critical information to the key decision 
maker, the minister."  However, Maria Maley first systematically documented this aspect of 
political policy staffers' work and identified distinctive policy roles which were "important in 
shaping policy outcomes" and which depended on advisers' privileged involvement "in a 
minister's overlapping relationships with other policy actors and [as] conduits for information 
within these relationships" (2000, 467-8).  She further elaborated on the importance of 
ministerial staffers' informal networks and relationships which provide a vehicle for political and 
policy co-ordination across government (Maley 2011, 1484). 
 Other researchers identify similar themes.  In New Zealand, Eichbaum and Shaw (2011, 
596 ) find that staffers are "key actors" in core executive networks, connecting on behalf of their 
ministers across a range of executive relationships, brokering policy agreements and negotiating 
with legislators in the context of minority governments resulting from proportional 
representation.  Connaughton (2010, 362-3) concludes that political policy advisers in the 
Republic of Ireland have "significant" duties on "cross-cutting issues that transcend departmental 
boundaries and include consensus building in complex policy networks". Jonathan Craft (2016) 
provides the fullest analysis of partisan policy advisers in Canada.  He documents how they 
provide substantive and procedural brokerage and co-ordination across government, not only in 
first ministers' offices but throughout the executive, and uses this framework "to move beyond 
country-specific accounts...toward a more comparatively generalizable framework" applicable 
across and even outside the Westminster family (Craft 2015a, 136-7).   
 Such a broad perspective is necessary for theorizing the role of political staff in executive 
government, but must have a solid empirical foundation.  Through evidence from a 2013 survey 
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as well as elite interviews, this chapter confirms the trajectory of recent literature, namely that 
political staffers use their networks of relationships to impact the policy process, through 
analysing the horizontal policy activity of ministerial policy advisers in Canada under the 
government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper (2006-2015).  Due to space constraints, it 
considers only relationships within the executive and parliamentary contexts and not those with 
outside stakeholders.  Emphasis is given to the "'deep structures'" (Connaughton 2010, 366) of 
co-ordination and discussion between Canadian ministerial offices which augment and facilitate 
advisers' more relationship-based networking, and to the significance of such practices for policy 
development.    
 
Methodology 
Using the Government of Canada's online Electronic Directory Services (GEDS) a total of 64 
individuals were identified who served as senior level ministerial political policy advisers (in all 
but a few instances with the title of either director of policy or senior policy adviser) at some 
point during the period from October 2012 to June 2013.
1
   These 64 staffers were invited by 
email to participate in a survey which consisted of both forced response and open-ended 
questions.   Thirty-four responses were received back from individuals employed in a wide range 
of ministerial offices, including at central agencies, the Prime Minister's Office and the offices of 
ministers of state.  The final survey response rate was 53 percent.  Survey data were augmented 
by elite interviews (and one email exchange) with the following: 14 current (at the time) or 
former Conservative political staffers who had served under the Harper government; two 
Chrétien-era Liberal staffers; one long-serving deputy minister; and a currently-serving senior 
adviser from Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's office.  The analysis also reflects the experience of 
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the author, who served as director of policy in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) from 2009 to 
2011 and in the offices of three other federal ministers from 2006 to 2009.     
 
 
Political Staffers: The Canadian Context 
 
Contextually, it is important to stress from the outset that ministerial political staffers are a 
comparatively numerous group in Canada (Yong and Hazell 2014, 152).  Appointed under 
section 128 of the Public Service Employment Act they are formally known as "exempt staff" 
because they are exempt from the usual public service rules for competitive hiring and non-
partisanship.  Hired directly by the minister, they serve at his or her pleasure and explicitly 
support the government's political agenda.  As context for the period under consideration in this 
study, there were in total 558 full-time exempt staffers across the Canadian government on 
March 31, 2013 (Dawson 2013, 5).  Ministerial policy advisers, a prominent species of the 
broader taxonomic genus of exempt staff, comprised about 20 percent of the entire ministerial 
staff community (Wilson 2015b).   
 The Privy Council Office (PCO) states that the raison d'être for ministerial exempt staff 
"is to provide Ministers with advisors and assistants who are not departmental public servants, 
who share their political commitment, and who can complement the professional, expert and 
non-partisan advice and support of the public service," and recognizes that this involves 
horizontal "liaising with other Ministers’ offices and caucus" (Canada, Privy Council Office 
2015, 46).  In setting out generic job descriptions for staffers, the 2011 Treasury Board Policy 
for Ministers' Offices establishes that, among other things, a minister's director of policy "needs 
to work closely with the Prime Minister's Office and other ministers' offices in order to co-
ordinate the development of policies and programs within the government" (Canada, Treasury 
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Board 2011, 66).  The horizontal themes of co-ordination and networking with other ministerial 
offices, including PMO, are again clearly emphasized.  These also emerge as prominent features 
from the survey. 
 
INTRA-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS: SURVEY FINDINGS 
How Advisers See Their Role 
When asked what skills advisers felt were "most useful" to their position, the relational aspects 
of the job figured prominently.  As Table 1 shows, 42% of respondents mentioned the 
importance of “interpersonal skill/relationship building/listening to others/respect.”  This was 
tied as the top response along with strong written communication skill.  The latter reflects the 
strong—and perhaps idiosyncratic—culture of documented political advice characteristic of the 
Harper PMO and many ministers’ offices (Craft 2016, 58; Wilson 2016 forthcoming).  But the 
former demonstrates that staffers prize these relational skills well above other characteristics that 
might be commonly expected in a political policy role such as: political judgment (mentioned by 
29% of respondents), political analysis (16%) and policy portfolio knowledge (13%).  A further 
relationally-oriented category of “teamwork/networking” was also mentioned by 13 percent of 
respondents.   This high emphasis upon interpersonal skill suggests that advisers recognize the 
importance of relationship building for their policy advisory work. 
 Table 2 lists the top 10 ways in which survey respondents described their job.  
Unsurprisingly, policy advisers most commonly say that they advise the minister with respect to 
policy (58%) and politics (48%).  But, given how so much attention is devoted to the relationship 
of political staff with public servants, it is noteworthy that meeting/working with officials (36%) 
ranks in fourth place, tied with the notion of collaborating and networking with other ministerial 
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offices, including PMO (36%).  Respondents also recognize the importance of implementing and 
ensuring congruence with the government's policy objectives (26%) and co-ordinating and 
managing the policy and cabinet process (19%), both functions which could apply to working 
with departmental officials (vertical) and across political networks (horizontal).   
Table 1-Most Useful Skills 
"What do you feel are the most useful skills for someone in your position?" (Top grouped 
responses by percentage of cases mentioned). 
 
Rank Response % 
1 Strong communications – writing 42 
1 Interpersonal skill/ relationship building/ listen to others/ respect 42 
3 Analyse/synthesize large amounts of information/ multiple issues 32 
4 Political judgment 29 
5 Time management/ work well under pressure/ remain calm 26 
6 Knowledge of institutions/government/electoral systems 19 
7 Strong communications – oral 16 
7 Knowledge of politics/political context 16 
7 Political analysis 16 
10 Teamwork/networking 13 
10 Portfolio/policy field knowledge 13 
 
 
 
Table 2-How Policy Advisers Describe their Job 
"In one paragraph, please describe your job" (top 10 grouped responses by percentage of cases 
mentioned). 
 
Rank Response % 
1 Advise minister – policy 58 
2 Advise minister – politics 48 
3 Manage/work with stakeholders 39 
4 Meet/work with officials 36 
4 Collaborate/network with other ministerial offices, including PMO 36 
6 Implement/ensure congruence with government policy objectives 26 
7 Supervise/manage staff/assist Chief of Staff 23 
8 Co-ordinate/manage policy/cabinet process 19 
8 Oversee/challenge/monitor departmental policy/admin 19 
10 Support/assist/defend minister 16 
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One adviser clearly articulated how different aspects of horizontal relationship- building 
come together in practice:  “My job is to make the Minister look good.  My colleagues are 
focused on him looking good in the media or in parliament - my role is more general in that he 
needs to have politically consistent policy content to discuss in those contexts and others.  So, 
my job is to take the overarching narrative of the Government and apply it to items within my 
Minister's portfolio.  I help him make decisions within this context.  I help him make 
relationships.  I help him speak to stakeholders, caucus, and cabinet in this context.  I help him 
achieve his personal goals.  I help him avoid problems and pursue successes" (Survey respondent 
19).  This sums up the horizontal dimension: developing relationships inside the executive 
(cabinet) and outside (stakeholders, parliamentary caucus) in order to advance the minister’s 
policy agenda. 
 
Relations With Other Ministers 
Policy staffers who work for one minister do not as a rule interact deeply with other ministers.  
As Table 3 shows, 50 percent of policy advisers will “occasionally” attend meetings between 
their own minister and other ministers, but only 6 percent will actively participate either very 
frequently (3%) or frequently (3%) in those meetings.  It is even more uncommon for them to 
represent their own minister at meetings with other ministers: 9 percent did so occasionally, and 
only 3 percent did so very frequently.  It was somewhat more common for them to mobilize 
support for their own minister’s policies among other ministers, presumably on an informal 
basis: 25 percent did this either very frequently (9%) or frequently (16%), with a further 22 
percent doing so occasionally.  One adviser described how he regularly dealt with another 
political office on a joint file.  “I actually got [name of policy adviser] to get me ten minutes to 
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brief [name of minister] on [topic of legislation under consideration] before officials got to 
him…. Once that relationship had been cultivated, the implementation of the [file] agenda 
moved much more smoothly” (adviser 9).  Such meetings happened, though they were not 
typical. 
Table 3-Interaction with Cabinet and Other Ministerial Offices 
 
"Thinking of your own work as a policy adviser in a minister's office, please rank the following 
activities on a scale of 1 to 5 according to how often you would engage in the activity, where 1 
means 'very frequently,' 2 means 'frequently,' 3 means 'occasionally,' 4 means 'rarely,' and 5 
means 'never.'"* 
 Respondents (%) 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 Attend meetings between minister and other ministers 9 25 50 16 0 
2 Actively participate in meetings between minister and other 
ministers 
3 3 61 27 6 
3 Represent your minister at meetings with other ministers 3 0 9 50 38 
4 Attend cabinet meetings (including cabinet committees) 22 9 41 19 9 
5 Meet with political staff from PMO (non PMO only) 36 39 21 4 0 
6 Meet informally with staff from other minister's offices 30 30 30 9 0 
7 Mobilize support for your minister's policies among other ministers 9 16 22 38 16 
8 Mobilize support for your minister's policies among political staff 
from other minister's offices 
25 41 25 6 3 
 
*Questions taken or adapted from Eichbaum and Shaw 2007, 99 and/or Eichbaum and Shaw 
2011, 587). 
 
 
Attending Cabinet 
PMO staffers have traditionally monitored and attended cabinet committee meetings (Campbell 
1987, 130; Goldenberg 2006, 110) but until recently advisers to other ministers have not done so.  
This reduced their policy influence and placed them at a distinct disadvantage not only compared 
to PMO but also to senior departmental officials who either attend cabinet or will be debriefed by 
those who do (Savoie 1983, 518).  The traditional rules for attendance continued in the early 
Harper years: advisers from PMO would attend cabinet committees and might (or might not) 
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provide political feedback to the ministerial staffers who were working on a file.  Later on, 
however, PMO instructed PCO to permit ministers presenting items at cabinet committees to 
bring one political staffer (often but not necessarily a policy adviser) into the room to listen to 
the discussion (Canada. Privy Council Office 2012, 19).  This practice is reflected in the survey.  
As Table 3 shows, 72 percent of respondents attend cabinet meetings at least occasionally.  Such 
access permits the ministerial staffer involved on the file to hear the political discussion among 
ministers which is vital when follow-up policy work is required.     
 
Working with Members of Parliament 
 
According to Eichbaum and Shaw (2007c, 99-100), political advisers in New Zealand have an 
important role in working with Members of Parliament. They found that 88 percent of advisers at 
least occasionally had meetings with members of the government’s parliamentary caucus (50% 
did so frequently or very frequently), and that 78 percent also met with MPs or advisers from 
other political parties (45% did so frequently or very frequently).  Advisers in Ottawa also 
interact with MPs from the government caucus, although less often than those in Wellington.  
According to the survey (Table 4), 72 percent of Canadian policy advisers at least occasionally 
accompany their minister to meetings with caucus colleagues (30% frequently or very 
frequently) and 60 percent actively participated in such meetings (27% frequently or very 
frequently).  This would include their role supporting Minister's Caucus Advisory Committees 
which Prime Minister Harper instituted to obtain input from backbench government MPs into 
policy proposals (Wilson 2015a, 236).  Indeed, 72% of Canadian advisers at least occasionally 
meet government MPs without the minister being present, although only 21% do so frequently or 
very frequently.  But meeting with MPs or staff from other political parties is much less common 
in Canada than in New Zealand, with only 22 percent of survey respondents doing so 
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occasionally.  Perhaps this difference in approach is due to the challenge of governing with 
multi-party coalitions under New Zealand’s system of proportional representation (Eichbaum 
and Shaw 2007a, 463).  Or perhaps MP liaison including cross-party contact in Canada is, given 
role differentiation among political staffers, led by political staffers other than policy advisers 
(for example, parliamentary affairs advisers).   
  
Table 4- Activity with MPs 
 
"Thinking of your own work as a policy adviser in a minister's office, please rank the following 
activities on a scale of 1 to 5 according to how often you would engage in the activity, where 1 
means 'very frequently,' 2 means 'frequently,' 3 means 'occasionally,' 4 means 'rarely,' and 5 
means 'never.'"* 
 
 Respondents (%) 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 Accompany minister to meetings with caucus colleagues 9 21 42 24 3 
2 Actively participate in meetings between minister and caucus 
colleagues 
9 18 33 30 9 
3 Meet with members of the government caucus without minister 6 15 51 24 3 
4 Meet with MPs or staff from other parties 0 0 22 50 28 
 
*Questions taken or adapted from Eichbaum and Shaw 2007, 99 and/or Eichbaum and Shaw 
2011, 587). 
 
 
Working with Other Ministerial Offices 
 
Not surprisingly, given how they view it as intrinsic to their job description, policy advisers 
report high levels of interaction with other ministerial offices.  As shown in Table 3 above, 60% 
of respondents meet either very frequently (30%) or frequently (30%) on an informal basis with 
staff from other ministerial offices.  Meeting with political staff from the Prime Minister’s Office 
is even more common, with 75% of (non-PMO) policy advisers doing this very frequently (36%) 
or frequently (39%).  This level of engagement with other political offices is expected based on 
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practice elsewhere.  For example, Eichbaum and Shaw (2007c, 99) found that policy advisers in 
New Zealand met frequently or very frequently with both other ministerial advisers (78%) and 
with PMO (69%), while Connaughton (2010, 359) observed a similar pattern in Ireland (72% 
and 64% respectively).  
 Advisers consider good relationships across political networks to be "very 
important...because you never know when you'll need them.  And offices don't do enough of 
this" (adviser 7).  Adviser 11 explained how relationships gave him a conduit for discussions 
with other political staffers:  "You got to know people in other ministers’ offices because the 
idea was then if there’s anything your boss ever needed from that other office you had somebody 
you knew who you could call there.  Even if it wasn’t their direct responsibility, they’d say to 
you ‘that’s so and so, call them and tell them I said you should call them.’  And you could very 
quickly find out who the right person was and get into a discussion with them.  So knowing 
people across government was quite helpful.”  
 Such connections could be valuable for different reasons.  In order to fully brief their own 
ministers, advisers might need either substantive information on a proposal or political 
intelligence on how their own proposal is being received.  One former PMO policy adviser 
observed how frequently presenting ministers were surprised at Cabinet by other ministers' 
questions, and concluded “This is their staff's fault."  (Adviser 7)   Advisers do not only convey 
information.  They are also active in mobilizing political support for their ministers' policies.  
Sometimes, as shown in Table 3, they do so with other ministers directly: 25 percent do so very 
frequently (9%) or frequently (16%), although this is notably less often than in New Zealand 
where 41 percent do so very frequently (19%) or frequently (22%) (Eichbaum and Shaw 2011, 
593).  On the other hand, Canadian staffers are more likely to mobilize support for their 
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ministers' policies among other advisers to other ministers.  In Canada, 66 percent of policy 
staffers do so very frequently (25%) or frequently (41%), while only 9 percent do so rarely (6%) 
or never (3%).  In New Zealand, by contrast, only 37 percent do so frequently/very frequently 
and 44 percent rarely/never (Eichbaum and Shaw 2011, 593).   
 Maley describes how Australian advisers have become the "executive-level negotiators 
within government" and hold delegated authority (if informally) from ministers to negotiate 
policy positions with other political offices in the expectation of ministers' approval (2000, 463).  
In Canada the mobilization function certainly involves political discussions between ministers’ 
offices in response to disagreement between officials.  As one adviser explained: "If departments 
had differing views then [political] staff needed to talk stuff out to resolve.  Staff would negotiate 
and could work horizontally to develop a common position to present to their ministers which 
might hope to overcome the department gridlock."  Another adviser was blunter: “We did the 
behind the scenes work below when the civil service would not listen….I would call it an end 
run around the civil service” (Adviser 3).   
 A former chief of staff explained that, on high level matters of conscience and general 
principle, ministers “were very much their own chief interlocutors.  But, as issues descended into 
complexity, extreme levels of detail, and protracted discussion or conflict, ministers delegated 
more and more authority to issue area experts on the political staff” (Adviser 10).  A PMO policy 
adviser agreed and talked about meetings “to try and bridge the gap and come to a consensus” 
(Adviser 7).  Ministers simply could not dedicate the time needed to work through the minute 
details on a single file.  Further, using staff for such “proxy conflicts” allowed ministers to act as 
“nominal peacemakers to close the deal” once the details had been thoroughly debated (Adviser 
10).  But, he explained, in such cases he always worked within the negotiating parameters set by 
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the minister in advance.  Further, “humility and vigilance were key” so that he always delineated 
his minister’s express views from his own.  Staffers who had a “very strong track record of 
anticipating the minister’s views and wishes correctly” had strong currency and would be treated, 
by officials and other offices, as a “direct proxy for the minister.”  But the key was “never to 
overstep” since doing so even once seriously undermined a staffer’s reputation (Adviser 10).   
 Do negotiations become political horse-trading?  Adviser 10 describes how, 
“shamefully,” he once committed to have the minister commission a study in his department in 
exchange for support from another minister for action on an unrelated but regionally significant 
file.  “Not my finest moment,” he conceded, “but my minister was in extremis” (adviser 10).  
Another former staffer who had worked with several ministers and at PMO felt that such explicit 
bargaining was rare.  Nevertheless, he did recall a time when, in order to advance an important 
file in provincial negotiation, his minister needed support from other federal ministers and he 
was “deployed to represent our political master in discussions with another minister’s office” 
(adviser 13). While not typical, staffers are on occasion involved in such quid pro quo 
negotiations. 
 While it is open to all policy advisers to network on an informal basis, geography hinders 
this since ministerial offices in Ottawa are political enclaves isolated (symbolically and 
physically) within their departmental headquarters.  Consequently, ministerial staff have 
relatively easy access to public servants but must make a conscious effort to develop personal 
relationships with political colleagues.  On the other hand, technology—in particular, email and 
direct messaging with Blackberry BBM (the ubiquitous tool within government), including 
group BBM chats—permits instant communication between political offices.  But while informal 
networking has never been easier, not all advisers are equally well-placed to take advantage.  
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Some might lack the temperament or opportunity to make connections, while others might not 
succeed in escaping from their departmental officials' orbit.  Political staffers "work within their 
own stovepipes," observed one policy director.  It is possible to pick up the phone and work out 
issues directly with other ministerial offices or with PMO, "but I'm finding a lot of offices don't 
do this.  If you are entrepreneurial this can be very useful" (adviser 2).   
 
Cabinet Pre-Briefs 
In order to facilitate broader political engagement, the Harper PMO hosted formal meetings with 
senior policy advisers from all ministers’ offices.  The nature of these meetings evolved over 
time.  Soon after the Harper government was elected in 2006, the PMO director of policy, Mark 
Cameron, began to convene regular meetings on a monthly to semi-annual basis in order to 
discuss implementation of the government’s priorities and future agenda.  Some PMO policy 
advisers also held meetings for policy staffers from the ministerial offices within their areas of 
responsibility; these focused on broad discussion of emerging issues, not on specific cabinet 
agenda items, and were held on a similarly occasional basis—sometimes monthly or more, 
sometimes less frequently.   
 By 2009, PMO policy advisers had regularized a system of weekly "cabinet pre-briefs” 
which continued in more or less the same form until the government’s defeat in 2015.  A few 
days prior to the weekly meeting of most cabinet committees, the responsible PMO policy 
adviser would chair a meeting at PMO for the directors of policy representing each of the 
ministers on that committee.  The meetings had several purposes.  First, PMO was acting as a 
"social convenor" (adviser 7) in bringing advisers together regularly from across government and 
assisting them to build personal relationships.  Adviser 11, who (above) emphasized the 
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importance of personal relationships, recognized the importance of central convening, saying 
that "A good network of people across the government is very helpful.  The policy director 
meetings at PMO were valuable even just for that reason alone."  
 Second, the pre-briefs permitted detailed political consideration of items on the upcoming 
agenda of each cabinet committee.  Context is important.  In Canada, the Privy Council Office 
(PCO) acts as the secretariat for all cabinet and cabinet committee meetings (except for Treasury 
Board) and prior to a meeting will circulate the agenda as well as one or more binders containing 
the formal cabinet submissions for consideration as signed by the sponsoring minister(s).  At the 
time of the PMO pre-brief, ministers' staffers will usually have received and reviewed the 
materials (they are permitted to do so for most items); their ministers, however, likely will not 
yet have done so.  Instead, ministers will usually review the binder closer to the meeting, along 
with a political memo prepared by their own office staff with political context and advice. 
 The meetings, therefore, have several important functions.  They allow the lead office - 
whether the director of policy or the policy adviser working most closely on the file - to explain 
to the group his or her minister's policy position and political rationale.  This is an important 
opportunity for information transfer, especially complex background or technical details, as well 
as for mobilizing support and saying "Here's our proposal, and here's why we think it is the best 
option" (adviser 12).   Other advisers also have the opportunity to seek clarification in 
anticipation of writing briefing notes to their own ministers on the topic.  The meetings also 
provide political intelligence.  The presenting office will likely not hear the specific views of 
other ministers (who will not yet have read the proposal).  However, a room full of political staff 
is a useful political sounding-board; questions and challenges indicate possible weak points and 
allow the minister to shore up his or her argument.   
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 A senior PMO adviser lauded the pre-briefs, observing that "the efficiency of having 
everyone in the same room just can't be replicated" (adviser 12).  All offices receive the same 
information from the expert staffer on the file and heard the same political discussion at the same 
time.  Since all advisers would have to brief their own ministers in the next few days, the 
meetings helped them to prepare and lessen the time crunch.  While the meetings provided 
opportunity for PMO to provide instruction on policy files, this was not their usual purpose.  
From the PMO's perspective, “We could function quite nicely without [them]….This was about 
getting other ministers’ offices up to speed on the files” (adviser 12).   The relevant PMO policy 
adviser would have been in ongoing communication with the sponsoring office, and so would 
already know the lead minister's views.  Further, by this point the PMO would already have 
provided a memorandum to the prime minister with their view and sometimes received back his 
response.  If he provided direction, they could pass it on (adviser 12) but they did not need the 
pre-briefs to do this.   
 
 PMO and “Four Corners” Meetings 
While the cabinet pre-briefs may have been largely about information transmission for the 
benefit of other offices, another “deep structure” implemented under the Harper government, the 
“four corners” meeting, was very much (although not exclusively) for the benefit of the PMO.  
Involving departmental officials as well as other political offices, these meetings allowed the 
PMO to integrate vertical and horizontal networks in order to obtain expert information and exert 
central influence—if not sometimes direct control—over policy development in key areas.  Craft 
noted the existence of these meetings (2016, 190) but, thinking them “rare” (272), 
underestimated their significance.   
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 Normally in Canada the PMO advisers deal directly on a daily basis with PCO officials, 
but much less regularly with public servants in other departments.   For their part, departmental 
officials take their direction from their own minister, subject to co-ordination by the PCO, and 
not from the PMO.  This system has the advantage of clear lines of accountability, but there is 
also the potential for miscommunication.  Of course, the PMO and the minister’s office will try 
to maintain horizontal contact along political networks.  And individual PMO advisers may (and 
should) have personal networks across government, including with deputy ministers and other 
senior officials (Goldenberg 2006).  Sometimes, however, these are not sufficient.   
 In order to dialogue across the political-public service divide,  the PMO instituted "four 
corners" meetings at which PMO and PCO personnel could meet together in one room for 
briefing and discussion on a single issue with the relevant departmental officials and the 
appropriate staff from their minister’s office.  Usually these meetings involved policy issues, 
although the tool could also be used for communications or issues management purposes.  
Ministers themselves did not attend.     
 In an email, Guy Giorno, who served as chief of staff to Ontario Premier Mike Harris as 
well as to Prime Minister Harper, explained that he first instituted "four corners" meetings  in the 
Premier's Office at Queen's Park.  From there the concept--and the name--were imported by the 
Harper PMO; this occurred, as advisor 11 recalls, "after we'd been in government a few years."  
In an interview a deputy minister confirms that they were, federally at least, an “innovation” of 
the Harper administration.  “Absolutely.  Sure.  We never had four corners before.”  The 
innovation invited controversy. 
 From the PMO’s perspective—often shared by the minister’s office—the meetings were 
useful in three ways.  First, information transfer.  The meetings gave the PMO “access to the real 
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experts that we couldn’t speak with otherwise” (adviser 12) and allowed everyone to hear the 
same answers at the same time, rather than having the expert information filtered through non 
experts, whether in the minister’s office or at the PCO.  Second, as a ministerial adviser said, 
four corners meetings served to “get everyone on the same page” in terms of direction.   As he 
explained, “if ministerial staff wanted to drive forward on an issue but the public service had 
concerns,” then they could be put on the table and resolved (adviser 11).  Third, meetings helped 
to overcome delay.  As the same ministerial adviser explained, “if stuff was held up, then it was 
a good way to get an issue moving.  If a department was holding something up, then PMO could 
call the department in front of PCO who could then give them marching orders to get things 
going” (adviser 11).  A chief of staff agreed that four corners meetings helped to “break the 
power of the ‘telephone game’ and various delay tactics, which is why I like them so much” 
(adviser 10).  He added that in his experience “sometimes just suggesting a four corners can 
break the log jam.”  
 From these comments it is clear that four corner meetings were not just useful to the 
PMO but also to ministerial offices in some circumstances.  Meetings, however, did not always 
involve the two political offices ganging up on the public service.  Some configurations might 
have PMO and PCO on the same page seeking information and responsiveness from the 
department and minister’s office.     
 The downside of four corners meetings is the perception that the PMO could use them to 
issue direction to ministerial staff and to departmental officials, which only their own minister 
ought to do.  Thus, according to the deputy minister interviewed, they represent “an insidious 
intrusion into the proper chains of accountability,” potentially undermining ministers and their 
responsibility for actions taken in their departments. PMO policy advisers were conscious of this 
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problem.  One senior PMO policy adviser explained: “I tried to be very careful about never 
giving direction.  We weren’t authorized to give direction unless it came from the PM himself.  
And there were relatively few instances where that was the case.” (adviser 12). An experienced 
ministerial director of policy agreed that, from what he saw, the PMO did not use the meetings to 
give direction to departments or to minister’s offices.  Rather, the PMO used them to call both 
minister’s offices and departments “to the principal’s office” if they weren’t moving a file 
quickly enough, and he didn’t see this as inappropriate (adviser 11). 
 Whether because of these accountability concerns or, as a PMO adviser suggested, PCO’s 
fear that they were losing control of the information flow to PMO (adviser 12)—or a 
combination of both—at one point PCO sought to restrict four corners meetings to items on the 
main agenda of the Priorities and Planning committee of cabinet.  As a PMO senior adviser 
explained, the offices settled on a compromise whereby all requests for four corner meetings had 
to be submitted from the PMO chief of staff directly to the Clerk’s office, and could not be 
requested at lower levels.  “This was not a huge impediment,” the adviser explained, but “we 
thought more about whether we really needed one before submitting the request,” and 
presumably PCO felt somewhat more comfortable about how they were being used (adviser 12).   
 
Institutional Choices and Government Style 
Political offices everywhere are under the same pressures and so, quite independently, can 
develop similar solutions to similar problems.  Connaughton (2010, 365) notes that Irish policy 
advisers met on a weekly basis under the auspices of the first minister’s office to discuss the 
weekly cabinet agenda. This resembles the Harper PMO.  Sometimes practices are imported 
from elsewhere, just as four corners meetings derived from a previous Conservative government 
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in Ontario.  Structured and centrally co-ordinated meetings for political policy staff were not 
unique to the Harper government; but neither had they been a prominent feature of previous 
Canadian federal governments.  A former policy adviser under the Chrétien government recalls 
that, in her experience, structured meetings were rare, most conversations were ad hoc, and co-
ordination across offices and with PMO occurred “through more informal mechanisms where 
social capital and personal networks played a big role” (Adviser 14).  Eddie Goldenberg, long-
time senior policy adviser and later chief of staff to Prime Minister Chrétien, agrees.  “Before 
each [cabinet] committee there was nothing formal,” he explained in an interview.  “The 
Economic policy person would get the agenda and may talk it over with her counterpart in the 
minister’s office….But we didn’t have any of the so-called four corners meetings or anything 
like that.”  Different PMOs have different structures and processes depending on their style and 
needs.  The Harper PMO developed a higher than usual institutional formality in terms of 
horizontal co-ordination, in part as a way to focus on the government's political agenda in the 
uncertainty of a minority parliament but also as a way to develop political staff networks as a 
counterweight to the public service.  
 Early indications are that the still relatively new Liberal government of Prime Minister 
Justin Trudeau (elected in October 2015) is maintaining some of the Harper government's 
practices in terms of central co-ordination.  According to a senior adviser in the Trudeau PMO, 
four corners meetings continue and are "seen as regular course of practice."  In cases where there 
is a "blockage or misunderstanding" they are "a way to get everyone around the table and 
identify what those issues are and solve them."  The adviser considers the tone of the meetings to 
be "pretty positive," and he believes that PCO is of the same view.  While the Trudeau PMO 
does not hold formal briefings on cabinet committee agenda items, the Trudeau adviser says that 
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PMO uses its "convening role" to hold a monthly meeting of ministerial policy directors in order 
to "co-operate and share best practices" and also to encourage "informal consultations" between 
offices.   
 As under all governments, the practices of the Trudeau PMO will evolve to meet its 
unique needs and operating style.  For example, reports indicate political staffers being recruited 
from the public service to a much greater extent than under the Conservatives (Shane 2016) as 
well as extensively from the Liberal provincial government in Ontario (Taber 2015).  The former  
practice will tend to create a different and less adversarial relationship between the political staff 
culture and officials; the latter means importing ready-made personal networks between advisers 
and suggests that perhaps the ministerial staff culture in Ottawa is more likely to resemble that 
under the provincial Liberal government at Queen’s Park than the federal Liberal government 
under Jean Chrétien.  The evolution of practice in the Trudeau government over time bears 
watching.  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
While specifically examining a single point in time under the government of Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper, this analysis has revealed significant parallels in ministerial policy staffers' 
horizontal activities with documented practice elsewhere.  At the same time, however, it suggests 
caution with respect to generalization.  In important ways, practice in Canada differed under 
Harper from that under previous prime ministers; but there was even variation within the 
Conservatives' decade in power.  Many factors, including the prime minister's personal style, the 
parliamentary context, the overall government culture and its relationship with the public service, 
impact the role of ministers and therefore the role of ministerial staff.  While it can be predicted 
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that ministerial staff will use networks and relationships to pursue political goals, how they do so 
is very much context specific.   
 Advisers' political work is entirely appropriate for political staff supporting political 
decision-makers.  However, as this chapter has shown, it is double-edged.  With respect to the 
public service, by taking responsibility for supporting ministers with the political aspects of 
briefing and bargaining, policy staffers allow departmental officials to maintain an appropriate 
distance, thus reducing pressures towards inappropriate politicization.  However, exempt staff 
can complement but never replace the need for professional advice from public servants to 
ministers, and relying only on political networks in an attempt to "end run" deputy ministers 
should be resisted.  On the political side, the PMO has a positive role to play in facilitating 
relationships and information transfer between ministerial offices, and by co-ordinating 
discussions can strengthen the government's ability to pursue its agenda.  But while the prime 
minister may direct ministers, his office holds no such power; therefore the PMO must (without 
explicit warrant) resist using horizontal levers, whether formal or informal, to lord it over 
ministerial offices.  Nevertheless, political policy advisers play an essential role in supporting 
ministers and, in Canada as elsewhere, any account of cabinet decision-making is incomplete 
without recognizing their formal and informal inter-executive activity.
                                               
Endnote 
1
 This is the third in a series of studies based on the same survey of ministerial policy staffers.  
The first established a demographic profile and examined their tenure in office (Wilson 2015b).  
The second considered staffers' "vertical" relationship with public servants (Wilson 2016). 
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Chapter 8 
 
A TARGETED FEDERAL MENTAL HEATH TRANSFER: ARE 
PROSPECTS BETTER UNDER THE TRUDEAU LIBERALS? 
 
Mary Bartram 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Mental health problems and illnesses affect one in five Canadians in any given year, with the 
combined cost to the economy (from both lost productivity and direct service provision) 
estimated at more than $50B annually (Lim et al. 2008; Mental Health Commission of Canada 
2012a; Smetanin et al. 2011). However, significant gaps and inequities have arisen over the 
history of mental health policy in Canada. This chapter for example leaves open the complex 
question of the extent to which addictions are considered to be a part of mental health policy.  
 With spending on mental health at only 7 per cent of public spending on health, Canada 
is far from keeping pace with the 10 to 11 per cent reached by counterpart countries such as the 
UK and New Zealand (Jacobs et al. 2010). Further, gaps in public insurance coverage have 
created inequities in access, with unmet needs for mental health problems more highly 
concentrated at lower levels of income than for physical health problems (Statistics Canada 
2013), and with treatments people receive largely “decided not on evidence-based best practices 
but on their employment benefits and income level” (Anderssen 2015, F1). 
As documented below, the historical record shows that in the absence of targeted mental 
health transfers, provincial (and subsequently territorial) governments will continue to be hard 
pressed to narrow the gap in funding for mental health services. Starting in the post-World War 
II era, federal transfers have played a critical role in supporting provinces to better meet needs 
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for health care through enhanced funding, and to reduce inequities in access to care through 
public health insurance. However, the history of federal transfers for mental health has been 
largely one of exclusion, evasion and neglect. Unmet needs for mental health care have just been 
too vast and expensive to take on, too jurisdictionally thorny to address, too politically expedient 
to evade, and too stigmatized to make a real priority.  
Despite and to some extent because of this history, prospects for a targeted mental health 
transfer under the Trudeau Liberals are good, maybe even strong. In both the federal Minister of 
Health’s mandate letter and the Liberal’s first budget (Prime Minister of Canada 2015; Finance 
Canada 2016), the government has reconfirmed platform promises to negotiate a new Health 
Accord and improve access to mental health services. Changing Directions, Changing Lives: The 
Mental Health Strategy for Canada (MHS) recommended that public spending on mental health 
be increased from 7 to 9 per cent of all public spending on health, along with an equivalent 
increase in social spending and more effective use of current expenditures (Mental Health 
Commission of Canada 2012a). Support for mental health as a policy priority has grown over the 
past decade (Mulvale et al. 2014), reflected in a wave of provincial and territorial mental health 
strategies and action plans, and increased attention from the public and the media. A recent 
survey found that 90% of Canadians support a targeted mental health transfer (Canadian Mental 
Health Association, 2015). The stage is thus set for renewed consideration of a targeted mental 
health transfer, to help close the gap in funding and inequities in access to services. Will it be 
possible to open a “policy window” (Kingdon 1995) to advance this policy solution on the 
national agenda? 
This chapter is divided into three sections. First, the potential for a targeted mental health 
is situated in the context of overall fiscal federalism and the nature of the federal spending power. 
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This account includes early criticism in Parliament and elsewhere of the failure to directly fund 
mental health. The second section explores more recent history extending to the very recent past 
and shows further federal neglect and related disproportionate gaps in mental health funding due 
to shifts in the overall structure and nature of fiscal transfers in public health. The final 
conclusions of the chapter then offer a political analysis for the early Trudeau era arguing that 
the near-term prospects for a targeted mental health transfer are good and maybe even strong but 
also conditional given the dual histories presented above. It also offers brief discussion of the 
forms that such a transfer could take.  
 
MENTAL HEALTH FUNDING IN THE CONTEXT OF FISCAL FEDERALISM AND THE 
FEDERAL SPENDING POWER 
 
The prospects for a targeted mental health transfer in Canada hang in large part on whether 
mental health is considered to be a national priority, thereby justifying the use of the federal 
spending power in an area of provincial/territorial jurisdiction. Broadly speaking, the distribution 
of tax room, tax revenue and spending responsibilities lies at the heart of federalism, with federal 
transfers as a critical distribution mechanism (Ouimet 2014). Further, vertical fiscal imbalances 
tend to be built into fiscal federal arrangements, with federal governments holding back some 
fiscal room to deploy its federal spending power in order to promote national objectives through 
transfers (Boadway 2001).  
Canadian federalism is both highly decentralized and highly complex relative to other 
federal jurisdictions (Ouimet 2014; Boadway and Watts 2004). Canadian history has been 
shaped by debates over vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances and federal spending power, 
both the principles embodied in the constitution and the practices expressed through equalization 
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payments and health and social transfers. What is more, the highly political nature of Canadian 
federalism may have played out most intensely in the health sector. According to Banting and 
Corbett (2002,31), healthcare in Canada is “intensely politically salient,” with “health politics 
influenc[ing] federalism as much as federalism influences health politics.”  
After 150 years of heated political debates over the distribution of resources and 
responsibilities, in general and as related to healthcare specifically, suffice it to say that the near-
term prospects for a targeted mental health transfer will depend on the outcome of highly 
political negotiations between federal, provincial and territorial governments, not to mention 
other powerful interests such as the Canadian Medical Association. After the perceived failures 
of the 2004 Health Accord to buy change with increased but largely unconditional federal 
transfers (Health Council of Canada 2014; Maslove 2016), it remains to be seen how the new 
Liberal government will navigate the tricky political waters of a new Health Accord. Will it be 
more successful at tying transfers to specific targets and reforms, or will provincial autonomy 
prevail again? Thus far, mental health is perceived to be a national priority, after or perhaps 
alongside pharmacare and home care (which also confront significant gaps in public insurance 
coverage). Will that be enough for mental health to become enough of a national objective to 
justify the use of federal spending power? Even if negotiations bog down, could mental health be 
the exception that proves the rule?  
 
The Federal Role in Mental Health: Compounding Legacies of Exclusion 
The stage was set for mental health policy to fall outside of federal jurisdiction even before a 
federal government existed in Canada. The first asylum was established in Saint John in 1837, 
and by the time of confederation asylums had spread across North America such that they were 
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explicitly named as an area of provincial jurisdiction in the Constitution Act of 1867: “The 
Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Hospitals, Asylums, Charities, and 
Eleemosynary Institutions in and for the Province, other than Marine Hospitals” (Canada 
2012:s.92).  
A mix of best intentions and political expediency drove this early spread of asylums. On 
the one hand, the beginning of colonial governments coincided with the emergence of the moral 
treatment movement in Europe and North America. Asylums were envisioned as an enlightened 
alternative to the warehousing of people with mental illness in jails or poorhouses, and as 
offering a well-ordered respite from the fast-paced, rapidly changing early 19
th
 century society 
(Brown 1984; Rothman 1990). On the other hand, asylums were a politically-expedient solution 
to a pressing public health and safety issue, providing a morally defensible method for getting 
unmanageable numbers of people affected by mental illness off of the streets regardless of the 
quality of care they received in asylums (Rothman 1990). For example, the first asylum was 
established in Saint John, where higher rates of immigration made “the plight of the insane more 
evident and more urgent” (Francis 1977, 26).  
The intent to provide treatment in a therapeutic setting was overwhelmed by the reality of 
the high demand for this new institution. Asylums quickly became overcrowded (presumably 
because they provided a better alternative to jails, living in the streets, destitution, or family 
care). By 1891, the superintendent of the asylum in Saint John estimated that “of the 442 mental 
patients residing in the asylum, only 16 are expected to be restored to mental health” (New 
Brunswick 2011, 4). Similarly by 1939 at the Ontario Hospital for the Insane in Whitby, Ontario, 
“the patient population swelled to 1,736, bed capacity was 1,542, and patients overflowed into 
the hallways” (Ontario Shores n.d.). In the face of this increasing demand and overcrowding, the 
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ideals of moral treatment gave way to warehousing, seclusion and restraints (Lurie and 
Goldbloom 2015).  
 
1948-1972 National Health Programme: Targeted, Conditional Grants 
In the years following World War II, Canadian federalism became more centralized in the 
interests of national re-building and the development of a welfare state. Returning soldiers both 
exacerbated over-crowding in mental hospitals (as asylums were now called) and drew attention 
to the poor quality of care. The number of patients in mental hospitals grew from 31,686 in 1931 
to 48,056 in 1945, making up 50% of hospital patients in Canada (Canada, House of Commons, 
1948, 6169). These urgent mental health needs compelled the federal government to use its 
federal spending power in a long-standing area of provincial jurisdiction. Targeted mental health 
grants were included under the National Health Programme in 1948 as one of a handful of 
national health priorities such as tuberculosis, venereal disease, and hospital construction. These 
grants were administered almost like contribution agreements, with provincial proposals 
reviewed by and held accountable to officials at the Department of National Health and Welfare 
in Ottawa. At $7M per year at the outset of the program, mental health was the largest grant 
targeted to a particular disease.  
 
1957-1977 Cost-Shared Hospital and Medical Services Transfers  
Prime Minister Mackenzie King explicitly intended the National Health Programme grants to be 
“fundamental prerequisites of a nation-wide system of health insurance” (Canada, House of 
Commons 1948, 3931). Nevertheless, when it came time to consider mental health in the context 
of health insurance debates in the 1950s and 1960s, the earlier investments (both the federal 
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grant and provincial investments in asylums) provided an excuse for the decision to exclude 
mental hospitals. As argued by Paul Martin Sr., the then federal Minister of Health who 
introduced the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act (HIDSA): “It would be wrong by 
any principle … for us to include as part of the hospital insurance scheme … mentally ill people 
who receive treatment in provincial institutions” (Canada, House of Commons, 1957, 2677). 
Further, “No attempt is being made to discriminate against tuberculosis patients and those who 
suffer from mental illness … This bill is designed to assist individuals in their individual hospital 
problems and not to subsidize provinces which are receiving assistance in other ways from the 
government” (Canada, House of Commons 1957, 3384).  
 The federal government’s position was extensively criticized by opposition parties, and a 
proposed amendment to re-consider including mental hospitals in HIDSA was debated right up 
until the final vote in 1957. According to Alexander Nicholson, Member of Parliament from 
Saskatchewan:“[I]t is most unfortunate that half of the people who are sick every day in the year 
are barred from the benefits of this so-called national health insurance plan… The cost per day 
for the patients in the mental hospitals of Canada [was] $2.70 per patient per day in the mental 
hospitals … and $10.77 per day in the public hospitals. It now becomes clear why the minister is 
trying to get from under the responsibility of the federal government for this very large group” 
(Canada, House of Commons 1957, 3382). Erhart Regier, a Member of Parliament from British 
Columbia, couched the argument more in terms of the vertical fiscal imbalance: “This 
government gets over 70 per cent of every tax dollar; and simply because most of the provincial 
governments have now assumed full responsibility for mental care…, the federal government 
saw a way of saving some money” (Canada, House of Commons 1957, 2667).  John Diefenbaker 
(Leader of the Opposition) put it more colourfully: “Why is this? Why are these [mental] 
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hospitals … discriminated against? …At the present time the provinces find themselves with a 
smaller and smaller share of the tax dollar and with an increasing problem intensified by our 
modern way of life which has resulted in the multiplication of the number of mental patients. 
This load of responsibility cannot be discharged properly by the provinces” (Canada, House of 
Commons 1957, 3386). 
These debates were revisited in the 1960s, with the Royal Commission on Health 
Services (the Hall Commission) and the introduction of the Medical Services Act (MSA). The 
Canadian Mental Health Association (1964) (CMHA) released its study, More for the Mind. This 
report recommended a shift from mental hospitals to care in general hospitals and communities 
in light of new treatment advances and concerns about stigma. However, the CMHA 
recommended that this shift be phased in: “The immediate scrapping of all old-style mental 
hospitals in favour of some new ‘master plan’ is not advocated, but planning at the regional and 
local levels can lead to the development of a new pattern of services which will better meet the 
needs of the mentally ill” (CMHA 1964, 45).  
Accordingly, the Hall Commission made a series of detailed recommendations designed 
to encourage the shift, but also recommended that HIDSA be expanded to cover mental hospitals 
in the meantime (Canada, Royal Commission on Health Services 1964, 26). However, these 
nuances were ultimately overlooked as both federal and provincial governments appeared to 
latch onto the notion that mental illness could be most effectively treated in general hospitals; as 
these were already covered under HIDSA, little in the way of action was needed beyond 
encouraging the shift.  
 The federal government was again criticized for seeking to avoid shouldering an 
expensive responsibility. Harry Harley (Member of Parliament for Halton, Ontario) pointed out 
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that psychiatric beds in general hospitals still only numbered 4,000 compared with the 68,000 
beds in mental hospitals (a number which still totalled nearly half of hospital beds in Canada in 
1967) (Canada, House of Commons 1967, 1803). In one of his many speeches on this issue, 
David Orlikow (Member of Parliament for Winnipeg North) argued that the exclusion of mental 
hospitals resulted in “one type of treatment for people in the middle and upper income brackets” 
being far more likely to access higher quality care from psychiatrists and in general hospitals in 
urban centres, and “another and much poorer type of treatment for people in the low income 
brackets” (Canada, House of Commons1968, 3508).  
The federal government openly recognized the financial implications of expanding 
HIDSA, both in light of the high costs involved and in light of on-going fiscal federal 
negotiations. As recounted by federal Minister of Health Judy LaMarsh, during the 1964 
federal/provincial conference on health: “[T]here was general acceptance of the principle of the 
integration of mental hospitals and tuberculosis sanatoria into the general hospital system. 
However, I did point out that the financial implications would need to be reviewed within the 
framework of the proposed study of the tax structure” (Canada, House of Commons 1964, 5814). 
Further, federal Parliamentary Secretary for Health Margaret Rideout argued that: “The question 
of extending federal contributions so as to include mental and tuberculosis hospitals is a financial 
question and is precisely the type of question which is now being studied in depth, along with 
other federal- provincial financial arrangements, by the tax structure committee. It is because of 
this, and pending a decision as to the future of federal-provincial programs such as hospital 
insurance, that the government does not propose to make any move at this time to include mental 
hospitals in the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act” (Canada, House of Commons 
1967, 1798-9). 
225 
 
 
The outcome of these considerations is telling: in 1967 the MSA was voted in without 
expanding HIDSA to include mental hospitals. Certainly the MSA improved access and equity of 
access to mental health care provided by physicians, a significant policy achievement. However, 
the importance of this improvement was overshadowed by the hugely disproportionate number 
of people receiving sub-standard, uninsured services in mental hospitals. When the targeted 
mental health grant under the National Health Programme was dropped not long after in 1972 
(National Health and Welfare 1972), the federal role in mental health was further diminished. 
 
FURTHER FEDERAL NEGLECT AND DISPROPORTIONATE GAPS IN MENTAL 
HEALTH FUNDING  
 
The more recent history shows federal neglect and related disproportionate gaps in mental 
health funding due to shifts in the overall structure and nature of fiscal transfers in public health. 
Two periods of change and complexity are examined below. 
 
1978-1992 Block-Funded Transfers, De-Institutionalization and the Canada Health Act  
 Mental health policy faded further from view at the federal level over the next fifteen 
years. The shift to block-funding, the move toward de-institutionalization without the required 
investment in community services at the provincial level, and the unwillingness by either level of 
government to expand insurance coverage with the Canada Health Act (CHA) did nothing to 
address the long-standing gaps and inequities in mental health policy. 
 Mental health was largely absent from the debates about the Established Programs 
Financing (EPF) Act, introduced in 1978. The shift from cost-shared to block-funded transfers 
was caught up in the broader dynamics of fiscal federalism, with provincial governments gaining 
more autonomy in the form of fewer conditions on federal transfers and a greater share of tax 
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room, in exchange for greater budgetary certainty for the federal government (Ouimet 2014). As 
argued by Maioni (2002), the EPF tied federal transfers to the gross domestic product rather than 
actual health care costs, leaving provinces with greater responsibilities for growing health care 
costs. 
 These cost pressures combined with new opportunities for community-based treatment 
noted in the Hall Commission report to once again provide a recipe for political expediency. The 
move to close mental hospitals (known as de-institutionalization) that started in the 1970s was 
driven as much by the cost pressures on provincial health systems in the wake of EPF, as by the 
imperative to provide higher quality care for people living with mental health problems and 
illnesses. By the mid-20th century new pharmacological and psychotherapeutic treatments had 
opened up new opportunities for active treatment (as opposed to custodial care) and recovery of 
meaningful lives in the community for people living with mental health problems and illnesses 
(Canadian Medical Health Association 1964). In combination with a new wave of advocacy to 
address deplorable conditions in mental hospitals, these treatment advances built public support 
for de-institutionalization (Mulvale et al. 2007).  
 However, the promised re-allocation of funding from psychiatric institutions to 
community-based services was never fully realized (Lurie and Goldbloom 2015). According to 
Orlikow: “With the development of the tranquillizer drugs, many people who earlier spent years, 
if not their whole lives, in mental hospitals have been and are being released. The idea was that 
they would be serviced outside in the community which would help them in the transition years. 
… [E]ven in a city like Toronto there are very few services for these people, so they are going 
back to the hospitals again” (Canada, House of Commons 1982, 15869). While de-
institutionalization undoubtedly improved the lives of those who were able to secure community-
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based treatments and supports, it also provided a political rationale for further erosion of public 
funding for mental health services at a time when provincial health systems were under 
increasing cost pressures.  
The CHA, passed in 1984, further entrenched the legacies of exclusion and neglect of 
mental health services. In the wake of the 1980 Quebec referendum, the federal government was 
able to shift the federation toward a more centralized approach in the name of national unity 
(Ouimet 2014). This centralization included imposing national health standards to put an end to 
extra billing through the CHA. However, this new appetite for federal standards did not extend to 
under-insured areas such as home care and pharmacare, and perhaps even more particularly it did 
not extend to mental health.  
At the time of the CHA negotiations, the combined impact of the shift from cost-shared to 
block transfers, growing health care costs, and the shortfalls of de-institutionalization left both 
levels of government with little appetite for expanding responsibility for mental health insurance 
coverage beyond services provided by physicians or in general hospitals. Federal Minister of 
Health Monique Bégin recalled federal/provincial discussion of the “gray areas of medicare” as 
follows: “Some ministers felt it put expansionist pressure on the health-care system ... Strategic 
as well as economic considerations prevented me from deviating one iota from the principle that 
the basic rules of health insurance remain unchanged … Mental illness was a touchy question. 
Though in practice many of the treatments and services for mental illness were fully integrated 
into general health care, the provinces did not want to see anything in this category included in 
medicare” (Bégin 1987, 160-1). 
 By this time the issue was not so much coverage for mental hospitals; block transfers 
made the details of how federal health transfers were spent quite at the discretion of provincial 
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governments. However, with new forms of psychotherapeutic and community-based treatment, 
coverage of non-medical providers (such as psychologists, social workers, and nurses) had 
become increasingly relevant. As argued by Bill Blaikie, a Member of Parliament from 
Winnipeg, the CHA failed to “provide leadership and incentives for moving the health care 
model with which medicare currently co-exists away from the present physician-dominated, 
curative model, toward a more comprehensive, community-based preventive health care model 
such as groups like the Canadian Nurses' Association have suggested” (Canada, House of 
Commons 1984, 454).  
Largely as a result of advocacy from the Canadian Nursing Association and over the 
objections of the Canadian Medical Association, a small toehold for non-medical providers was 
achieved in the comprehensiveness clause (clause 9) of the CHA: “In order to satisfy the criterion 
respecting comprehensiveness, the health care insurance plan of a province must insure all 
insured health services provided by hospitals, medical practitioners or dentists, and where the 
law of the province so permits, similar or additional services rendered by other health care 
practitioners” (CHA 1984). However, provincial governments have been very reluctant to use 
this clause to expand coverage of non-medical providers, which to date has been largely limited 
to public insurance coverage for midwifery services. When provincial governments have acted to 
expand access to non-medical services, they have sought to retain control by making targeted, 
direct investments in community agencies or hospital-based clinics, rather than opening the door 
to demand-driven insurance coverage. While these developments have been positive, these 
controlled investments have fallen far short of closing the gap in funding for mental health 
services. 
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1992-2014 Health Reform Transfers and National Mental Health Funding Proposals 
Mental health has steadily moved onto the national agenda over the past two decades of health 
reform transfers. However, none of the health reform transfers has resulted in significant mental 
health investment, as mental health has been largely crowded out by other priorities. The  
Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology report (Canada 2006) on 
mental health, titled Out of the Shadows at Last,  and the subsequent release of the 2012 Mental 
Health Commission of Canada  report set out clear funding proposals, but to date the impact 
beyond raising the profile of mental health has been limited. 
The motivation for broader health reform stemmed as much from concerns about the 
sustainability of the healthcare system in the face of spiralling costs, as from new thinking about 
comprehensive, patient-centred, quality healthcare. In the context of these concerns about 
sustainability, it was once again difficult for real progress to be made in narrowing the gap in 
funding for mental health care. For a total cost of $150M between 1997 and 2001, the Health 
Transition Fund funded 141 pilot projects, of which 21 focused on mental health (Goldner 
2002). For a total cost of $800M from 2000 to 2006, the Primary Healthcare Transition Fund 
funded a variety of projects, including $3.8M for one national project on collaborative mental 
health care and a few provincial mental health projects (Canada 2007; Health Canada 2007). 
Even with the massive increases to federal health transfers with the 2003 and 2004 Health 
Accords, mental health only warranted being included as “short-term acute community mental 
health home care for two-week provision of case management and crisis response services,” an 
awkward add-on to one of three home care priorities (Canada 2004).  
It was only when the above mentioned Senate Standing Committee on Science and 
Technology followed up its 2002 report on health (Canada 2002) with Out of the Shadows, its 
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2006 report on mental health (Canada 2006), that momentum started to build for mental health as 
a national priority. Building on the earlier transition funds, the 2006 report recommended a 10 
year, $5.1B Mental Health Transition Fund, with a focus on supporting the transition to 
community-based services and improving access to housing for people living with mental health 
problems and illnesses. The Harper Conservatives did not take up this recommendation, but did 
follow the Senate’s recommendation to establish the Mental Health Commission of Canada 
(MHCC) in 2007 with a budget of $140M over 10 years and a mandate that included the 
development of a national mental health strategy (Finance Canada 2007). The development of 
the MHS has spurred unprecedented mental health policy development at all levels of 
government and in many sectors (Mulvale et al. 2014; Lurie and Goldloom 2015). However, this 
policy development has not been matched by anything more than marginal new investments.  
To put some real numbers around the shortfall, the goal set in the MHS was to bring the 
proportion of public health spending on mental health up from 7 to 9 per cent (with equivalent 
increases in social spending as well as more efficient use of existing spending). Based on the 
$145B in public spending on health in 2012 (Canadian Institute for Health Information 2014), 
reaching 9 per cent would require increased spending on mental health by $3B per year, from 
$10B to $13B. The federal CHT made up 21 per cent of provincial health expenditures in 2012 
(Canadian Institute for Health Information 2014; Finance Canada 2015a). If the federal 
government took on 21 per cent of this $3B mental health funding gap, the cost would be $630 
million per year; if it went back to the original 50/50 cost-sharing formula for public health 
insurance, the cost would be $1.5B.  
These kinds of numbers far exceed previous federal transfers on mental health, which 
seems to have peaked with the $7M per year spent on the mental health grant starting in 1948, 
231 
 
 
the equivalent of $73M in 2015 after adjusting for inflation. Just as in 1957 and 1964 when 
mental hospitals were excluded from hospital insurance, in the 1970s when provinces closed 
mental hospitals without re-investing accordingly in community and general hospital services, 
and again in 1984 when the CHA did not expand to include coverage of non-medical mental 
health services, provincial and territorial governments today are challenged to close the mental 
health funding gap without targeted federal support.  
At the same time, this lack of progress in closing the mental health gap through the health 
reform years has been influenced by broader developments in fiscal federal politics. In exchange 
for commitments to consult and secure a set threshold of provincial support for major initiatives, 
the federal government pushed for greater constitutional recognition of federal spending power 
through the Meech and Charlottetown Accords. After these Accords failed, softer policy 
recognition was secured in 1999 with the Social Union Framework Agreement (SUFA), which 
was approved by all provinces and territories except for Quebec (Ouimet 2014). However, this 
new recognition has not fundamentally changed the political nature of fiscal federalism. Post-
SUFA, the federal government’s choice of which national objectives to pursue through the use of 
federal spending power has been as much based on the political calculus of the day as ever. 
For example, the 2011 announcement by the Harper Conservatives of a completely 
unconditional approach to the CHT (Finance Canada 2011) was consistent with the government’s 
“open federalism” position, whereby the federal government sought to limit its involvement to 
areas of clear provincial and territorial jurisdiction. At the same time, this approach distanced the 
Conservative government from the perceived failures of the 2004 Health Accord. While 
provinces and territories gained certainty regarding federal health transfers, they were left to their 
own devices for the increasingly impossible task of health reform. By contrast, in 2014 the 
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Conservatives strongly exerted federal spending power on job training (also clearly under 
provincial and territorial jurisdiction) through the Canada Jobs Grant, a far more politically-
attractive policy area. 
 
A CONCLUDING POLITICAL ANALYSIS ON THE PROSPECTS FOR A TARGETED 
MENTAL HEALTH TRANSFER BY THE TRUDEAU LIBERALS 
 
What then are the prospects for a targeted mental health transfer under the Trudeau Liberals? Is 
the moral and economic case for closing the gap in funding for mental health services 
compelling enough? Has a real policy window opened?   
On the down side of the ledger, early signs suggest that mental health may be 
overshadowed by other pressing healthcare priorities, namely home care and pharmacare 
(Simpson, 2016). Mental health was not mentioned in the joint press release coming out of the 
first Federal/Provincial/Territorial Ministers of Health meeting early in 2016 (Canadian 
Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat 2016). Meanwhile, federal fiscal politics are bound to 
be as intense, and health policy as intensely politically salient, as ever. Whatever interests 
provincial and territorial governments have in improving access to mental health care will be at 
least balanced by their interests in maintaining their autonomy, and Quebec will likely opt out of 
whatever deal can be reached. The $3B that would be required to bring the mental health from 7 
to 9 per cent of public spending on health would be difficult to achieve at the best of times, let 
alone during an economic downturn. Finally, while stigma may be lessening, the risks of 
exclusion and neglect by policy-makers are alive and well in a country where 46 per cent of 
people believe that mental illness is used as an excuse for poor behaviour (Canadian Medical 
Association 2008).  
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On the plus side, the independent streams of problems, policies and politics in the 
Kingdon model of agenda setting are strongly aligned (Kingdon 1995). The funding and equity 
gap between mental health and health care is increasingly recognized as a serious problem. To 
quote Prime Minister Trudeau, “this separation of mental health as being outside of health has to 
stop…we have to lean in” (quoted in Crespi 2016). The MHS and related work lay out numerous 
policy solutions which are based on extensive civil society engagement (Mulvale et al. 2014), 
and have been welcomed by provincial governments. Lessons learned from the early Health 
Accords may also have increased the appetite for policy solutions which attach stronger 
conditions to federal transfers, by either targeting to specific issues such as mental health or 
setting specific targets. The political stream is also favourable, with public support for a targeted 
transfer at 90 per cent and a commitment from the Trudeau Liberals to improve access to mental 
health on the books. The remaining ingredient may be the policy entrepreneur who will invest 
the time and energy to advance this topic firmly on the decision agenda by coupling the three 
streams.  
This political analysis suggests that the prospects for a targeted mental health transfer are 
good, maybe even strong, but not a sure thing. There are a variety of forms that such a transfer 
could take. It seems highly unlikely that there would be support from the provincial and 
territorial governments, let alone the federal government, to expand demand-driven public health 
insurance coverage under the CHA. The same can be said for approaches that tie federal transfers 
to employment-based or private insurance; thus far, such proposals have invoked politically 
unpalatable moves away from first-dollar coverage, even though they might actually be an 
improvement over the status quo for non-medical mental health services.  
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Far more likely is a variant of the earlier Health Accords. A targeted mental health 
transfer could be tied to fairly specific actions such as expanding access to psychotherapy 
(Anderssen 2015:F1), or to the Out of the Shadows report proposal for transitional funding to 
strengthen community-based services. Alternatively, a targeted transfer could be more loosely 
tied to the implementation of the MHS, with a specific target to reach the 9 per cent targeted 
share of public health spending. As argued by Maslove (2016), the bilateral gas tax transfer 
agreement model might be more effective than multilateral agreements such as the earlier Health 
Accords. The gas tax transfer set national objectives but was implemented through bilateral 
agreements which responded to different provincial and territorial needs. Such a bilateral 
approach could potentially leverage federal spending power to spur innovation across the 
country, in a manner consistent with of the spread of Saskatchewan-based innovations in health 
insurance in the mid-20
th
 century.  
In the absence of successful negotiation of a targeted transfer, incremental progress can 
still be made to close the mental health gap, or to at least slow the rate at which the gap widens. 
With their recent mental health strategies and plans, some provincial and territorial governments 
have been able to make targeted investments in mental health, even in the face of escalating 
health costs and projected declines in federal transfers (although in the case of Ontario targeted 
investments in mental health have been outstripped by spending on physician health). The 
federal government could make smaller-scale transfers to provincial and territorial governments 
and organizations through departmental budgets as it has done for addictions funding through the 
National Anti-Drug Strategy (Canada 2015), or it has done for cancer and mental health through 
federally-funded organizations such as the Canadian Partnership Against Cancer (2015) and the 
MHCC. 
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While the focus of this chapter has been on prospects for a targeted mental health transfer 
under a new Health Accord, social spending plays a critical role in mental health policy as well, 
in sectors such as housing, education, justice and child welfare. Moreover, the federal 
government has important jurisdictional responsibilities to improve the quality and availability of 
mental health services for specific population groups such as indigenous peoples, federal 
inmates, and the military. The opportunity also exists to advance mental health funding through 
other health reforms, for example through home care or pharmaceutical insurance. This strategic 
approach has long been used as a way to advance mental health reform, which has traditionally 
been below the radar screen of policy makers (Rochefort 1999).  
Incremental progress on health spending is of course to be welcomed, as would increased 
social spending, increased investment in direct federal services, or investments that are piggy-
backed on other health reforms. However, there does seem to be a window of opportunity to 
introduce a targeted mental health transfer. A national mental health strategy is in place, the 
federal government is committed, public interest and support are at an all-time high, and Health 
Accord negotiations are underway. With its decision in 1957 to not take on the high cost of 
insuring services for the 40 per cent of hospital patients in mental hospitals, the federal 
government entrenched a gap between mental health and physical health care that has never been 
closed. Without significant federal support, history tells us that provincial and territorial 
governments will continue to be challenged in their efforts to address this fundamental disparity 
affecting the lives of millions of Canadians.  
  
236 
 
 
References 
Anderssen, E. 2015. “We have the evidence...Why aren’t we providing evidence-based care?” 
The Globe and Mail 22 May, p. F1.  
Banting, K.G., and S. M.  Corbett. 2002. “Health Policy and Federalism: An Introduction’, in 
K.G. Banting and SM Corbett. eds. Health Policy and Federalism: A Comparative Perspective 
on Multi-level Governance. 1-38. Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University, 
Kingston Ontario. 
Bégin, M., 1988. Medicare: Canada’s Right to Health, Optimum Publishers. International, 
Montréal. 
Boadway, R. 2001. “Inter-governmental Fiscal Relations: The Facilitator of Fiscal 
Decentralization”. Constitutional Political Economy, 12, 93–121. 
Boadway, R. and R.L. Watts. 2004. “Fiscal Federalism in Canada, the USA, and Germany”, 
Working Paper, no. 6, Queen’s University, Kingston Ontario. 
Brown, T.E. 1984. “The Origins of the Asylum in Upper Canada, 1830-1839: Towards an 
Interpretation”., Canadian Bulletin of Medical History, 1, 27-58. 
Canada. 2004. First Ministers’ Meeting on the Future of Health Care. Available from 
http://healthycanadians.gc.ca/health-system-systeme-sante/cards-cartes/collaboration/2004-
meeting-racontre-eng.php 
Canada. 2007. Primary Health Care Transition Fund. Available from 
http://healthycanadians.gc.ca/health-system-systeme-sante/services/primary-primaires/transition-
adaptation-eng.php 
Canada. 2012. A Consolidation of the Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982, Justice Canada, Ottawa. 
Canada. 2015. Anti-drug Strategy Initiative Funded Projects. Available from 
http://www.healthycanadians.gc.ca/anti-drug-antidrogue/funding-financement/projects-projets-
eng.php 
Canada Health Act 1985. Available from http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-6/  
Canada, House of Commons. 1948. Debates, Vol. 4. 
Canada, House of Commons. 1948. Debates, Vol. 6.  
Canada, House of Commons. 1957, Debates, Vol. 3. 
Canada, House of Commons. 1964, Debates, Vol. 6. 
Canada, House of Commons. 1967, Debates, Vol. 2. 
237 
 
 
Canada, House of Commons. 1968, Debates, Vol. 4. 
Canada, House of Commons. 1984, Debates, Vol. 1. 
Canada, House of Commons. 1984, Debates, Vol. 14. 
Canada, Royal Commission on Health Services. 1964. Report. Volume 1, Author, Ottawa. 
Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology. 2002. The 
Health of Canadians: The FederalRole. Government of Canada, Ottawa. 
Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology. 2006, Out of 
the Shadows at Last: Transforming Mental Health, Mental Illness and Addictions Services in 
Canada, Government of Canada, Ottawa. 
Canadian Institute for Health Information. 2014. National Health Expenditure Trends 1975-
2014. Author, Ottawa. 
Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat. 1999. Agreement: A Framework to Improve 
the Social Union for Canadians. Available from 
http://www.scics.gc.ca/english/conferences.asp?a=viewdocument&id=638 
Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat. 2016. Statement of the Federal-Provincial-
Territorial Ministers of Health. Available from 
http://www.scics.gc.ca/english/conferences.asp?a=viewdocument&id=2341 
Canadian Medical Association. 2008. 8th Annual National Report Card on Health Care, Author, 
Ottawa.  
Canadian Mental Health Association. 1964. More for the Mind, Author, Toronto. 
Canadian Mental Health Association. 2015. CMHA announces results of Nanos research survey 
on mental health funding. Available from http://www.cmha.ca/news/cmha-announces-results-of-
nanos-research-survey-on-mental-health-funding/#.Vr31X-azk7I  
Canadian Partnership Against Cancer. 2015. Progress in Action: 2014/15 Annual Report, 
Author, Toronto. 
Crespi, M.  2016. The Social (television broadcast) 27 January 2016, Toronto, CTV. 
Finance Canada. 2007. Aspire to a Better, Safer, Stronger Canada. Author, Ottawa. 
Finance Canada. 2011. Harper government announces major new investment in health care. 
Available from http://www.fin.gc.ca/n11/11-141-eng.asp 
Finance Canada. 2015. Federal Support to Provinces and Territories. Available from 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/mtp-eng.asp 
238 
 
 
Finance Canada. 2016. Growing the Middle Class. Available from 
http://www.budget.gc.ca/2016/docs/plan/budget2016-en.pdf  
Francis, D., 1977. “The Development of the Lunatic Asylum in the Maritime Provinces’, 
Acadiensis, 6(2), 23–38. 
Goldner, E.M. 2002. Sharing the Learning: The Health Transition Fund Synthesis Series – 
Mental Health, Canada, Ottawa. 
Health Canada. 2007. Primary Health Transition Fund: Summary of Initiatives. Available from 
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/pubs/prim/2007-initiatives/index-eng.php#p3a3  
Health Council of Canada.2014. Better Health, Better Care, Better Value for All: Refocusing 
Health Care Reform in Canada, Author, Toronto. 
Jacobs, P., C. Dewa, A. Lesage, H-M. Vasiliadis, , C. Escober, , G. Mulvale, and R.Yim.2010. 
The Cost of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services in Canada. Institute of Health 
Economics, Edmonton. 
Kingdon, J.W., 1995. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. 2
nd
 Edition. Longman, New 
York. 
Lim, K.-L., P. Jacobs, A. Ohinmaa, D. Schopflocher,  and C. Dewa. 2008. “A New Population-
based Measure of the Economic Burden of Mental Illness in Canada”, Chronic Diseases in 
Canada, 28(3), 92-98. 
 
Lurie, S., and D.S. Goldbloom.2015. “More for the Mind and its Legacy’, Canadian Journal of 
Community Mental Health, 1–24.  
Maioni, A., 2002. “Federalism and Health Care in Canada”, in Health Policy and Federalism: A 
Comparative Perspective on Multi-level Governance. eds. K.G. Banting and S. 
M.Corbett.Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario.52-
67. 
Maslove, A., 2016. “Health Care Problems Structural, Not Financial”. Hill Times, 8 January. 
Mental Health Commission of Canada. 2012a. Changing Directions, Changing Lives: The 
Mental Health Strategy for Canada. Author, Calgary. 
Mental Health Commission of Canada. 2012b. Government of Alberta Welcomes Changing 
Directions Changing Lives: The Mental Health Strategy for Canada. Available from 
http://www.mentalhealthcommission.ca/English/system/files/private/MHStrategy_PressReleaseS
trategyLaunchAB_ENG_0.pdf 
Mental Health Commission of Canada. 2012c. Mental Health Commission of Canada Launches 
Changing Directions, Changing Lives: The Mental Health Strategy for Canada in New 
Brunswick. Available from 
239 
 
 
http://www.mentalhealthcommission.ca/English/system/files/private/MHStrategy_PressReleaseS
trategyLaunchNB_ENG_0.pdf  
Mulvale, G., J. Abelson, J., and P. Goering. 2007. “Mental Health Service Delivery in Ontario, 
Canada: How do Policy Legacies Shape Prospects for Reform?”. Health Economics, Policy and 
Law, 2(4), 363-389. 
Mulvale, G., H. Chodos, M. Bartram, M., M.P. MacKinnon, and M. Abud. 2014. “Engaging 
Civil Society Through Deliberative Dialogue to Create the first Mental Health Strategy for 
Canada: Changing Directions, Changing Lives’, Social Science and Medicine, 123, 262–268.  
National Health and Welfare Canada. 1972. Annual Report, Author, Ottawa. 
New Brunswick. 2011. The Action Plan for Mental Health in New Brunswick 2011-2018.Author, 
Fredericton, NB. 
Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences. n.d., A Brief History. Available from 
http://www.ontarioshores.ca/UserFiles/Servers/Server_6/File/PDFs/Detailed_History.pdf  
Ouimet, H.R., 2014. “Quebec and Canadian Fiscal federalism: From Tremblay to Séguin and 
Beyond”., Canadian Journal of Political Science, 47, 47–69.  
Prime Minister of Canada. 2015. Minister of Health Mandate Letter. Available from 
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-health-mandate-letter 
Rochefort, D., 1999, ‘Beneath the radar screen: The politics of mental health policy reform’, 
paper presented at the 1999–2000 Beverley Lecture, Toronto. 
 
Rothman, D.J. 1990. The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New 
Republic. Aldine de Gruyter, New York. 
SEII Coordinating Centre. 2009. Moving in the Right Direction. Centre for Addictions and 
Mental Health, Toronto.  
Simpson, J., 2016. “Liberals get it right with focus on home care”, Globe and Mail 28 January, p. 
A11. 
Smetanin, P., D. Stiff, C. Briante, C.E.  Adair, S. Ahmad and M. Khan. 2011. The Life and 
Economic Impact of Major Mental Illnesses in Canada: 2011 to 2041. Risk Analytica, on behalf 
of the Mental Health Commission of Canada. 
Statistics Canada. 2013.Canadian Community Health Survey, 2012: Annual Component. Author, 
Ottawa. 
Sunderland, A., and L.C. Findlay. 2013. “Perceived Need for Mental Health Care in Canada: 
Results from the 2012 Canadian Community Health Survey–Mental Health”. Statistics Canada 
Health Reports, 24(9), 3–9. 
240 
 
 
Chapter 9 
HOW OTTAWA MENDS: RENEWAL AND SUPPORT TO REGISTERED 
CHARITIES UNDER A LIBERAL GOVERNMENT? 
 
Karine Levasseur 
INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between the Harper government and registered charities was an uneasy 
one at the best of times.  With the election of a majority Liberal government, will this 
relationship change and if so, how will it change?  This chapter provides answers to these 
important questions. If the Trudeau government is serious about repairing its relationship 
with the charitable sector, the government must resolve several pressing policy problems 
facing charities. First, the new government must reassure charities and Canadians that the 
regulator — the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) — is independent and follows the rule 
of law amidst recent concerns that the Harper government politicized the CRA to silence 
charities.
1
 Second, the new government must modernize the meaning of charity and 
advocacy rules.
2
 While there are several options for reform, this chapter argues that 
legislating a definition of charity is needed along with an expansion of the advocacy 
rules.  
These proposed solutions are significant and go far beyond merely clarifying the 
existing rules. For too long, Canada has initiated small incremental change while other 
common law countries have undertaken significant reform making Canada a laggard on 
the international stage. To be sure, this type of reform is not without its challenges and 
there have been signals by the new government that it may be realigning (read: lowering) 
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expectations as to what policy change it can deliver. On this point, I argue that the new 
government is not moving away from its political commitments, but moving ahead albeit 
very gently. 
The chapter begins with an overview of the charitable sector in Canada followed 
by an examination of the problems associated with the meaning of charity and advocacy. 
It assesses the relationship between the sector and the Harper government, and then turns 
its attention to the new Trudeau government with its promise of renewal and support.  
The chapter discusses some possible reform options and closes with a discussion related 
to the support for, and the challenges to, modernizing the meaning of charity and 
advocacy.  
SIZE, SCOPE, AND ROLE OF REGISTERED CHARITIES  
There are approximately 86,000 charities currently in operation in Canada.  Charities 
comprise organizations or foundations that provide a public benefit and pursue one of the 
following purposes: relief of poverty; advancement of education; advancement of 
religion; or purposes that benefit the community. Registered charities are permitted to 
issue income tax receipts for donations that may then be claimed by the donor to reduce 
taxes. This ability to issue income tax receipts for donations is significant with Canadian 
tax filers reporting a total of $8.8 billion in donations in 2014 (Statistics Canada 2016). 
To become a registered charity for tax purposes, a non-profit organization must apply to 
the CRA and receive charitable status.  
Presumably, the federal government’s provision of charitable status is recognition 
that certain purposes are deemed worthy of support under interpretation of the common 
law
3
 since charitable status confers certain benefits. In her earlier work this author 
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(Levasseur 2008) concluded that receiving charitable status matters to the functioning of 
an organization because of the benefits that flow from receiving said status, notably the 
ability to expand and diversify funding opportunities. There is a heightened legitimacy 
that comes with being a charity. With the government’s stamp-of-approval, charities are 
trusted and perceived as being held accountable. 
When registered charities are combined with non-profit organizations, they form 
the world’s second largest voluntary sector proportional to Canada’s economic output 
and contribute 8.9% to the GDP (Hall, et al. 2005:7-9). Indeed, their economic 
contribution exceeds that of several industries including agriculture and motor vehicle 
manufacturing (Statistics Canada 2009). Besides this economic importance, Canadians 
place a high value on the role of charities in governing.   A recent survey initiated by the 
Muttart Foundation (Lasby and Barr 2013:9-10) reveals that 79% of Canadians trust 
charities and two-thirds believe that charities understand the needs of citizens better than 
government.  Studying the relationship between charities and the federal government is 
critical because charities deliver some of the most important goods and services such as 
food banks, shelters and hospitals in Canada, but they do so much more. They represent 
identities, promote citizenship and build social capital, thus making them crucial 
governance actors. 
INSTITUTIONAL LEGACIES 
The Constitution Act of 1867 (s. 92(7)) grants exclusive regulatory powers over charities 
to the provinces in such matters as fundraising. The registration of charities, however, in 
the form of tax expenditures for donations falls under the jurisdiction of the federal 
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government constitutionally (s. 91(3). As the regulator in this area, the federal 
government is responsible for defining the meaning of charity for tax purposes.  
For non-profit organizations to become registered charities for tax purposes, both 
the purposes and activities must be deemed charitable. For the former, no definition of 
charitable purposes exists within Canadian legislation so officials must rely on the 
common law for guidance when determining which purposes should be deemed 
charitable. Charitable purposes are rooted in the common law of the English Preamble of 
the Statue of Charitable Uses, 1601. The Preamble provides a list of acceptable 
charitable purposes and this list was later interpreted in an English court decision of the 
Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax Act v. Pemsel in 1891. In that 
case, Lord Macnaughten outlines four heads of charity  — relief of poverty, advancement 
of education, advancement of religion and purposes beneficial to the community — that 
are used today to determine which purposes are charitable (Bridge 2002, 5; see also 
Webb 2000, 27).  
Canada’s interpretation of the common law is more restrictive than many other 
common law countries (Broder 2014; Drache 2002; Levasseur 2012; Phillips 2011). 
Purposes considered charitable in other common law countries, such as the promotion of 
multicultural activities, amateur sports, and patriotism may not necessarily be considered 
charitable in Canada (Broder, 2001).  
Non-profit organizations that are denied charitable status may appeal the decision 
to the courts. The court of first instance for issues concerning charitable status is the 
Federal Court of Appeal followed by the Supreme Court of Canada. The costs associated 
with an appeal are considerable so few appeals are pursued.  Indeed, Broder (2014) points 
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out that the Supreme Court has only rendered decisions to date on three cases related to 
the meaning of charity.
4
  Phillips (2011, 220) notes that the courts can update the 
meaning of charity through regular review. However, she is also quick to point out that 
insufficient regular review leaves the common law “calcified depending on that last case 
heard” (Ibid, 220).  With the few opportunities provided for the courts to render 
decisions, they have not updated the meaning of charity. Space constraints prevent a full 
overview of court decisions rendered (see Cullity 2014; Stevens 2000 for more details), 
but one decision worth exploring clearly illustrates this point.  
In 1999, the Vancouver Society for Immigrant and Visible Minority Women 
appealed the denial of charitable status to the Supreme Court. While Vancouver Society 
has several goals, one of its primary goals involves the social and economic integration of 
immigrant and visible minority women through a variety of services including a job 
referral service and other services such as resume writing, accreditation, and counseling 
(Stevens 2000).  Despite its laudable goal, the majority justices denied the appeal on two 
grounds according to Stevens (2000). First, the recipients — immigrant and visible 
minority women — are not necessarily in need of charity. Stevens (2000) notes, “The 
target ‘all immigrants’ would include independent immigrants who would not require 
assistance and therefore could not be the object of charity”. Second, the promotion of 
employment is not charitable unless it is incidental and ancillary to other charitable 
purposes. The majority justices concluded that the employment-related purposes and 
activities such as the provision of a job directory are neither incidental or ancillary. As a 
result, Vancouver Society “was not exclusively charitable” (Stevens  2000).  While the 
Supreme Court refused to modernize the meaning of charity, it called upon Parliament to 
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do so with Mr. Justice Frank Iacobucci asserting: “…even though some substantial 
change in the law of charity would be desirable and welcome at this time, any such 
change must be left to Parliament” (Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible 
Minority Women v. Minister of National Revenue 1999).  
Non-profits that apply for charitable status must have both charitable purposes 
and activities. In terms of activities, organizations that apply for charitable status must 
limit their political activities better known as ‘advocacy’. The courts have defined 
political activities as the “seek[ing] to retain, oppose, or change the law or policy or 
decisions of any level of government in Canada or a foreign country” (Canada Revenue 
Agency (CRA) 2003).  In 2003, the CRA updated its administrative guidelines that limit 
the amount of advocacy activities that a charity may initiate to 10-20% of resources, 
depending upon the size of the organization.
5
  
This limitation on advocacy has been thoroughly reviewed in the literature. Two 
basic views on this limitation exist. One view suggests that limiting advocacy is 
reasonable because the use of taxpayer dollars vis-à-vis the charitable tax expenditure is 
inappropriate (Bryden 2002). The second view suggests this limitation undermines 
charities and their ability to address the root-causes of problems in society (Bridge 2002). 
In this view, charities are left to respond to the problems caused by poverty, for example, 
but are limited in advocating systemic changes. Yet, advocacy is an important public 
policy input that has contributed to some important public policy changes particularly 
related to smoking regulations and drunk driving (Imagine Canada 2014). 
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REGISTERED CHARITIES UNDER THE HARPER GOVERNMENT 
Budget 2012, which largely focused on jobs and economic growth as a response to the 
financial downturn starting in 2008, contained an important public policy decision that 
had an impact on registered charities in relation to their advocacy.  The Budget frames 
the advocacy undertaken by registered charities as a problem that requires increased 
oversight and states, “Recently, concerns have been raised that some charities may not be 
respecting the rules regarding political activities. There have also been calls for greater 
public transparency related to the political activities of charities, including the extent to 
which they may be funded by foreign sources” (Department of Finance 2012, 204).  
These “calls for greater transparency” were rooted in the controversial Northern 
Gateway pipeline designed to connect Alberta’s oilsands to the BC coast and support the 
export of crude oil. In early 2012, Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver penned an open 
letter to charities in the Globe and Mail where he implied that certain groups, notably 
environmental charities, were undermining the interests of Canadians. He notes that these 
groups “threaten to hijack our regulatory system to achieve their radical ideological 
agenda. They seek to exploit any loophole they can find, stacking public hearings with 
bodies to ensure that delays kill good projects. They use funding from foreign special 
interest groups to undermine Canada’s national economic interest.” (Oliver 2012). This 
letter, according to Kirkby (2014), establishes an ‘us versus them’ narrative whereby 
good economic development with the promise of good-paying jobs were at stake because 
of radical groups including charities.  Following this open letter, Environment Minister 
Peter Kent appeared on CBC’s Power and Politics and suggested that charities were 
engaging in money laundering to support their political activities: “offshore funds have 
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improperly been funneled through — laundered if you will, that's a fairly accurate 
word — through Canadian organizations that have charitable status to be used in ways 
that would be improper given that charitable status" (CBC News 2012).    
As a response to this so-called problem, Budget 2012 allocated $8 million to the 
CRA ($5 million in 2012-2013 and $3 million in 2013-2014) at a time when departments 
experienced budget reductions to achieve two goals: ensure greater transparency and 
institute new audits. For the first goal, Budget 2012 expanded authority to the CRA to 
require additional information from charities related to their political activities and 
whether these activities are funded through foreign donations. This resulted in a revision 
made to the annual return for charities (T3010) that contained a new political activities 
schedule (schedule 7).  No changes were made to the legislation related to the permissible 
advocacy activities of registered charities.   For the second goal, the budgetary increase 
required the CRA to conduct special audits of political activities undertaken by charities. 
Between 2012-2016, an additional 15 ‘political activity’ audits were to be completed in 
each year for a total of 60 in addition to the ‘regular’ 800-900 audits completed annually 
as outlined in Table 1. 
Phillips (2009) asserts that the approach of the Harper government to the sector 
was one of neglect in failing to address important issues. She notes that 
“The federal government has created a dilemma for itself. It appears to have made 
it clear that it does not need any relationship of significance with the voluntary 
sector — not advocacy, nor research, nor the promotion of volunteerism, nor 
social enterprise nor active citizenship.” (2009, 30).  
Yet, Phillips (2011) also concedes that the Harper government expanded the amount of 
the charitable tax expenditure so there is some semblance of a governing philosophy for  
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Table 1: Completion of political activities audits 
 As of January 20, 2016 
Completed 30 
Underway 24 
Not yet started 6 
 TOTAL: 60 
Source: Canada Revenue Agency 2016 
this sector whereby citizens have the choice to direct their philanthropic dollars and 
provide greater opportunity for charities to attract private funding. By way of example, 
the Harper government introduced an expanded charitable tax credit for first-time donors 
to receive an additional 25% in tax credits for donations. Moreover, the Harper 
government allowed the donation of shares in public companies without payment of the 
capital gains tax in 2006. In 2015, the Harper government sought to extend this provision 
to shares in private companies and real estate, which was expected to take effect in 2017, 
but was cancelled by the Trudeau government in 2016. Carter et al. (2016,  2) identifies 
that the “proposed rules were complicated and fraught with practical and implementation 
challenges” so this may explain why the new government opted not to further expand the 
charitable tax expenditure. Moreover, there were comments made by the Liberal Party 
during the election against the reliance on boutique tax expenditures. 
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The central question raised is whether this heightened scrutiny over ‘political 
activities’ is an act of good stewardship to ensure the integrity of the tax system or a 
bullying effort on the part of the Harper government to distract charities with audits and 
create a chilly environment for charities engaging in advocacy? The comments made by 
the Harper government were both inflammatory and divisive. Of further concern were the 
specific comments by the Environmental Minister Peter Kent that charities were involved 
in money laundering operations to undermine domestic public policy conversations. 
While framed as an appropriate course of oversight to protect domestic public policy 
formulation from foreign interests, the introduction of these ‘political activities’ audits 
were rooted in spite. The Harper government employed inappropriate rhetoric and 
imagery that undermines the trust that Canadians have with charities. 
Another question worth probing is whether certain types of charities — those in 
opposition to the government agenda — were targeted for audits. Kirkby’s (2014) 
research concludes that certain charities from the environment, development and human 
rights, and charities receiving donations from labour unions were targeted for political 
activity audits. The CRA indicated that it selected the charities to undergo a political 
activity audit without political interference (Canada Revenue Agency 2015). Yet, we may 
never fully know whether certain charities were targeted because of the privacy 
associated with tax matters. Unless a charity reveals that it is being audited by the CRA, 
there is no conclusive evidence for social science researchers to assess whether certain 
types of charities were targeted.  
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LIBERAL PARTY PLATFORM: RENEWAL OF A RELATIONSHIP WITH 
CHARITIES? 
  
The 2015 federal election saw the Liberal Party of Canada advance a platform with key 
electoral promises that, if implemented, will have an impact on charities. The electoral 
promises are three-fold: elimination of political activities audits instituted by the Harper 
government; heightened transparency through modernization data collection processes 
including the T3010 which is an annual form completed by all registered charities; and, 
creation of a new legislative framework for registered charities. 
These promises were articulated in the mandate letters to the Minister of Finance, 
who is responsible for the Income Tax Act, and the Minister of National Revenue, who is 
responsible for the CRA. The mandate letter to the Minister of National Revenue expects 
the Minister to: 
“allow charities to do their work on behalf of Canadians free from political 
harassment, and modernize the rules governing the charitable and not-for-profit 
sectors, working with the Minister of Finance.  This will include clarifying the 
rules governing “political activity,” with an understanding that charities make an 
important contribution to public debate and public policy.  A new legislative 
framework to strengthen the sector will emerge from this process” (Office of the 
Prime Minister 2015).  
When it assumed office, the new government was seen as ushering in a change as to how 
the federal government relates to the charitable sector. The approach under the Harper 
government was one of scepticism and spite, particularly in the latter part of its mandate, 
but the initial approach of the Trudeau government is a willingness to engage the sector. 
The Trudeau government has followed through with its electoral promise to end the 
political activity audits or what it dubbed “political harassment”. On January 20, 2016, 
Minister of National Revenue Diane Lebouthillier announced that the political activity 
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audits would cease and that of the 30 completed audits to date, only five (5) resulted in 
revocation of charitable status for reasons not related to advocacy. Twenty-four audits are 
still in-progress and will be completed, but the audits will now be conducted as regular 
audits, not as political activity audits. The remaining six audits that have not commenced, 
will not occur (Canada Revenue Agency 2016). In her estimation, the audits show 
compliance: “The results of the political activities audit program have shown that the 
charities audited have been substantially compliant with the rules regarding their 
involvement in political activities” (Canada Revenue Agency 2016). 
As for the other electoral pledges to clarify the advocacy rules and construct a 
new legislative framework, it is unclear whether the rules will simply be clarified, which 
would mean incremental change at most, or whether the rules themselves will be 
changed. The mandate letters provide directives to the Minister of National Revenue and 
the Minister of Finance, but they are quite broad so it is not entirely clear if the new 
government is focused on incremental or larger more transformative policy change.
6
   
MOVING FORWARD 
The Meaning of Charity 
There are several ways to address the public policy problem related to the meaning of 
charity in Canada.  The first option is to do nothing. The second option is to maintain the 
common law.  One example includes some changes to the institutional configuration 
whereby access to the courts becomes easier in the hope that it allows for more review of 
the meaning of charity. Another example is the reliance on administrative guidelines that 
clarify, and at times update the meaning of charity, but within the confines of the 
common law.  These guidelines have been used extensively by the CRA in recent years 
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and they are designed to supplement the common law and lead to greater transparency by 
“promot[ing] a better understanding of what types of organizations may be registered 
within the parameters of the charity law” (Canada Revenue Agency 2004).  Guidelines 
have been issued in some of the most problematic areas including human rights, 
ethnocultural communities, advocacy, and racial equality to name a few examples. To 
what degree, though, do the guidelines update the meaning of charity and advocacy from 
its roots in 1601?   
Phillips (2011) suggests the changes are marginal at best. She notes, for example, 
that the administrative guidelines related to ethnocultural communities, which 
presumably would help an organization like Vancouver Society to become registered as a 
charity, do not require the “courts to be bound by CRA guidance, and they have not been 
put to the test” (Phillips 2011, 222).  Drache (2004) agrees and states, “[CRA] takes the 
position that in order to qualify, organizations must meet the common law tests of what is 
a charitable activity. The end result is that while the paper offers considerable guidance 
as to what will be acceptable, it is far from a forgone conclusion that all or most existing 
ethnic organizations will be able to meet the tests.”  
A third option involves legislation.  Since Canada’s meaning of charity is rooted 
in common law, it can learn from other common law countries that have updated the 
meaning of charity through this option notably the UK, Australia and New Zealand 
(Lalonde 2016: 5). Space considerations prevent a full comparative treatment of how 
each jurisdiction has updated the meaning of charity. Rather, this section will explore one 
jurisdiction — England and Wales — to illustrate that things can be done differently.   
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England and Wales engaged in this debate under former Prime Minister Tony 
Blair. Blair requested the Strategy Unit to examine how the legal and regulatory 
frameworks affect charities and non-profit organizations with a specific emphasis placed 
on the meaning of charity. In his opening remarks to the Strategy Unit’s final report, 
Blair agrees with the report’s findings that there is a serious public policy problem related 
to the meaning of charity: 
“The comprehensive analysis underlying this report shows that the law and 
regulation have not kept pace with developments. Charitable purposes, for 
instance, were set out in a statute over 400 years ago. The current law is unclear, 
has not evolved in a way which best meets the needs of contemporary 
communities and does not reflect the diversity of organizations which operate for 
a public benefit” (United Kingdom, Strategy Unit 2002:5-6). 
 
The final report concluded that a need existed for a legislated definition of charity with 
the concept of conferring a public benefit at the heart of any new definition. The 
government’s response to this report — Charities and Not-for-profits: A Modern Legal 
Framework — followed in July 2003 which accepted most of the recommendations. 
 The next step consisted of a draft Charities Bill introduced into the legislature in 
May 2004 with the Charities Bill receiving Royal Assent on November 8, 2006.  The new 
Charity Act, 2006, provides a two-fold statutory definition for charity (Morris 2011:41). 
Organizations seeking charitable status must confer a public benefit and fall under one of 
the new heads of charity. The Charity Act, 2006 expands the four heads of charity under 
the Pemsel Test to 13 heads as follows: 
 Prevention or relief of poverty; 
 Advancement of religion; 
 Advancement of education; 
 Advancement of health or the saving of lives; 
 Advancement of citizenship or community development; 
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 Advancement of the arts, culture heritage or science; 
 Advancement of amateur sports; 
 Advancement of human rights, conflict resolution or reconciliation or the 
promotion of religious or racial harmony or equality and diversity; 
 Advancement of environmental protection or improvement; 
 Relief of those in need by reason of youth, age, ill-health, disability, financial 
hardship or other disadvantage; 
 Advancement of animal welfare; 
 Promotion of the efficiency of the armed forces of the Crown; of the efficiency of 
the police, fire and rescue services or ambulance services; and, 
 Any other purposes charitable in law. 
 
These 13 heads of charity, according to Morris (2011:43), “widen the scope of 
what might be considered charitable”.  A good example that illustrates the kinds of 
purposes that can be registered as charities in England and Wales, but not in Canada, are 
those dedicated to the prevention of poverty. In 2014, Oxfam Canada was informed by 
the CRA that its goal to prevent and relieve poverty was problematic.  While the common 
law clearly identifies the relief of poverty as a charitable purpose, the prevention of 
poverty is not a charitable purpose because resources may be directed at individuals who 
are not yet poor and thus not in need of charity (Tsao et al. 2015, 44). Yet, Morris (2011) 
clearly illustrates the difference under the Charity Act 2006 that allows for the prevention 
of poverty to be considered charitable in the UK, not just the relief of poverty as found 
under the common law.  
Another example relates to amateur sport.  When sport is used to achieve a 
charitable purpose, it is generally viewed as charitable. For example, the promotion of 
sports to assist persons with disabilities would generally be viewed as charitable in 
Canada. Sport, by itself and most notably amateur sports, is not recognized as charitable 
under our common law tradition according to Broder (2001: 80). First, sport is difficult to 
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place within the four heads of charity since it does not: relieve poverty, advance religion 
or education, or encompass the broader community. Second, sport can generate a 
personal, but not necessarily a public benefit. This interpretation was confirmed by the 
Supreme Court in its 2007 decision on the Amateur Youth Soccer Association (AYSA) 
whereby “sport does not qualify as charitable under Canadian law” (Phillips 2011, 221). 
In Canada, only national organizations that promote amateur sports are eligible for quasi-
charitable status under the Registered Canadian Amateur Athletic Associations 
(RCAAA) as ‘qualified donees’ under s. 149.1 of the Income Tax Act. This leaves local, 
provincial or regional amateur sports organizations unable to access the benefits of 
charitable status vis-à-vis the tax system. Drache (2002b: 9) argues that the addition of 
the RCAAA to the Income Tax Act was done to nurture the development of Canadian 
athletes competing in the 1976 Olympics in Montreal without calling the organizations 
charities and to overcome the common law that could not accommodate these types of 
organization. Yet, the legislated definition in England and Wales permits amateur sports 
organizations to be registered as charities unlike in Canada (Valentine 2015: 2).  
The benefit of a legislated definition is that it can accommodate those purposes 
that are not deemed charitable in the common law. For example, common law does not 
permit the preservation of a culture, promotion of multiculturalism, or provision of 
employment services to immigrants to be deemed charitable in Canada. Under a 
legislated definition, however, these purposes could be charitable whereby the meaning 
of charity becomes a political decision, not an administrative decision.  
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Advocacy 
In relation to advocacy, Canada relies on a quantification model to determine the level of 
acceptable advocacy based on the budget of a registered charity, and this model is also 
used by the United States. However, the spending limits are much higher in the United 
States than in Canada despite the fact that the “fundamentals [in the States] are not 
markedly different from Canadian regulation but overall are more flexible and 
accommodating of advocacy” (Harvie 2002, 21. See also Boyle 1997, G9).  Charities in 
the United States with budgets under $500,000 may spend up to 20% (maximum of 
$100,000) on advocacy initiatives (Smucker 1999, 55). Comparatively, charities in 
Canada with budgets over $200,000 may only spend 10% whereas small charities with 
budgets less than $50,000 may spend up to 20% (maximum $10,000).
7
   
In contrast, the education model provides discretion to government officials as to 
what are acceptable levels of advocacy. England and Wales is an example of this model, 
and Cullity (2014, 29) contends that their approach to advocacy is far “more benevolent” 
than the Canadian approach because there is no expectation that advocacy be ancillary or 
incidental to the pursuit of charitable purposes. Rather, advocacy is permitted as a means 
to an end, so long as advocacy does not comprise the sole means of the charity (Cullity 
2014). Harvie (2002, 21) agrees. In her estimation, the important distinction is that 
England and Wales do not require charities to allocate substantially all of their resources 
to charitable purposes as in Canada thus providing greater room for advocacy.  
Support and Challenges to Reform 
Moving a reform agenda will require support from charities, non-profits and the broader 
public. At the height of the Voluntary Sector Initiative in the early 2000s, there were 
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several sources of evidence to suggest unity for reform within the voluntary sector.
8
 The 
Voluntary Sector Forum, launched in 2002, comprised 19 members of the sector 
representing various and broad constituencies identified advocacy reform as a top 
priority. The Let Charities Speak consultation process in 2001 involving the former 
Canadian Centre for Philanthropy (now Imagine Canada) visited 14 cities with 700 
participants. A survey formed part of this consultation process with 490 completed 
surveys.  91% agree that the advocacy laws were unacceptable with 97% agreeing that 
legislative change is required.  A consultation process organized by Canadian Policy 
Research Network (CPRN) amongst the voluntary sector also shows support for updating 
the meaning of charity (Goldenberg 2004).  Many of these sources of evidence are now 
feeling their age so Gibbins (2016) is quite accurate in saying that these proposals need to 
be updated with consultations occurring with the non-profits, charities and the public. 
More recently, the Max Bell Foundation held a two-day consultation process on May 10 
and 11, 2016 with the sector in Calgary to ascertain its views on the need for reform. The 
results from this consultation process are not yet available. 
In the area of advocacy, public opinion supports the need for reform. A recent 
survey by the Muttart Foundation (Lasby and Barr 2013: 88) reveals that 94% of 
Canadians agree charities should advocate on public problems “like the environment, 
poverty, or healthcare.” Moreover, 69% agree that the current advocacy “laws should be 
changed to permit charities to advocate more freely for their causes” (Lasby and Barr 
2013: 91).
9
  
While there is clear support for reform, there is evidence that charities are not 
meeting the current limits placed on advocacy. A 2011 analysis of the T3010 data 
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reported by charities reveals that for every $10,000 spent on charitable activities, only $1 
is spent on political activities which equates to .01% — an amount far below what is 
permitted (Blumberg 2012a).
10
 Three explanations exist as to why charities are not 
engaging more in advocacy: the ‘advocacy chill’ discussed earlier, lack of interest, and/or 
lack of expertise.  This raises a challenge: if the Trudeau government liberalizes the 
advocacy rules, will charities engage in more and better advocacy?  
Answering this question involves some gazing into a crystal ball, but there are 
some signs that charities are taking advocacy more seriously. First, there is more training 
offered in the areas of advocacy,
11
 public policy
12
 and government relations
13
 to improve 
capacity. Second, intermediary organizations are lending their expertise in these areas or 
are active in recruiting volunteers with these skillsets for charities.
14
  Last, there are well-
documented success stories of charities involved in advocacy (Cave 2016). It has a 
snowball effect whereby success shows board members and donors the possibility of 
what can be achieved with modest investments in advocacy such that there is a desire to 
engage in future advocacy initiatives (Levasseur 2014, 283-284). 
Another challenge relates to the generosity of the charitable tax expenditure. 
There are concerns to protect the treasury from a liberalization of the meaning of charity 
and advocacy (Levasseur 2012). With more non-profit organizations registered as 
charities under an expanded meaning of charity and advocacy, there may be more tax 
receipts issued that could erode the tax base. A 2016 evaluation of the charitable tax 
credit in Canada reveals that donors respond positively when the tax credit for charitable 
donations in increased (Department of Finance 2016).  Moreover, with the generous tax 
expenditures currently provided for charitable donations, to what degree should 
259 
 
 
governments subsidize advocacy? This question will no doubt be challenging for the new 
Trudeau government.  
Yet another challenge for modernizing the meaning of charity and advocacy 
relates to transparency. Public opinion shows there is heightened demand for greater 
transparency over charities in light of recent fraud cases involving charities (for example, 
inflating tax receipts for amounts higher than the donated amount). The Muttart 
Foundation survey reveals that Canadians expect charities to provide information, but 
few Canadians agree that charities are providing sufficient information related to their 
impact (36%), use of donations (26%) and fundraising costs (21%) (Lasby and Barr 
2013, 64). To provide more accurate and timely information, the CRA received funding 
to allow charities to file their annual charity information form electronically.  
The charity information T3010 annual form requires charities to disclose 
information about their activities, revenues, expenditures, charitable gifts and political 
activities. Implementation of e-filing is expected in November 2018. While Canada is 
hailed as the leader in open data related to charitable information that is comprehensive, 
accessible and user friendly (Power By Data 2016), e-filing is expected to make it easier 
for charities to file annually. With more accurate data, this should result in heightened 
transparency and accountability according to McMurren et al (2016, 4). They note that, 
“Not only can openness lead to more eyes on relevant data, but it can also lead to the 
right eyes on the data – i.e., making the data accessible to the people with the specific 
knowledge needed to recognize troubling discrepancies”.  Despite this important 
development, there remains an important challenge in that the CRA is bound not to 
divulge personal tax-related information. As a result, Canadians will do not know when 
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charities are audited as noted earlier or the details surrounding the revocation of 
charitable registration.  
CONCLUSIONS 
These challenges illustrate that reform is complex. To be sure, there is support for reform, 
but the challenges are significant and could explain why the Trudeau government has 
been relatively quiet in recent months. Indeed, there have been recent signals that the new 
government is realigning expectations about what policy change it can deliver. One 
example relates to the political activity audits. As noted earlier, the new government 
ended these audits in January 2016. However, the audits in-progress will continue, but the 
six audits that have not started are cancelled. This decision has not been well received by 
some in the charitable sector and has been described as a “half-measure” and a “timid” 
decision with supporters calling for an end to all the political activity audits (Beeby 2016; 
Kirkby 2016). 
  The concern for those charities undergoing an audit is the drain on its resources 
whereby time is spent working on the audit not on advancing the mission of the 
organization or the needs of clients. This disappointment is understandable, but so too is 
the need for the new government to maintain the independence of the regulator and not  
interfere with the auditing process as per the first goal for the new government indicated 
earlier in the introduction. Another example of concern involves the 2016 budget that 
contained little to no substance on how the new government will modernize charity 
policy.   
To what extent, then, is the new government shying away from its electoral 
commitments to modernize charity policy? Is it moving away from its commitment or 
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moving ahead? I argue the latter and suggest the new government is proceeding with its 
commitments albeit very gently for two reasons. First, it is important to keep in mind that 
the new government came into office with a very ambitious policy agenda and some 
issues such as assisted-suicide have become urgent in nature. It is not surprising then that 
the government has attended to other policy issues prior to modernizing charity policy.  
Second, the government is developing a process to consult on these matters. Budget 2016 
(206) directs the CRA to consult with stakeholders and develop an online consultation 
process on the “rules governing charities and their political activities”. By emphasizing a 
process to consult with charities, non-profits and the broader public, it signals that the 
new government desires input on modernizing charity policy rather than the government 
pre-determining the policy outcome.   
Consultations are a good starting point and may finally allow Canadians the 
much-needed opportunity to discuss what it means to be a charity in 2016, not 1601. That 
said, Canada is a laggard on the international scene despite many years of small, 
incremental changes resulting from the issuing of administrative guidelines.  What 
Canada needs are changes to the rules, far beyond mere clarification of the existing rules. 
Fortunately, Canada does not need to reinvent the proverbial wheel. The new government 
would do well to look at other common law countries and how they modernized charity 
policy.  
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Endnotes 
 
1
 I would like to thank the peer-reviewers for raising this idea. 
 
2
 There are other pressing concerns, notably federal government funding to charities and 
non-profit organizations and the institutional design to support charity policy specifically 
whether the CRA is the best institution to monitor charities. This chapter focuses its 
analysis exclusively on issues related to the meaning of charity and advocacy. 
  
3
 I would like to thank the peer reviewers for this point and for other constructive insights 
and suggestions regarding my analysis. 
 
4
 These cases include: Guaranty Trust Co. v. Minister of National Revenue (1966); 
Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v. Minister of National 
Revenue (1999); and, A.Y.S.A. Amateur Youth Soccer Association of Canada v. Canada 
(Revenue Agency) (2007).  
 
5
 This administrative guideline incrementally changes the limit for advocacy amongst 
charity, but only for smaller charities. Prior to this updated guideline, the limit for 
advocacy was 10% for all charities. 
 
6
 The points in this paragraph were raised during Imagine Canada’s webinar titled ‘State 
of the Sector’ held Feb. 24, 2016. 
  
7
 Canada employs a sliding scale to quantify advocacy. For charities with budgets less 
than $50,000, 20% may be spent on advocacy; budget between $50,000-$100,000 may 
spend 15% on advocacy; budgets between $100,000 - $200,000 may spend 12% on 
advocacy; and, budgets over $200,000 may only spend 10%. 
 
8
 See Johnston (2015) for a more complete history of how the voluntary sector and 
federal government worked together. 
 
9
 Nearly two-thirds (62%) agree that a new organization that is independent of 
government should regulate charities (Lasby and Barr 2013: 103). However, Gibbins 
(2016) indicates that public knowledge related to regulatory oversight is limited at best so 
cautions should be exercised when interpreting public opinion in this area. 
   
10
 There are concerns related to reliability of the reported T3010 data (see Blumberg 
2012a). 
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11
 The Advocacy School started by Sean Moore is a good example. 
  
12 The Max Bell Foundation is offering its eighth Public Policy Training Institute for 
registered charities, and Canada’s first graduate program in non-profit studies at Carleton 
University offers courses in public policy and advocacy as both core and optional 
courses. 
 
13
 The United Way of Winnipeg offers a three-day workshop aimed specifically at 
charities and non-profits on how to develop a government relations strategy and engage 
in the public policy process. 
  
14
 The Ottawa-based Canadian Advocacy Network connects charities and non-profits 
with professionals in the areas of public affairs and government relations on a voluntary 
basis.  SPARK, a service provided by the Canadian CED Network, also pairs volunteers 
with these skills with the voluntary sector. 
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Chapter 10 
        CANADA PENSION PLAN ENHANCEMENT: ISSUES AND UNEXPECTED OUTCOMES 
Ian Lee 
INTRODUCTION 
Through much of the 20
th
 century in Canada it is fair to state that health care policy and pension 
policy attracted disproportionate political debate and a great deal of attention from policy 
analysts. Thus, after the major policy reforms of the 1960s that saw the introduction of a single 
payer public health care system and equally importantly the introduction of Old Age Pensions, 
the Guaranteed Income Supplement and the Canada Pension Plan, one would think that in the 
words of the late US Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, that a period of benign neglect was in 
order.   
Yet in the last decade and especially so after the Great Recession of 2009-10, increasing 
concerns were expressed concerning the Canadian Retirement Income System (Prince 2013; 
Moscovitch, Falvo and Macdonald 2015).This chapter offers a further contribution to the debate 
surrounding the adequacy of the Canadian Retirement Income System (RIS) but one that 
focusses on the Canada Pension Plan (CPP). 
  The chapter is organized around a five part analytical story: the origins and design of the 
RIS and its three versus four pension pillars and whether personal  investments outside of 
registered plans ought to be included or excluded when analyzing adequacy of the RIS; the 
alleged inadequacies of the CPP; the introduction in 2014-15 of the proposed Ontario Registered 
Pension Plan (ORPP) on the assumption of serious pension savings inadequacies; the unexpected 
CPP agreement of June 2016 between the Trudeau Liberal government and 8 of 10 provinces 
and how it was achieved; and an analysis of the agreement. Conclusions then follow. 
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The central argument advanced in the analysis builds on empirical income and asset data 
from Statistics Canada and the OECD that demonstrates that elder poverty collapsed in the 30 
years following the Pearson RIS reforms in the mid-1960s and that Canada has in fact one of the 
lowest rates of elder poverty in the OECD. I argue that, despite this, the union movement, NGOs, 
and some pension scholars and some leading politicians insisted large numbers of future elders 
would experience financial difficulties in retirement.  But the argument made that Canadians are 
saving inadequately for retirement hinges on whether one includes or excludes investments 
outside of registered pensions. I conclude for these and related reasons that the 2016 CPP 
agreement will benefit Gen X and the millennials many years in the future.  Yet, there was no 
public discussion at all of the unprecedented staggering intergenerational transfer of wealth in 
the billions and likely trillions that will occur over the next 30 years as the parents of the 
boomers pass their wealth to the boomers and then the boomers pass their wealth to their 
children. As no attempt was made in the CPP reforms to target those future seniors that need help 
– advocated by the Quebec Minister of Finance – it is likely the CPP will continue to be a work 
in progress that will need to be reformed again in the future.    
 
THE RETIREMENT INCOME SYSTEM (RIS) IN CANADA: THREE PILLARS OR FOUR 
The origin of Canada’s RIS can be dated to the introduction of the Old Age Pensions Act in 1927 
that provided for a small monthly benefit that was means-tested for Canadians who reached 70 
years of age, with costs shared between the federal and provincial governments.  In 1952, this 
was replaced by the Old Age Security (OAS) Act that converted the pension to a universal 
pension for all Canadians at 70 or older supported exclusively by the federal government from 
general taxation revenues (Parliamentary Research Branch 1990). It should be noted that while 
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the OAS was initially established as a universal social program, a claw back through the income 
tax system was introduced much later by Finance Minister Paul Martin that transformed OAS to 
a de facto means-tested program.  In 2015, recovery tax for OAS starts once an individual earns 
more than $72,809 and OAS is fully clawed back once earnings exceed $118,055. 
In 1967, to supplement the OAS, the Pearson Government established the Guaranteed 
Income Supplement (GIS), a means-tested, non-taxable benefit for low-income retirees funded 
out of general revenues.  In 1968, the eligibility age for an Old Age Security pension was 
reduced from 70 to 65 where it has remained since. In the 1970s, payments made from these 
programs were indexed to inflation.  The GIS was also expanded several times between 1971 and 
2006 to further target low income elders who were below the poverty line. Together, the OAS 
and GIS are considered to be the first pillar of the pension system that is designed to provide for 
a minimum income in retirement for all Canadians.   
The second pillar of the RIS consists of government-sponsored and managed compulsory 
contributory earnings-related plans. In 1965, the Pearson Government established a multi-tiered 
system with the phase-in of the Canadian Pension Plan (CPP) which provided a pension benefit 
during retirement years funded by compulsory payroll contributions as a percentage of income 
made by the worker (and matched by the employer).
 
The primary eligibility age for the Canada Pension Plan was set at 65. In general, benefits 
under CPP depend on annual earnings up to a cap called the Year’s Maximum Pensionable 
Earnings (YMPE) and the contributory period starts at age 18 and continues until benefits are 
taken up, or age 70. The benefits during retirement years are calculated using three components: 
the basic replacement rate (25% of covered earnings), the average ratio of earnings to the Year’s 
Maximum Pensionable Earnings and the average of the last five Year’s Maximum Pensionable 
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Earnings numbers. The pension payments are treated as taxable income and can reduce or 
eliminate the amount of GIS an individual may receive. 
The third pillar of the RIS is widely considered by scholars, policy analysts and elected 
officials to include employment-related pension plans which are either Defined Benefit (DB) 
plans (providing a guaranteed monthly income in retirement based on years of service) or 
Defined Contribution (DC) plans (providing an income in retirement based on the contributions 
and investment income earned while working). The payroll premium contributions to these plans 
are tax deductible and are subject to an annual cap/limit established by the Income Tax Act.  
Taxes on investment income while in these plans are deferred and are only taxed when monies 
are withdrawn or received. The income received from these plans through withdrawals also 
impacts eligibility for the income-tested guaranteed income supplement benefits (for additional 
income received reduces the amount of GIS received).  
The third pillar also includes individual savings made pursuant to registered tax-assisted 
plans designed primarily for those who do not participate in employer-sponsored pension plans. 
Registered retirement savings plans (RRSP), are treated the same for tax purposes as DB or DC 
pension plans.  A much more recent addition to tax assisted plans was introduced in 2009 by the 
Harper Government - Tax-Free Savings Accounts (TFSA) - where no tax deduction for 
contributions are provided but investment income accumulates tax free while in the TFSA and 
withdrawals from the TFSA are tax free.   Both plans have annual caps or limits which are 
indexed and are cumulative in nature.  However, as the TFSA is not pension specific for it can be 
used to purchase real estate or chattels, it could be argued it should be considered as part of a 
fourth pillar (i.e. all investments outside of registered pension plans whether employer or 
individual). 
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Seldom discussed with respect to the three pillars are underlying principles that cohere to 
create the Canadian retirement system.  The first - implicit - principle is that no Canadian should 
live below the poverty line.  Consequently, the first pillar – OAS and GIS – are in fact pure 
social welfare programs and not a genuine pension plan as no premium contributions are 
required nor are benefits based on years of employment.  Indeed, both programs are funded from 
general taxation revenues.  Without stating so explicitly, these two programs are de facto 
targeted to low-income Canadians in the bottom two quintiles, based on the accurate but unstated 
assumption that low income people have little or no discretionary income to save while working.  
The second pillar, the universal obligatory CPP, has a forced savings component built into it with 
compulsory premiums of 9.9% of salary by both the employer and the employee.  However, the 
caps placed on contribution levels also ensure that the savings component is not onerous enough 
to significantly impact consumption (as premiums deducted from income cannot be spent on 
consumption) but enough to provide a reasonable amount of retirement income for low income 
people when combined with OAS and GIS.  Restated, the CPP was never designed to replace 
workforce pensions.   
Many lower income Canadians – mostly employed in small and medium sized firms 
earning minimum or near minimum wage incomes – typically have no employer pension, while 
people in the upper two quintiles (and virtually everyone in the broader public sector (including 
education, utilities, healthcare) are far more likely to have an employer sponsored pension plan. 
Indeed, the approximate percentage of Canadians without an employer pension plan is 
suspiciously similar to the percentage of the workforce employed in SMEs. 
Importantly, the first three pillars do not include any accumulated investments in assets 
such as a primary residence, vacation properties, equity investments and bonds or ownership of 
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SMEs, each of which are held outside of registered pension plans.  This exclusion strongly 
suggests that analysts who only recognize the first three pillars (mostly those who advocate an 
enhanced CPP) – believe that investments outside of registered pension plans cannot or should 
not be used to supplement retirement income.  Yet, a recent HSBC study showed that Canada is 
among the global leaders of retirees planning to partially fund their retirement with the sale of 
property (Marr 2016).  Indeed the English language created a word to describe this phenomenon 
– “downsizing”.  This suggests that the public component of the three pillars, while available to 
all Canadians, was designed to address the needs of Canadians in the bottom two quintiles – and 
not the needs of all Canadians.  We return to this theme below. 
THE ALLEGED INADEQUACIES OF THE CPP 
One of the most popular allegations made by pension reform advocates such as the Canadian 
Association of Retired Persons (CARP), the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA) 
and the Broadbent Institute is that a substantial number of Canadian seniors live in poverty.  For 
the vast majority of Canadian seniors, nothing could be further from the truth.  It was once true 
that prior to the pension reforms of the 1960s, the face of poverty was overwhelmingly that of 
senior citizens. However, elder poverty – measured by the percentage below the poverty line 
collapsed over the decades after these policy reforms. Moreover, according to the OECD 
“Pensions at a Glance” 2013 report, Canada has enjoyed one of the lowest levels of elder poverty 
in the entire OECD for many years at approximately 7.2% of elders (Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development 2013). And it must be noted that the OECD are the most affluent 
countries in the world with the highest per capita incomes.  Restated, Canada has one of the 
lowest elder poverty rates in the world.  
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These findings of low levels of elder poverty are corroborated by the Statistics Canada 
Household Balance Sheet that reveals year after year that elders are by far the wealthiest age 
cohort in Canada – measured by average net worth (Statistics Canada 2013). There is nothing 
unusual about this – as we move through life most (but not all) individuals save and invest and 
accumulate wealth. 
However, asset poverty is strongly correlated with youth, with people under 35 having a 
very small median net worth of less than $35,000. At the other end of the age continuum, senior 
couples have an average median net worth of a remarkable $650,000.  It must be immediately 
acknowledged that a substantial portion of this net worth is in residential properties, which 
should not surprise as Canada has one of the highest rates of home ownership in the world at 
69% of households (and 75% of seniors). The discussion of net worth leads us inexorably to an 
analysis of the composition of household wealth in Canada. Contrary to the gloomy and frequent 
media headlines of deeply over indebted Canadians, the Statistics Canada empirical data reveals 
a completely different picture. Approximately one third or $3 Trillion of Canadians’ gross assets 
are held as investments in various asset classes by employer pension plans and individual 
registered pension plans such as RRSPs while 2/3 of total Canadian personal wealth is held in 
asset classes outside of registered pension savings vehicles. 
Yet such pillar four investments in asset classes held outside of registered pension plans 
are just as real and legitimate for they possess the same legal characteristics as any private 
property asset that can be sold and monetized as assets held inside registered pension plans.  
Restated, an asset in any asset class can be sold and converted to cash – whether equities, bonds, 
real estate, art etc.  It must be noted that when dealing with pension investments, the liquidity of 
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the investment – how quickly it can be sold and monetized to cash – is irrelevant as pension 
decision making involves the very long run where any asset can be sold and converted to cash.  
Even more importantly, very few analysts have noted the following crucial contradiction.  
Pension funds invest in some of the very asset classes that pension reform advocates insist must 
be excluded when owned individually outside of a registered pension plan.  Advocates deny the 
legitimacy of the very same or similar investments outside of pension plans that they expect 
pension plans to make.  
An example vividly illuminates this.  The 2016 Liberal federal budget introduced us 
illustratively to David and Neera, a middle class couple.  Imagine, however, the following further 
thought experiment. One day, Neera instructs her bank to debit her bank account for $1000 to 
purchase a GIC and then instructs her bank to place the GIC in her self-managed RRSP at the 
bank.  Pension advocates nod sagely and agree aggregate pension savings increased in Canada 
by $1000 (because it did).  However, the following day, her spouse David, instructs his bank to 
purchase a $1000 GIC by debiting his bank account.  But he tells them he does not want the GIC 
placed in his RRSP.  David will hold it as a simple investment outside of any pension plan.  The 
cry goes out – it does not count towards pension savings in Canada!  Yet, it is the identical 
amount invested in the very same asset class.  One GIC is held inside an RRSP and one GIC is 
held outside an RRSP.  
This illuminates the nature of the debates between those analysts who claim Canadians 
are not saving enough and face a growing pension crisis versus those who argue there is no 
pension or savings crisis.  The CPP pension reform group refuses to recognize or accept the 
substantial personal wealth in asset classes in this fourth pillar as a source to supplement 
275 
 
retirement income.  Consequently, this group argues the mere $3 Trillion held in registered 
pension plans is woefully inadequate, thus demanding a “universal” policy solution - an across 
the board increase in CPP benefits (and premiums).  Meanwhile, those who believe there is no 
pension crisis argue most Canadians are doing well in retirement if one recognizes the substantial 
wealth – 70% of total personal wealth - in the fourth pillar that can and is used to supplement 
income in retirement. 
There is a second issue relating to pension reform in Canada concerning those who have 
not yet retired.  As shown above, Canada has one of the lowest levels of elder poverty in the 
OECD.  Nonetheless, we must address the financial viability of Canada’s future seniors who 
have not yet retired.  Are they as well equipped for retirement?  According to a McKinsey & 
Company (2015) study on pension readiness, “4 out of 5 Canadian households are on track to 
maintain their standard of living in retirement…but they still leave 17 percent of households at 
risk of having to lower their standard of living when they stop working.”  Interestingly, most of 
the households at risk are not in the bottom two quintiles but rather in the middle quintile and 
upper middle quintile.  This identified minority of middle and upper middle income individuals 
who will experience a significant decline in income in retirement have a common profile: 1) they 
do not own their home; 2) they are not members of employer pension plans and 3) they do not 
contribute to RRSPs or TFSAs.  This research is confirmed in separate findings by Milligan 
2015, and Mintz 2016. 
We can now step back and observe the architecture of Canada’s hybrid retirement 
system.  In retrospect, what is not well understood at all today by a number of pension analysts is 
that the designers of our retirement income system in the mid-1960s effectively established two 
pension systems. The well-known and well understood first two pillars of OAS, GIS and CPP 
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were designed to ensure that Canada’s two bottom quintiles (mostly) did not fall below the 
poverty line (however measured).  While OAS and CPP was provided universally to people 
above 65 years of age, the amounts were relatively small – enough to bring low income people 
above the poverty line – but radically insufficient to ensure upper middle income earners would 
maintain their income status in retirement in the absence of additional income from other 
sources. 
The Pearson Government understood what is still not well understood to this day even by 
many pension experts.  Low income working Canadians are low income as they are employed 
largely in minimum wage employment in for example, the myriad retail strip malls across 
Canada, businesses on main streets including hospitality and restaurants which are dominated by 
small and medium enterprises that are typically undercapitalized, with low profit margins and 
high rates of business failure.  These firms lack the resources to afford the matching employer 
premiums that would be required of a comprehensive or much more generous CPP.  Moreover, 
the low income employees of SMEs could not afford the much larger pension premiums that 
would be associated with a comprehensive CPP. 
   For these reasons, it is legitimate to surmise that the Pearson pension planners 
deliberately made OAS non-contributory and supplemented by a non-contributory GIS while 
ensuring a modest universal CPP plan.  Restated, the intent was not to develop a comprehensive 
public retirement income system that addressed the needs of middle and upper income Canadians 
- who were deliberately left to rely mostly on what is now characterized as the third pillar 
(employer pension plans and individual savings such as RRSPs) and the fourth pillar (all 
investments outside of registered pension plans).  Restated, the Pearson government cleverly 
created a de facto targeted public pension system in the first and second pillars for the bottom 
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two quintiles wrapped in the cloak of universality in the hybrid Canadian retirement system they 
designed, while leaving the remaining quintiles to rely on the third and four pillars. 
We now turn to the 2014 election promise in Ontario to establish an Ontario pension due 
to the alleged inadequacies analyzed above. 
INTRODUCTION OF THE ONTARIO RETIREMENT PENSION PLAN (ORPP) 
In May, 2014, the Government of Ontario called a provincial election.  Liberal leader Kathleen 
Wynne decided to focus on pension reform as a critical issue and promised to create the Ontario 
Retirement Pension Plan (ORPP). On June 2, 2014, the Ontario Liberals won a decisive majority 
government and Premier Wynne continued her calls for an expansion of CPP at a premier’s 
meeting in Charlottetown, PEI in August, 2014.  She released a government-backed Ekos survey 
that showed that only 15% of Canadians felt that they had enough to retire comfortably.  Premier 
Wynne called on Premiers to take the lead on this issue instead of waiting for the Federal 
Government. In the absence of a positive announcement from the federal government, the 
Province of Ontario introduced Bill 56, The Ontario Retirement Pension Plan Act on December 
8, 2014 which received Royal Assent May 5, 2015. 
Structure of the ORPP 
 
The ORPP was designed to supplement CPP for workers who either do not have a workplace 
pension or who have a pension that is not, at the very least, comparable to ORPP.  The Ontario 
Government will “only exempt defined contribution plans if they have a minimum annual 
contribution rate equal to 8% of employee pay and if the employer matches at least half of all 
employee contributions” (McFarlane 2015).  When it is fully phased in, workers will contribute 
1.9 per cent of their income to the plan, and employers will match the contribution .Contributions 
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will stop at a maximum income of $90,000 a year whereas CPP contributions max out at an 
income of $53,600.   
There was significant criticism of the ORPP from scholars and think tanks in addition to 
sustained criticism from the business community, large, medium and small. The analysis by 
Mintz (2015) highlighted 10 reasons why the ORPP was a bad policy decision.  Most 
importantly, he argued the plan would be expensive and complicated to administer with Ontario 
employees moving between employers exempt from ORPP and those not exempt, and even 
possibly, moving out of Ontario. He also argued it would distort labour markets with some firms 
swapping private pension plans for the ORPP if it meant saving on contributions (Ibid).  
Mintz pointed out as well that the plan extended to many upper-income households with 
up to $180,000 in income when two-earners retire. He also noted that the plan actually hurt the 
middle class as many middle-class individuals would be subject to much higher tax rates on plan 
benefits, especially in the $73,000 to $90,000 range as Old Age Security payments are clawed 
back. He also argued that the timing was bad.  Ontario was facing a weak economy with a falling 
employment rate.  The ORPP was essentially a new tax on business and... “much of it will be 
shifted back in lower wages over time. In the short run, companies facing international 
competition will face higher costs along with higher Ontario energy costs, property taxes and 
new levies to pay for infrastructure” (Ibid). 
Analysis by Milligan (2016) also highlighted the inefficiencies of one Province acting on 
its own noting that:  “the lack of co-operation between the federal and Ontario governments 
means that vital tax changes to accommodate the ORPP aren’t being made. This denies Ontario 
residents fair tax treatment of their pension contributions.”  Milligan also recognized the 
mismatch with the actual current pension problems as it covered low earners who currently 
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receive Old Age Security and the income-tested Guaranteed Income Supplement which often is 
greater than their working salaries.  Therefore, an expanded ORPP would take money from low 
income earners when they are struggling in their working years.  Worse yet, they will pay full 
ORPP premiums on their earnings, but lose up to half the value of their ORPP benefits once 
received due to income testing required of GIS benefits (Ibid). 
A study by Vaillancourt et.al (2015) for the Fraser Institute also criticized the ORPP, 
noting that “…past increases in the compulsory CPP contribution rate were followed by 
decreases in the private savings rate of Canadian households…Our results suggest that overall 
retirement savings won’t increase to the extent of the increase in compulsory savings, and 
perhaps won’t increase at all. In the end, there will be a reshuffling of retirement savings, with 
more money going to forced savings and less to voluntary savings” (Ibid). 
In summary, the criticisms aimed at the ORPP ranged from the poor economic state of 
Ontario, the complexity and cost of administering the ORPP, the mismatching of the solution 
with the current pension problems and finally, the financial impact on businesses. 
THE CPP AGREEMENT OF JUNE 2016 
On June 20, 2016, the provincial Finance Ministers met with Liberal federal finance minister Bill 
Morneau and, to the surprise of many (including this author), it was announced they had reached 
an agreement in principle to expand the CPP (Department of Finance 2016).  All provinces, with 
the exception of Quebec and Manitoba, supported the proposed agreement.  The 2016 CPP 
reforms establish a new, separate tier which will be phased in over 7 years.  The reform expands 
the upper earnings cap from today’s $54,900 up to $82,700. To pay for this, the contribution rate 
will go up by 1 per cent for both employers and employees. The 7-year phase-in that will 
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commence January 1, 2019 – 2 years later than the ORPP was supposed to launch.  It calls for a 
gradual 7-year phase-in beginning on January 1, 2019 consisting of a: 5-year contribution rate 
phase-in below the Yearly Maximum Pensionable Earnings (YMPE), followed by a 2-year 
phase-in of the upper earnings limit. The maximum amount of earnings subject to CPP will be 
increased by 14% and the income replacement level will be increased to one-third of income 
with an upper earnings limit of $82,700 upon full implementation in 2025. 
It is noteworthy that since: “the CPP enhancement will be fully funded, each year of 
contributing to the enhanced CPP will allow workers to accrue partial additional benefits. In 
general, full enhanced CPP benefits will be available after about 40 years of making 
contributions. Partial benefits will be available sooner and will be based on years of 
contributions.” (Department of Finance, Ibid). The agreement also called for an increase in the 
Working Income Tax Benefit in order to offset the increased CPP contributions of eligible low-
income workers. The Government expects that additional annual spending of $250 million will 
achieve this objective (based on the full implementation of the higher contribution rate on 
earnings below the YMPE). Employee contributions to the enhanced portion of the CPP will be 
deductible however; a tax credit will continue to apply to existing employee CPP contributions. 
The Federal Government’s rationale is that providing a tax deduction for employee 
contributions associated with the enhanced portion of CPP will avoid increasing the after-tax 
cost of saving for Canadians (Ibid). Finance Canada announced, however, that it will not release 
a detailed report until later this fall that will reveal how changes to the CPP and Old Age 
Security will affect Ottawa’s long-term financial health (Curry 2016a). 
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It was widely reported that the agreement was achieved after British Columbia suggested 
that the phase-in take place over an extended period of time to soften the economic blow (caused 
by the mandatory premium increases) to those provinces who were concerned about the impact 
on their already weak economies.  This delay allowed Saskatchewan and Alberta to support the 
agreement.  (Manitoba’s Finance Minister did not initially comment.  His government had only 
been recently elected in May, 2016). 
One of the major debates concerning the proposed CPP expansion dealt with the impact 
on lower income Canadians due to a claw back of the Guaranteed Income Supplement.  To 
alleviate these concerns, it was proposed that the federal Working Income Tax Benefit be 
increased to assist low-income earners.  It was for this reason the Federal Government also 
allowed the provinces to make province-specific changes to the design of the Working Income 
Tax Benefit to better harmonize with their own programs. To that end, the Federal Government 
will be consulting with the provinces and territories before implementing the final design of the 
enhanced Working Income Tax Benefit. 
At the request of Ontario, Ottawa and all participating provincial cabinets agreed to 
individually approve the Agreement no later than July 15
th
.  With that agreement, the Ontario 
Finance Minister confirmed that Ontario would not proceed with the ORPP (Curry and Dhillon 
2016). Quebec Finance Minister Leitao criticized the agreement for being too costly and going 
too far.  Consequently, Quebec announced it would propose an alternative expansion of the QPP 
that would exempt the new premiums from income ranging from $3,500 to approximately 
$27,000 which will produce a targeted approach.  B.C. Finance Minister de Jong stated that:  “I 
think we have reached a balanced approach to satisfying the objectives that were set out. That is, 
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a modest enhancement that is fully funded, that is affordable; affordable from the perspective of 
the employees who will be asked eventually to contribute a little bit more to enhance their 
ultimate benefits, and affordable, importantly, from the point of view of employers.” (Ibid). 
Most interestingly, Ontario Premier Kathleen Wynne claimed credit publicly for the final 
CPP agreement asserting that "quite frankly, I was a thorn in the side of many of my colleagues," 
she said. "I kept bringing this up. I kept making it clear that we were moving ahead, and I kept 
making it clear that we all knew that there was a national problem." (Leslie 2016). Premier 
Wynne’s claim seemed to be supported by Premier Wall of Saskatchewan when he stated that 
“Saskatchewan had a choice to make the CPP changes better by going slower with an extended 
implementation period, or sitting it out and risking that a more aggressive plan like the Province 
of Ontario’s would be implemented nationally.” (Curry and Taber 2016). 
All the stars seemed to have lined up for CPP reform until the province of British 
Columbia announced that it would not meet the July 15
th
 deadline as it would be launching on-
line public consultations.  Without the agreement of British Columbia, the CPP reforms could 
not be ratified by the Federal Government as B.C. is the 3
rd
 most populous province and Quebec 
had not agreed to sign on.  Federal Finance Minister Morneau appeared relaxed in his response, 
stating: “The process remains on track for the government to table federal legislation in the fall, 
as planned.” (Curry 2016). 
Before we examine the impact of the CPP reforms, it is critical to remember which 
Canadians are struggling in retirement.  Firstly, although Canada enjoys one of the lowest levels 
of elder poverty in the entire OECD, as shown above, there are approximately 7.2% of elders 
who are below the poverty line.  Secondly, approximately 20% of Canadians are at risk of a 
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substantial decline in their standard of living when they retire.  Most of those households are not 
in the bottom two quintiles but rather in the middle quintile and upper middle quintile.  This 
identified minority of middle and upper middle income individuals who will experience a 
significant decline in income in retirement have the common profile noted earlier: 1. do not own 
their home; 2. are not members of employer pension plans and 3. do not contribute to RRSPs or 
TFSAs. 
Do the announced reforms help these two groups?  Certainly not current elders due to the 
Paul Martin reforms of the late 1990s that codified the rule that CPP benefits cannot be paid 
before the premium and investment returns have been earned.  As described earlier, the 
enhancements to the CPP must be first fully funded, although each year of contributions allow 
payees to realize partial payouts.  For this reason, it will require 40 years before the full benefits 
of the new CPP agreement will be achieved.  These reforms, moreover, are being phased in over 
the next 9 years to 2025, ensuring there will be no relief for current elders.  
 The approximately 20% of Canadians near retirement that are not pension ready will 
receive limited benefits due to the requirement that benefits must be funded before payouts can 
be made.  For low to middle earners who are currently at or under the earnings cap, the reformed 
CPP will boost their pension by about one-third. Whereas the old CPP replaced just 25 per 
cent of their earnings, the new CPP will expand that up to 33.3 per cent. For those earning more 
than today’s $54,900 earnings cap, the upward expansion of the earnings cap toward $82,700 
means they are now covered at 33.3 per cent over earnings in the $54,900 to $82,700 range that 
were previously not covered at all. Because of this extra coverage, middle-to-high earners will 
eventually see a substantial increase in their CPP cheques—paid for by much heftier CPP 
premiums when they are working. (Milligan 2016). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
A review of the evidence reveals a consensus amongst most pension scholars that Canada is not 
experiencing a pension crisis.  Indeed, then pensions business CEO Bill Morneau (and now 
Finance Minister in the Trudeau Government), and his Chief Economist Fred Vettese in their 
book (Vettese and Morneau 2013) specifically debunked the idea of a pension crisis or a savings 
crisis in Canada based on the empirical data and the evidence. There is an emerging, belated 
recognition that elder poverty has been vastly reduced in Canada during the past 50 years 
subsequent to the Pearson Government pension reforms of the 1960s. 
 Moreover, there is an increasing recognition that the bottom quintiles in Canada 
experience a substantial increase in income upon retirement due to the combined impact of CPP, 
OAS and GIS, in contrast to the low incomes earned by the two bottom quintiles during their 
working years.  At the same time, there is an increasing recognition that most but not all 
Canadians near retirement are pension ready. Based on the foregoing empirical evidence and 
analysis, we can conclude that the CPP reform agreement of 2016 was not designed to help 
existing retirees nor those near retirement.  
 Due to the long phase in to 2025 and the requirement for benefits to be funded before 
being paid, the evidence suggests that the new CPP reforms were designed primarily to benefit 
millennials and Gen X people who will be retiring many years in the future.  Unfortunately, 
public debate mostly ignored the unprecedented intergenerational wealth transfer that will take 
place over the next 10 to 30 years as the parents of the boomers pass on followed by the 
boomers.   It has been estimated that in the next 5 to 10 years, $750 billion in assets will be 
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inherited by the boomers who possess very substantial wealth themselves that will in turn be 
passed to Gen X and millennials.  In the fullness of time, it may yet be realized that the CPP 
reforms were superfluous. However, the fundamental flaw in the CPP agreement of June 2016 
was to fail to follow the recommendation of the Quebec Finance Minister and target the reforms 
to exempt those in the bottom quintiles, who will experience higher CPP premiums deducted 
from their meagre incomes to receive benefits far in the future that will be partially clawed back 
from GIS received. For these reasons, the Canada Pension Plan remains a work in progress. 
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